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The liberalization of telecommunications and technological change have unbundled a vector of public interventions in this industry. Now different government levels interact. The economics of federalism shed light into this new landscape. The insights from this branch of research are used to analyze the European Union common telecommunications policy (as compared to the history of federal and state regulations in the US) and the role of local and regional powers in the promotion of broadband new generation networks. Decentralized non-specialized policies internalize policy externalities, whereas specialized centralized authority internalizes territorial spillovers. Preliminary empirical evidence shows that decentralization of policies inside member states is not detrimental for broadband investment in the European Union. ; La liberalización de las telecomunicaciones y los cambios tecnológicos han dado lugar a un nuevo vector desagregado de intervenciones públicas en este sector. Dado que en la regulación ahora participan distintos niveles de gobierno, el análisis económico del federalismo puede aportar ideas a este nuevo escenario. Las herramientas de este área de investigación son utilizadas en este trabajo para analizar la política común de telecomunicaciones de la Unión Europea (en comparación con la historia de las regulaciones federal y estatal en los Estados Unidos), así como también el papel de los poderes locales y regionales en la promoción de las redes de nueva generación. Las políticas no especializadas y descentralizadas intenalizan las externalidades que se producen en la interacción de políticas públicas, mientras que las autoridades especializadas y centralizadas internalizan los efectos desbordamiento entre territorios. Alguna evidencia empírica preliminar señala que la descentralización de las políticas dentro de los Estados miembros no perjudica a las inversiones en banda ancha en la UE.

L'atemptat terrorista a Madrid tres dies abans de les eleccions generals de març de 2004 sembla que capgirà els resultat esperats pels sondejos decantant la balança del PP cap al PSOE. Investigadors de la UAB han aprofitat l'oportunitat única que els brinda aquest fet per analitzar l'impacte d'aquelles eleccions generals en les grans empreses espanyoles utilitzant les tècniques d'estudi d'esdeveniments, que mesuren l'impacte dels esdeveniments sorpresa en el mercat de valors, i així posar a prova algunes hipòtesis políticoeconòmiques. La seva conclusió és que l'impacte d'un o altre partit governant a Espanya no provoca grans canvis en les polítiques econòmiques generals, sinó que canvia el valor dels acords entre els polítics i les empreses. ; El atentado terrorista en Madrid tres días antes de las elecciones generales de marzo de 2004 parece que invirtió los resultados esperados por los sondeos decantando la balanza del PP hacia el PSOE. Investigadores de la UAB han aprovechado la oportunidad única que les brinda este hecho para analizar el impacto de aquellas elecciones generales en las grandes empresas españolas utilizando las técnicas del estudio de eventos, que miden el impacto de los eventos sorpresa en el mercado de valores, y así poner a prueba algunas hipótesis político-económicas. Su conclusión es que el impacto de uno u otro partido gobernante en España no provoca grandes cambios en las políticas económicas generales, sino cambia que el valor de los acuerdos entre los políticos y las empresas. ; The terrorist attack in Madrid three days before the general election of March 2004 seemed to be the cause of the unexpected election results, overturning all predictions and tipping the balance from PP to PSOE. UAB researchers have taken the opportunity this event presents to analyse the impact the 2004 election had on large Spanish firms. To do this, they used event study techniques, which measure the impact of surprise events on the stock market, and tested a series of politico- economic hypotheses. Their conclusion is that the impact produced by either of the ruling parties in Spain does not cause large changes in general economic policies. Instead, what changes is the value of agreements between politicians and firms.

This article starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to Network industries. Some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities and multiple objectives) are then added and used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and specialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architecture of regulation expand.

Defence date: 8 December 2000 ; Examining Board: Vicente Salas (Chairman, University of Zaragoza) Ramón Marimón, (Ministry of Science and Technoclogy, Madrid / EUI, Co-supervisor) James Dow, (London Business School, Supervisor) Paul Grout (University of Bristol) ; First made available online 12 February 2019 ; The examining board indicated in the PDF and on the print version of the thesis ( Prof. Roger Farmer, UCLA and EUI ; Prof. Itzhak Gilboa, Tel Aviv University ; Prof. Alan Kirman, GREQAM. Marseille, Supervisor ; Prof. Avner Shaked, University of Bonn) are wrongly indicated ; The academic literature has developed a number of "standard prescriptions" for the privatization and regulation of utilities. The main purpose of this thesis is to qualify some of them, and build on the qualifications to find new insights. Although these prescriptions have not been endorsed universally, they permeate most of the theoretical and empirical work done in the recent past. In general, they constitute a benchmark that has enriched our understanding of the many economic issues related to the role and performance of privatized, regulated firms. These standard prescriptions are broadly based on the British experience and some specific strands of economic theory. By and large, progress has been made in reforming countries using these standard prescriptions. But the British experience can today be complemented with the experience of other countries, and with new developments in several fields of economic theory. The evolution itself of the British privatized industries, interacting with the evolution of the political cycle in the U.K., also helps to give a more balanced and complex view of this field. ; 1. Introduction 2. Regulating utilities with political constraints 3. The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities 4. The takeover of Enersis by Endesa : the control of privatized utilities

In the last days of the electoral campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, on Thursday March 11th 2004, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 persons in commuting trains in the capital Madrid. Four days later, the opposition party won the election, against all predictions that were made prior to the terror attacks. This change in expectations presents a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques to test some politico-economic hypotheses. The quantitative exercise is carried out employing Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Hypothesis testing is improved by means of bootstrapping techniques. Convergence theories prove quite resilient as, jointly, quoted firms were not significantly affected by the election outcome. The impact on politically connected companies and particular economic sectors, however, suggest that a combination of capture and agency problems may play a role in explaining the effects of the change in expectations.

In the last days of the electoral campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, on Thursday March 11th 2004, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 persons in commuting trains in the capital Madrid. Four days later, the opposition party won the election, against all predictions that were made prior to the terror attacks. This change in expectations presents a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques to test some politico-economic hypotheses. The quantitative exercise is carried out employing Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Hypothesis testing is improved by means of bootstrapping techniques. Convergence theories prove quite resilient as, jointly, quoted firms were not significantly affected by the election outcome. The impact on politically connected companies and particular economic sectors, however, suggest that a combination of capture and agency problems may play a role in explaining the effects of the change in expectations.

We analyse the impact of regulation, industrial policy and jurisdictional allocation on broadband deployment using a theoretical model and an empirical estimation. Although central powers may be more focused and internalize interjurisdictional externalities, decentralized powers may internalize local horizontal policy spillovers and use a diversity of objectives as a commitment device in the presence of sunk investments. The latter may, for instance, alleviate the collective action problem of the joint use of rights of way and other physical infrastructures. In the empirical exercise, using data for OECD and EU countries for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether centralization promotes new telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. The existint literature, in the main, claims it does, but we find no support for this claim in our data. Our results show that indicators of national industrial policy are a weakly positive determinant of broadband deployment and that different measures of centralization are either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband penetration.

In the last days of the electoral campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, on Thursday March 11th 2004, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 persons in commuting trains in the capital Madrid. Four days later, the opposition party won the election, against all predictions that were made prior to the terror attacks. This change in expectations presents a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques to test some politico-economic hypotheses. The quantitative exercise is carried out employing Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Hypothesis testing is improved by means of bootstrapping techniques. Convergence theories prove quite resilient as, jointly, quoted firms were not significantly affected by the election outcome. The results on the impact on particular companies and industries, however, suggest that a combination of capture and agency problems may play a role in explaining the effects of the change in expectations.

This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies and the independence of regulators for a cross section of countries. These indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. We find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. We also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behavior of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when we take into account the endogeneity of regulatory independence.

El libro de César Molinas es un trabajo ambicioso. Tiene tres partes: una de prospectiva global, una de diagnóstico de la situación de España y otra de propuestas sobre cómo solucionar sus principales problemas. Respecto a la primera parte, la más extensa, Molinas avala la hipótesis del fin de la Historia, pronosticando el carácter irreversible de la globalización y la democracia liberal, así como la posibilidad de que se alcance nada menos que la inmortalidad humana.

We review the related academic literature and the international evidence on the institutions of regulation and competition policy, to analyze the creation in 2013 of the new macro regulator in Spain, the CNMC. The institutional reform merged the competition policy authority with virtually all sector regulators with the exception of the financial regulator. The aim of the paper is to assess the extent to which the Spanish reform follows international best practices as well as how it fits within the analysis found in the academic literature. Although there is not a universally superior approach, neither in practice nor in theory, important shortcomings remain with the model that was finally adopted in Spain. Some institutional diversity would facilitate an optimal level of regulatory independence and governmental coordination for each sector, and ultimately achieving better results in terms of consumer welfare.

We empirically estimate the effects of regulated access prices and firms'multinational status on firm performance by using firm, corporate group, and country level information for the European broadband market between 2002 and 2010. Three measures of firm performance are used, namely: market share, turnover and productivity. Special attention is paid to differences in the impact on the performance measures depending on a firm's position as either a market incumbent or entrant. We find that while access prices have a negative effect on entrants' market share and turnover, the effect on incumbents'market share, turnover and productivity is positive. Further, we find that multinational entrants perform better than national entrants in terms of their market share but worse in terms of their turnover and productivity. The opposite is true of incumbent multinationals which perform better than nationals in terms of their turnover and productivity but worse in terms of their market share. This confirms that a firm's multinational status has a significant impact on its performance, and that this impact differs for incumbents and entrants. Finally, when evaluating the impact of access prices on firm performance at the mean performance of national and multinational firms, we find that the impact of access prices is lower for multinational than for national firms.

PPPs are complex, long-duration contractual structures with higher transaction and financing costs than conventional procedures. Furthermore, governments that decide to use this type of tool must be trained properly [in their structuring, use and execution]. This need for training can be even more recurrent in regional or local governments, where sometimes, the design of the allocation of resources is insufficient for managing this type of contract and do not have sufficient guarantees to ensure that projects can be sustained.With the aim of improving the technical capacities of regional and local governments, which generally have less resources than national governments, CAF—Development Bank of Latin America—drafted this technical guide with the objective of proposing some basic concepts for a better understanding about what a PPP is and what it is not, like how to evaluate the use of the PPP model with respect to other possible formulas and how to tackle the structuring process of a typical contract. This analysis was carried out with urban projects in mind, generally with a high social component, where the economic return without public funds is not always viable.