Suchergebnisse

This article examines the implications of Japan's strategic partnerships with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-countries on its foreign aid policy. Although there were previous attempts at aligning the broad goals of Japan's aid policy with security and defence objectives, it argues that these partnerships have increasingly led to the emergence of a securitized aid. This is because strategic partnership, as a new form of security practice in the Asia-Pacific, extends the scope of Japan's regional cooperation to the fields of defence and security. The overall extent of Japan's aid securitization is still minimal but prominent in terms of the aid discourse, pattern of allotments or choice of recipients and institutional structures. Despite the adoption of new development cooperation charter in 2015, the use of Japan's ODA is still confined to non-military use which limits Tokyo's desire to deepen its security cooperation with ASEAN partner-countries.

The Joint Statements and declarations on the establishment, promotion, and strengthening of strategic partnership by the leaders of Japan and the Philippines since 2011 indicate an ardent desire toward making security and defense cooperation a salient feature of their 21st century bilateral relationship. Scholars would point to the "China factor" as a convenient reason to explain the strategic trajectory of this evolving relationship. While this study does not discount the "China factor" as a motivating force behind this change, it asserts that both nations were able to extend their partnership into the security realm because of some enabling domestic factors. Nonetheless, a Duterte Presidency may seriously derail this effort.

Why is Chinese aid attractive to some recipient countries and controversial in others? This study advances the idea that Chinese aid is more attractive in countries that lack or have weak Development Assistance Committee-based aid institutions. When there is a mismatch between a non-DAC donor and a recipient country's aid regimes, legal and political problems may arise, as the case of Chinese aid to the Philippines in the 2000s demonstrates. As a recipient country, the Philippines is more accustomed to DAC-based rules and practices governing development aid processes, while as a donor country, China's aid institutions evolved outside the DAC club. The controversies that subsequently arose from institutional mismatch created a public perception that Chinese aid was illegal and prone to corruption, undermining China's aid objectives. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

The article examines the recent changes in Japan's official development assistance (ODA) to Southeast Asia in response to domestic and international challenges after the cold war. It argues that Japan is in a position where it has to choose between "spending" and "earning" strategies in the disbursement of aid. Influenced by external and internal developments, Japan has tilted toward a "spending" approach over the last decade. Due to a limited ODA budget, Japan has to optimize the use of aid and disburse it more strategically. Also significant is the noticeable across-the-board increase in the grant allocation to Southeast Asia and Vietnam's emergence as a major recipient. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

The paper is a theoretical discourse on policy shift, defined as the turning point or threshold by which policymaking agents abandon old policy preferences in favor of new ones. It contends that policy shift is contingent upon two factors: (1) the nature of elite interests, and (2) exogenous pressures like world prices and economic crises. The dismantling of cohesive elite interests is essential before policy shift could take place. Exogenous pressures can help achieve this by altering the settings which define these interests.
Specifically, the paper examines the liberalization of trade and investment in the Philippines as an episode of policy shift. In the 1980s, the sudden reversal of international prices of agricultural products forced many agrarian elites to abandon agriculture and shift to other more lucrative business ventures like services and manufacturing. In the process, they explored new areas of interest and formulated corresponding sets of policy preferences. Against this backdrop and under a new constitution, former President Fidel V. Ramos and his successors pursued liberalization. The trend toward further economic liberalization became irreversible due to the country's commitment to international agreements such as the World Trade Organization, ASEAN Free Trade Area, ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement and the proposed Philippines-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.

AbstractIn this article, we have examined how Japan has supported ASEAN's economic integration through ODA and other diplomatic measures, and showed how Japan's engagements in ASEAN economic integration evolved over time. In addressing these issues, we took into account the growing influence of China's ascent in Southeast Asia, and assumed that Japan's China policy of mixed 'accommodation and balance' became explicit in Japan's ASEAN policy. The pronouncement of support for ASEAN integration, disbursement of aid to the region, forging of bilateral and regional FTAs/EPAs with ASEAN, and its recent initiatives and proactive involvement in the Mekong regional development are indicative of Japan's reactive posture on China's growing influence in the region. Japanese diplomatic initiatives in ASEAN are intended, in part, to accommodate and balance China's increasing prominence in Southeast Asia. This explains the simultaneous existence of competitive and cooperative initiatives of the two countries with ASEAN.