Suchergebnisse

Preface; One / An Introduction; Two / From the Ideology of the Township to the Gospel of Germs; Three / The Constitutional Foundations of Health and Prosperity; Four / The Pox of Liberty; Five / The Palliative Effects of Property Rights; Six / Empire, Federalism, and the Surprising Fall of Yellow Fever; Seven / Concluding Remarks; Notes; Index.

"Between 1810 and 1939, real per capita spending on patent medicines grew by a factor of 114; real per capita GDP by a factor of 5. The long-term growth and survival this industry is puzzling when juxtaposed with standard historical accounts, which typically portray patent medicines as quack medicines. This paper argues that patent medicines were distinguished from other products by an unusually low elasticity of demand with respect to product failure. While consumers in other markets stopped searching for a viable product after a few failed attempts, consumers of patent medicines kept trying different products, irrespective of the number of failed medicines they observed. The market expanded as the stock of people buying potential cures accumulated over time. Because no one was ever cured and consumers possessed a highly inelastic demand with respect to product failures, demand was unrelenting. In short, patent medicines flourished not despite their dubious medicinal qualities, but because of them. There is also evidence that genuine medical advances, such as the rise of the germ theory of disease and new therapeutic interventions, helped expand the market for quack medicines"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the effect of public water and sewer systems on African American life expectancy in the Jim Crow era.Why, at the peak of the Jim Crow era early in the twentieth century, did life expectancy for African Americans rise dramatically? And why, when public officials were denying African Americans access to many other public services, did public water and sewer service for African Americans improve and expand? Using the qualitative and quantitative tools of demography, economics, geography, history, law, and medicine, Werner Troesken shows that the answers to these questions are closely connected. Arguing that in this case, racism led public officials not to deny services but to improve them--the only way to "protect" white neighborhoods against waste from black neighborhoods was to install water and sewer systems in both--Troesken shows that when cities and towns had working water and sewer systems, typhoid and other waterborne diseases were virtually eradicated. This contributed to the great improvements in life expectancy (both in absolute terms and relative to whites) among urban blacks between 1900 and 1940. Citing recent demographic and medical research findings that early exposure to typhoid increases the probability of heart problems later in life, Troesken argues that building water and sewer systems not only reduced waterborne disease rates, it also improved overall health and reduced mortality from other diseases. Troesken draws on many independent sources of evidence, including data from the Negro Mortality Project, econometric analysis of waterborne disease rates in blacks and whites, analysis of case law on discrimination in the provision of municipal services, and maps showing the location of black and white households. He argues that all evidence points to one conclusion: that there was much less discrimination in the provision of public water and sewer systems than would seem likely in the era of Jim Crow.

Progressive-Era reformers claimed typhoid, a waterborne disease, was more prevalent in cities with private water companies than in cities with public water companies. This article tests this claim for the 1880 to 1920 period. The evidence suggests private companies invested in water filters more often than public companies, and that switching from private to public provision of water did little to improve typhoid rates.

Few systematic studies of the effects of patronage on public-sector employees' wages and working conditions exist. Exploiting a sample of nearly 90,000 workers, this article provides systematic evidence: Where patronage was widespread, state and local employees earned 40 percent more per hour; worked 16 to 17 percent fewer hours; and earned 22 percent more per week than comparable private-sector workers. Public-sector wage premia varied; low-skilled workers, and workers in Baltimore and New York, enjoyed relatively large wage premia. Wages were less dispersed in the public sector than in the private, suggesting that pay scales reflected politics, not marginal products.