Where Greece controls foreign policy under the new Tsipras government? The criticism of Greece on the further intensification of EU economic sanctions against Russia in the context of Ukraine crisis raises the question of whether Greece intends to leave 'the West'. The author denies this and refers to the geopolitical importance of the country in the eastern Mediterranean. Adapted from the source document.
In: The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Series on European and International Affairs; Turkey's Accession to the European Union, S. 107-120
This article deals with the first regional security institution ever established in the southeastern part of Europe. The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to discuss the origins, structure and mission of the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE); second, to investigate the reasons for MPFSEE inactivity, i.e., why the MPFSEE has so far not been involved in peace operations in the region; and third, to examine whether the MPFSEE is still capable of contributing to the furtherance of peace in southeastern Europe.
The article analyses Greece's traditional quest for providers of security against the Turkish threat by highlighting the gap between Greece's misguided expectations of turning both the Atlantic Alliance and the developing European defense project into providers of security and real-life cases indicating the inability of those security institutions to meet Greece's expectations. For Greek security analysts and decisionmakers, a series of events has provided ample proof that neither NATO nor the EU can provide Greece with security guarantees. More recently, another series of developments, mostly related to the evolving European security and defense project, was enough to draw Greece into a state of continuous vacillation between widening and bridging the `expectations-reality gap' described above. Following the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki, Greece initiated a long-term policy of removing the Turkish threat altogether. In the long run, this policy appears as the only sound alternative to Greece's longstanding search for security bulwarks, but in the short run Greece should realize the limits of the EU's involvement in its defense policies.
AbstractThe article discusses the parameters conditioning the chair's effectiveness in international multilateral negotiations. Building on existing accounts of Presidential functions, an analytical typology of these parameters is provided, elaborating on the direction and magnitude of their impact. Conditioning parameters are clustered into three categories: the broader international environment in which the chair operates and the issues with which (s)he is called to deal; organization-specific features of an institutional and political nature; and the chair's personal skills and country-of-origin attributes. The potential for effect of these parameters is illustrated by reference to the chairmanship of the UN Security Council (SC). The origins, institutional features and main tasks of the Council are discussed, as well as the role of its chair as an agenda manager and broker. It is argued that the SC President's role well exceeds the formal tasks that are stipulated in the Rules of Procedure. Although mainly procedural in nature, these tasks may have important political implications, stressing the informal component of Presidential intervention. The conditioning parameters identified have a catalytic impact upon and account for the great variance in SC chair performance and the effectiveness of the chair's intervention.
The article discusses the parameters conditioning the chair's effectiveness in international multilateral negotiations. Building on existing accounts of Presidential functions, an analytical typology of these parameters is provided, elaborating on the direction and magnitude of their impact. Conditioning parameters are clustered into three categories: the broader international environment in which the chair operates and the issues with which (s)he is called to deal; organization-specific features of an institutional and political nature; and the chair's personal skills and country-of-origin attributes. The potential for effect of these parameters is illustrated by reference to the chairmanship of the UN Security Council (SC). The origins, institutional features and main tasks of the Council are discussed, as well as the role of its chair as an agenda manager and broker. It is argued that the SC President's role well exceeds the formal tasks that are stipulated in the Rules of Procedure. Although mainly procedural in nature, these tasks may have important political implications, stressing the informal component of Presidential intervention. The conditioning parameters identified have a catalytic impact upon and account for the great variance in SC chair performance and the effectiveness of the chair's intervention. Adapted from the source document.