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Abstract
How is authority legitimated when global policy leads to the delegation of implementation and monitoring tasks to private actors? This paper shows that putting private actors at the forefront of compliance gives them significant interpretation autonomy, with knock-on effects for how rule-making authority is legitimated. I show that actors can mobilize to claim expertise based on their practice in, and input to, transnational administration and that professional associations are important arenas for establishing and legitimating these claims. The paper explores these dynamics through an empirical focus on the global anti-money laundering regime. Revolving around the Financial Action Task Force, the regime to tackle illicit finance has been a highly political process with a global reach. Yet it relies heavily on financial institutions to put systems in place that control the flow of money. This puts private compliance officers at the forefront of transnational administration. The paper shows that compliance officers have responded to the demands of this role by professionally organizing. Focusing on the largest professional association, the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists or ACAMS, a US-based association with a global program and membership, the paper explains that professionalization mechanisms have helped demarcate practice boundaries and support the expertise claims of private sector employees. By becoming the experts, these officers can claim pragmatic authority over what global policy rules and standards mean and how they can be implemented.

AbstractEfforts to combat global money laundering have established a transnational administrative regime that provides peer review mutual evaluations that are coordinated among national public administrations. Led by the Financial Action Task Force, this regime encourages compliance with anti‐money laundering (AML) standards to detect "effectiveness" in administrative capacity despite an absence of reliable data on money laundering activity. This article examines how national administrations engage different types of consultants in the preparation of mutual evaluations. I distinguish between the use of bespoke consultants who actively interpret effectiveness by wealthier countries, and "box‐ticking" consultants from global professional service firms which developing countries are more reliant on. As such, the transnational administration of AML governance and its links to consultants reflects and reinforces global power asymmetries. Wealthy countries can positively use consultants to manage their policy horizons, while developing countries are left with short‐term compliance that is not aimed at building administrative capacity.

What happens to remittances, an important feature of the global financial system, when a pandemic strikes? Despite early predictions of significant drops in volumes, flows have been affected less than expected. This commentary explains that this outcome is attributable in part to a renewed focus on the infrastructure of global finance and an accelerated development and use of digital solutions, but that it is mostly a result of the individual efforts and resilience of migrants.

Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These 'transnational veto players' frame and delimit policy options. The concept of 'transnational veto players' is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed 'too big to fail'. Actors debating and developing policy on 'too big to fail' may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The 'too big to fail' case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players. Adapted from the source document.

An essay in a special journal section on 'Fields of Global Governance: How Transnational Power Elites Can Make Global Governance Intelligible'. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThough the list of reforms following the onset of the financial crisis is long, we should resist the temptation to view the emerging regulatory framework in terms of a paradigm shift. Many key features of the system, including the privileged position of financial institutions, remain unchanged. This is not merely due to obstruction or capacity shortcomings but can be explained by considering the sources of ideas and the governance setting. Ideas and policy programmes for reform were generated by a policy community also responsible for shaping the pre‐crisis governance framework. Moreover, the ideas and preferences of these players are moulded by their transnational interactions and the club‐like mechanisms in place for determining what (and who) is to be included in discussions. These settings have produced policy programmes that helped address the immediate, 'fast‐burning' elements of the crisis, but have so far failed to put together a comprehensive reform programme.

Research Highlights and Abstract Concepts from domestic and comparative politics can be applied in a transnational context; the article develops the notion of 'transnational veto players'to explain the practice of financial reform. Understanding the nature of constituency in a transnational context is important for explanations of actor preferences and the mode of policy that ensues. While actors involved in global standard-setting in finance have formal defined constituencies, when operating in a transnational setting their interactions render their constituencies diffuse, including peers and other interlocutors. In transnational settings, actors act as veto players by defining and delimiting the pool of ideas available for reform. 'Too big to fail' has been highlighted as an important target for reform but the resulting changes in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions do not alter their core functions. Policy processes in transnational settings are shaped by actors whose approval and consent are required for reform to take place. These 'transnational veto players'frame and delimit policy options. The concept of 'transnational veto players' is developed through an empirical analysis of global reforms in the regulatory treatment of large financial institutions deemed 'too big to fail'. Actors debating and developing policy on 'too big to fail' may have formal defined constituencies, as regulators, academics or lobbying organisations, but in their transnational interactions they are also informed by a diffuse constituency of peers through their multiple associations within policy communities. These interactions determine which policy ideas are permissible and how they are adopted. The 'too big to fail' case shows how reform activity to curtail the risks posed by large financial institutions may also inadvertently strengthen their position as transnational veto players.

Abstract'Revolving doors' is a well‐suspected phenomenon of skills and knowledge transfer between the private and public sectors. It is thought to be especially notable among elites in transnational policy networks, where mobility can accrue status. In this article, we investigate revolving doors in the area of international financial governance. We target policymakers linked to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Monetary Fund's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). We test for revolving doors by examining the career histories of those working with the BCBS on the development of the Basel II accord, and staff on policy teams for financial systems monitoring via FSAP missions. Using sequence analysis, we trace career histories between 1971 and 2011 to observe the extent of revolving doors. Revolving doors are observed in club‐like elite policy communities but are less prevalent in policy teams in intergovernmental organizations. We find that revolving doors are important in establishing intellectual capture in how an issue is treated within transnational policy networks.