Suchergebnisse

This study analyses the intricate relationship between sanction-based accountability and bureaucratic shirking. Drawing on an original survey conducted among Chinese civil servants, it addresses the question of whether sanction-based accountability can effectively regulate the conduct of public officials and provide a cure for bureaucratic shirking. The study identifies the characteristics of shirking behaviour in the Chinese bureaucracy and distinguishes three major patterns: evading responsibility, shifting responsibility and reframing responsibility. The findings indicate that sanction-based accountability may contain some obvious and notorious slacking types of behaviour, such as stalling and inaction, but government officials may distort or reframe their responsibilities to cope with accountability pressure. Empirical evidence suggests that owing to some "strategic" adjustments in bureaucratic behaviour, flagrant shirking is replaced by more subtle ways of blame avoidance, such as playing it safe or fabricating performance information. Sanction-based accountability therefore does not offer a panacea for bureaucratic shirking. (China Q / GIGA)

AbstractThis study analyses the intricate relationship between sanction-based accountability and bureaucratic shirking. Drawing on an original survey conducted among Chinese civil servants, it addresses the question of whether sanction-based accountability can effectively regulate the conduct of public officials and provide a cure for bureaucratic shirking. The study identifies the characteristics of shirking behaviour in the Chinese bureaucracy and distinguishes three major patterns: evading responsibility, shifting responsibility and reframing responsibility. The findings indicate that sanction-based accountability may contain some obvious and notorious slacking types of behaviour, such as stalling and inaction, but government officials may distort or reframe their responsibilities to cope with accountability pressure. Empirical evidence suggests that owing to some "strategic" adjustments in bureaucratic behaviour, flagrant shirking is replaced by more subtle ways of blame avoidance, such as playing it safe or fabricating performance information. Sanction-based accountability therefore does not offer a panacea for bureaucratic shirking.

This study investigates the intricate interplay between citizens' trust in government institutions and their perceptions of institutional effectiveness. The two may have an endogenous relationship as they influence each other. Yet, since they stem from different sources and have distinct dynamics, their relationship may exhibit a directional bias in terms of causality: citizens' trust may impact the perception of institutional effectiveness more than vice versa. As the survey results from Hong Kong suggest here, this may indicate that trust is not only performance-based but also character-based, with the latter lasting longer and exerting a greater impact on perceptions of institutional performance.

Abstract
The importance of NGO s' participation in poverty alleviation has not only been well documented by extensive studies but also confirmed by rich experience both at the international and national levels. In China, the government officially opened its resources to NGO s in combating poverty in 2005, and NGO s are expected to work as important participants in China's accurate poverty alleviation project, which is the largest anti-poverty campaign launched by the central government since the foundation of PRC. However, empirical data in the paper shows that NGO s' participation in this ambitious project is at best very limited. Drawing from more than 30 interviews and some other sources of data, this paper argues that it is the nature of poverty alleviation in China, which can be defined as political task, that should account for the NGO's limited participation. To be more specific, the excessive workload assumed by the local government deprives officials' motivation to cooperate with NGO s, excluding NGO s out of the poverty alleviation project is also a rational behavior that can avoid risks for officials. Moreover, the over-supplied financial resource also makes the participation of NGO s unnecessary. This research adds more insights to the study on NGO s in China by arguing that the state-society interaction in China is still asymmetrical.

Does job satisfaction of street-level bureaucrats depend on intrinsic public service motivation (PSM) or extrinsic performance-contingent pay? Which factor exerts a more substantial impact on job satisfaction? Drawing on a data set of 220 frontline public service workers in Hong Kong, this study examines the nuanced relationship among PSM, performance-contingent pay, and job satisfaction. The findings show that both PSM and performance-contingent pay elevate the job satisfaction of street-level bureaucrats through a shared mediator-perceived job control. Furthermore, PSM, as an intrinsic motivator, exerts a stronger impact on job satisfaction than performance-contingent pay.