Suchergebnisse

Thailand's first wave of COVID-19 in March 2020 was triggered from boxing events and nightclubs in Bangkok, which spread to 68 provinces. The nation responded rapidly with strong public health and social measures on 26 March 2020. Contact tracing was performed by over 1000 surveillance and rapid response teams with support from 1.1 million village health volunteers to identify, isolate and quarantine cases. Thailand implemented social measures in April 2020 including a full-scale national lockdown, curfews and 14-day mandatory quarantine for international travellers. With a strong health system infrastructure, people's adherence to social measures and a whole-of-government approach, the first wave recorded only 3042 cases and 57 deaths with 1.46% case fatality rate. Economic activities were resumed on 1 May 2020 until the end of the year. On 17 December 2020, a second wave was carried by undocumented migrants who were not captured by the quarantine system. As the total lockdown earlier led to serious negative economic impact, the government employed a targeted strategy, locking down specific areas and employing active case finding. Essential resources including case finding teams, clinicians and medicine were mobilised. With synergistic multisectoral efforts involving health, non-health and private sector, the outbreak was contained in February 2021. Total cases were seven times higher than the first wave, however, early admission and treatment resulted in 0.11% case fatality rate. In conclusion, experiences of responding to the first wave informed the second wave response with targeted locking down of affected localities and active case findings in affected sites.

Thailand's first wave of COVID-19 in March 2020 was triggered from boxing events and nightclubs in Bangkok, which spread to 68 provinces. The nation responded rapidly with strong public health and social measures on 26 March 2020. Contact tracing was performed by over 1000 surveillance and rapid response teams with support from 1.1 million village health volunteers to identify, isolate and quarantine cases. Thailand implemented social measures in April 2020 including a full-scale national lockdown, curfews and 14-day mandatory quarantine for international travellers. With a strong health system infrastructure, people's adherence to social measures and a whole-of-government approach, the first wave recorded only 3042 cases and 57 deaths with 1.46% case fatality rate. Economic activities were resumed on 1 May 2020 until the end of the year. On 17 December 2020, a second wave was carried by undocumented migrants who were not captured by the quarantine system. As the total lockdown earlier led to serious negative economic impact, the government employed a targeted strategy, locking down specific areas and employing active case finding. Essential resources including case finding teams, clinicians and medicine were mobilised. With synergistic multisectoral efforts involving health, non-health and private sector, the outbreak was contained in February 2021. Total cases were seven times higher than the first wave, however, early admission and treatment resulted in 0.11% case fatality rate. In conclusion, experiences of responding to the first wave informed the second wave response with targeted locking down of affected localities and active case findings in affected sites.

Health and education are interrelated, and it is for this reason that we studied the education of migrant children. The Thai Government has ratified 'rights' to education for all children in Thailand since 2005. However, there are gaps in knowledge concerning the implementation of education policy for migrants, such as whether and to what extent migrant children receive education services according to policy intentions. The objective of this study is to explore the implementation of education policy for migrants and the factors that determine education choices among them. A cross-sectional qualitative design was applied. The main data collection technique was in-depth interviews with 34 key informants. Thematic analysis with an intersectionality approach was used. Ranong province was selected as the main study site. Results found that Migrant Learning Centers (MLCs) were the preferable choice for most migrant children instead of Thai Public Schools (TPSs), even though MLCs were not recognized as formal education sites. The main reason for choosing MLCs was because MLCs provided a more culturally sensitive service. Teaching in MLCs was done in Myanmar's language and the MLCs offer a better chance to pursue higher education in Myanmar if migrants migrate back to their homeland. However, MLCs still face budget and human resources inadequacies. School health promotion was underserviced in MLCs compared to TPSs. Dental service was underserviced in most MLCs and TPSs. Implicit discrimination against migrant children was noted. The Thai Government should view MLCs as allies in expanding education coverage to all children in the Thai territory. A participatory public policy process that engages all stakeholders, including education officials, health care providers, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), MLCs' representatives, and migrants themselves is needed to improve the education standards of MLCs, keeping their culturally-sensitive strengths.

In mid-2021, Thailand faced a fourth wave of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) predominantly fueled by the Delta and Alpha variants. The number of cases and deaths rose exponentially, alongside a sharp increase in hospitalizations and intubated patients. The Thai Government then implemented a lockdown to mitigate the outbreak magnitude and prevent cases from overwhelming the healthcare system. This study aimed to model the severity of the outbreak over the following months by different levels of lockdown effectiveness. Secondary analysis was performed on data primarily obtained from the Ministry of Health; the data were analyzed using both the deterministic compartmental model and the system dynamics model. The model was calibrated against the number of daily cases in Greater Bangkok during June–July 2021. We then assessed the outcomes (daily cases, daily deaths, and intubated patients) according to hypothetical lockdowns of varying effectiveness and duration. The findings revealed that lockdown measures could reduce and delay the peak of COVID-19 cases and deaths. A two-month lockdown with 60% effectiveness in the reduction in reproduction number caused the lowest number of cases, deaths, and intubated patients, with a peak about one-fifth of the size of a no-lockdown peak. The two-month lockdown policy also delayed the peak until after December, while in the context of a one-month lockdown, cases peaked during the end of September to early December (depending on the varying degrees of lockdown effectiveness in the reduction in reproduction number). In other words, the implementation of a lockdown policy did not mean the end of the outbreak, but it helped delay the peak. In this sense, implementing a lockdown helped to buy time for the healthcare system to recover and better prepare for any future outbreaks. We recommend further studies that explore the impact of lockdown measures at a sub-provincial level, and examine the impact of lockdowns on parameters not directly related to the spread of disease, such ...

By 2016, Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) had developed and implemented national action plans on noncommunicable diseases in line with the Global action plan for the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases (2013-2020). In 2018, we assessed the implementation status of the recommended best-buy noncommunicable diseases interventions in seven Asian countries: Bhutan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam. We gathered data from a range of published reports and directly from health ministries. We included interventions that addressed the use of tobacco and alcohol, inadequate physical activity and high salt intake, as well as health-systems responses, and we identified gaps and proposed solutions. In 2018, progress was uneven across countries. Implementation gaps were largely due to inadequate funding; limited institutional capacity (despite designated noncommunicable diseases units); inadequate action across different sectors within and outside the health system; and a lack of standardized monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to inform policies. To address implementation gaps, governments need to invest more in effective interventions such as the WHO-recommended best-buy interventions, improve action across different sectors, and enhance capacity in monitoring and evaluation and in research. Learning from the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the WHO and international partners should develop a standardized, comprehensive monitoring tool on alcohol, salt and unhealthy food consumption, physical activity and health-systems response.