Westphalia in IR theories -- Perspectives on Chinese sovereignty -- Productions of one China in the East China Sea -- State-led sovereignty constructions in Taiwan -- Sovereignty constructions in China -- Public opinion and Taiwan's domestic sovereignty contests -- External actors -- Demise of the one China sovereignty project -- Politics of sovereignty constructions.
This article challenges the dominant narrative that overlooks the role of domestic factors in Taiwanese foreign aid in favour of politics cast at the cross-Strait and international levels. It examines the emergence and effects of partisan politics on Taipei's foreign aid policies, including aid budgets and the motivation for providing foreign aid. It argues that, rather than the cross-Strait conflict as such, it was contests and rivalries among Taiwan's political parties and government agencies - underpinned by ongoing projects of state building - that shaped the variable objectives, policies and processes of Taipei's foreign aid-giving. (Pac Rev/GIGA)
This article examines the China-Taiwan diplomatic truce through the prism of Taiwan's post-2009 participation in the World Health Organization (WHO). It argues that Taipei's inclusion in the International Health Regulations (IHR) and its observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA) did not signify a suspension of the cross-Strait dispute over Taipei's capacity to participate in international affairs independently of Beijing. While Taipei ostensibly sought a WHA observership to strengthen Taiwan's health security, it also wished to validate Taiwan's international legal sovereignty. Beijing, for its part, appeared to have compromised its claim over Taiwan's sovereignty by abandoning the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan in international organizations (IGOs), but in practice enforced its sovereign claim by denying Taiwan unrestricted access to activities of the WHO and other IGOs. Thus, China-Taiwan interaction on the WHO issue created a facade of cross-Strait diplomatic détente. The appearance of a cross-Strait truce benefited Beijing by demonstrating China's goodwill towards Taiwan and by highlighting the practical gains ensuing from cooperative cross-Strait relations. It also benefited Taipei by showcasing an improvement in Taiwan's standing in global affairs as a result of the governmental strategy. However, it did not end the China-Taiwan contestations of sovereignty, nor did it transform them into unambiguous friends. Instead, it turned them into 'frenemies': competitive and mistrustful, yet convinced that cooperation - however tenuous or illusory - advanced their (conflicting) objectives more than the bitter enmity of the past decades. (Pac Aff/GIGA)