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ABSTRACTThis article discusses the concept of integrity. Often, integrity is used as a characteristic of individuals showing a high fidelity to generally praised norms. Here, a more independent meaning is suggested so that the concept implies a clear distance to integration instead of mixing up the two concepts. Integrity implies integration within the individual of beliefs, statements, and action. To what degree can society and companies accommodate a pluralism created by individuals with integrity? Here, it is argued that integrity is a useful virtue and that a more integrity‐friendly environment in companies would be beneficial by stimulating the empowered employee to make improved contributions. The concept is central for business ethics and crucial for the company's choice of such policies. A priority of integrity also affects organizational theory and the practical organizing of the company. Integrity is also vital for society at large for both citizens and companies, providing an ideological support for pluralism and a check on demands for conformism. The article also discusses how a virtue such as integrity can function as guidance for the individual operating in a complex world.

This article discusses the present negative evaluation of stereotypes. Do people who use stereotypes believe that a characteristic attributed to a group is categorical; that all members of group A have this trait? Empirical research & ordinary observations indicate that judgments are not so crudely made, but that people categorize in terms of probabilities. Therefore the rule "one should not generalize" seems unjustified. Further, such a view often endorses a strategy of correcting old stereotypes with the promotion of new stereotypes. The main problem is often not the negative view of others, but the idolized or victimized picture of the own group. The way to improve group relations according to the presented analysis is to become more tolerant to skeptical views of the own group. Knowledge about the universal human propensity for in-group preferences & honest statistics about actual differences will be helpful in this process. Adapted from the source document.

"Zwischen der Marktwirtschaft und allgemeineren Werten europäischer Gesellschaften gibt es eine Reihe von Interdependenzen. In diesem Beitrag werden die Einflüsse sowohl theoretischer als auch praktischer Vorstellungen einer Moral des Marktes diskutiert. Eine der Einflussquellen für Werte ist der Altruismus, der von Religionen gefordert und von den meisten Philosophen geachtet wird. Es wird untersucht, ob diese Forderung positiv beurteilt werden kann. Es besteht die Gefahr der Trivialisierung der Ethik in 'public-relation'-Diskursen, welche Ethik lediglich auf eine Hilfsfunktion in Dilemmasituationen oder auf Verhaltensrestriktionen reduzieren. Häufig wird in solchen Diskursen ein agentenneutraler Universalismus vorgeschlagen, aber für Unternehmen, die normsetzend wirken wollen, ist eine partikularistischere Ethik von größerem Interesse. Eine angemessene Theorie hierfür fehlt noch weitestgehend und viele wichtige Fragen werden eher juristisch als ethisch behandelt. Es gibt daher gute Gründe für die Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, den Nutzen konventioneller Ethiken zu überdenken, da diese weniger ein Teil der Lösung denn ein Teil der Probleme in Bezug auf Wertfragen moderner Gesellschaften sein könnten." (Autorenreferat)

Abstract.  Indirect reciprocity, defined as a beneficial act whose return comes from someone other than the act's recipient, is a common phenomenon in human societies. However, it is a poorly analyzed phenomenon with respect to payoffs. Are the expectations of return realistic, or not? Are these expectations pro‐social attitudes, or illusions induced through manipulation? I discuss four categories of putative indirect reciprocity, two of which pertain to interaction between individuals and two of which involve social systems. The conclusion is that two of these categories, reciprocal reputation and institutionalized reciprocity, are strongly linked to reciprocity, whereas the other two categories, generous reputation and metaphysical reward, are likely to involve only an element of illusionary reciprocity and a substantial degree of altruism.

We have read the commentaries with great interest. They vary greatly regarding the possibility of achieving a general model for separatist conflict solution, and there are certainly both practical problems as well as difficult priorities of principles. Several issues are addressed by more than one commentator, so we chose a discussion by issue rather than by commentator.

If the prescriptive "ought" is separated from the factual "is," an intellectual analysis of the real world is by definition without normative value. The naturalistic fallacy thesis—maintaining that normative and descriptive spheres must remain separated—is often presented in a weak sense that seems reasonable. However, only in a strong sense—by strictly separating facts and values—are fallacy accusations supported. We claim that this naturalistic fallacy thesis is unsound and that normative statements instead should be based on rational understanding as found in the Darwinian and social sciences. The Cartesian compromise should be abandoned, since only naturalism can provide a cogent framework for better understanding and support ethics with a solid foundation. Many people nurture values based on tradition, whim, subgroup identification etc., and they demand respect for those values. However, we can demand respect for values only when they have a rational foundation. The common belief in the thesis of naturalistic fallacy is an anti-intellectual device that shields values from rational inquiry.

This article outlines a consistent and rational model for solving ethnic conflicts. We argue that ethnic separation should be regarded as an alternative to national unity, and not simply dismissed as impossible. A decision on separation or unity should be made democratically by the group whose separation has been proposed. If separation is approved, migration over the border between the newly formed states should be part of such a solution. The article has three main parts: (1) a model for solving separationist demands; (2) an analysis of the evolutionary background to ethnic conflicts; and (3) a discussion of principal objections to the proposed model. The present international impotence in situations of ethnic conflict is to a high degree caused by seeing most solutions as impossible—either realistically or morally. This article stresses the virtue of having one model instead of the "flexibility" that currently prevails under the disguise of generally acclaimed, but contradictory ideals.