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AbstractI develop a dynamic model of forward‐looking entrepreneurs, who decide whether to operate in the formal economy or informal economy and choose how much to invest in their businesses, taking government policy as given. The government has access to two policy tools: taxes on formal business activity and enforcement (or policing) discouraging informality. The main focus of the paper is on transitional dynamics under different initial wealth levels. Whether an initially small business will be trapped in the informal economy and remain small forever or grow quickly and become a large formal business depends on tax and enforcement policies. High tax rates accompanied by loose enforcement – which is mostly the case in less‐developed countries (LDCs) – induce tax avoidance, discourage investment in formal businesses, and drive the entrepreneurial activity towards the informal sector even though the initial wealth level is high. Lowering taxes on formal activity joined with strict enforcement can help reducing the magnitude of poverty traps in LDCs – such as the MENA region, Latin America and developing Asia.

The Syrian Conflict generated forced immigration from northern Syria to southeastern Turkey. Arrival of refugees resembles a natural experiment, which offers good opportunities to study the economic impact of immigration. I study three main outcomes: labor markets, consumer prices, and housing rents. I document moderate employment losses among native informal workers, which suggests that they are partly substituted by refugees. Prices of the items produced in informal labor intensive sectors declined due to labor cost advantages generated by refugee inflows. Finally, refugee inflows increased the rents of higher quality housing units, while there is no effect on lower quality units.

I develop a dynamic model of forward-looking entrepreneurs, who decide whether to operate in the formal economy or informal economy and choose how much to invest in their businesses, taking government policy as given. The government has access to two policy tools: taxes on formal business activity and enforcement (or policing) discouraging informality. The main focus of the paper is on transitional dynamics under different initial wealth levels. Whether an initially small business will be trapped in the informal economy and remain small forever or grow quickly and become a large formal business depends on tax and enforcement policies. High tax rates accompanied by loose enforcement – which is mostly the case in less-developed countries (LDCs) – induce tax avoidance, discourage investment in formal businesses, and drive the entrepreneurial activity toward the informal sector even though the initial wealth level is high. Lowering taxes on formal activity joined with strict enforcement can help reducing the magnitude of poverty traps in LDCs.

This paper develops a model of sequential job search to understand the factors determining the effect of tax and enforcement policies on the size (i.e., employment share) of the informal sector. The focus is on the role of informal sector as a stepping stone to formal jobs. I argue that the stepping-stone role of informal jobs is an important concept determining how strongly government policies affect the size of informal sector. I measure the extent of the stepping-stone role with the intensity of skill accumulation in the informal sector. If informal jobs help workers acquire skills, gain expertise, and build professional networks for boosting the chances to switch to a formal job, then the size of the informal sector is less sensitive to government policy. In this case, the option value of a job in the informal sector will be high and a worker with an informal job will not rush to switch to a formal job when a policy encouraging formal employment is in effect. If, on the other hand, the informal sector does not provide satisfactory training opportunities, then the size of the informal sector becomes more sensitive to government policy. Calibrating the model to the Brazilian data, I perform numerical exercises confirming that the effect of government policy on the size of the informal sector is a decreasing function of the intensity of skill acquisition in the informal sector.

1970s witnessed violent, widespread, and highly-politicized student protests in Turkey. Small protests turned into bloody street clashes, the death toll exceeded 5,000, and a military coup came in - which resulted in mass arrests. Universities were at the center of the conflict and violence. We present a comprehensive empirical analysis of the education and labor market consequences of this political turmoil on cohorts directly exposed to educational disruptions. First, we document that the number of new admissions and graduates in post-secondary education declined significantly due to the turmoil. We report the decline in post-secondary graduation ratio to be around 6.6-7 percentage points for the exposed individuals. Second, we estimate a counterfactual wage distribution for the exposed cohorts using semi-parametric methods and check whether the turmoil affected the wage and occupation distributions. We find that the decline in educational attainment due to the turmoil pushed the exposed population toward medium- and low-income occupations, and compressed their wages toward the minimum wage. Finally, we use the unexpected decline in educational attainment as an IV to estimate returns to schooling. Our IV estimates suggest that the returns to an additional year of schooling range between 11.6-14 percent for men. In a heterogeneous-outcome framework, these IV estimates can be interpreted as the average causal effect of an additional year of schooling in post-secondary education.