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Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action
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How To De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India
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Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers
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Working paper
Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules
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Working paper
Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets
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Working paper
Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India
In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 5, S. 210-213
ISSN: 1944-7981
We provide a real-life application of a large scale affirmative action policy in school choice in the context of engineering school admissions in India where students not only care about what program they are matched to but also what type of seat category they are admitted under. We explain the market and the mechanism currently in use. Two significant shortcomings of the current mechanism are explained. The affirmative action policy in use leaves many seats vacant even though there are students who would take these seats. We provide the insight of a potential matching-theoretical solution to these problems.
On Relationships between Substitutes Conditions
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Working paper
Assignment Maximization
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