Suchergebnisse

PETER LAMBERT AND ANDREW NICKSON (EDS.): The Paraguay Reader: History, Culture, Politics. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013.

2013 was notable for the national electoral campaigns, followed by the April elections, the beginning of a new legislative period in July, and the establishment of the new administration under President Horacio Cartes of the Colorado Party. The return to power after five years by the Colorado Party put an end to the novel but failed and defeated government of the opposition parties. Paraguayan political institutions appear largely unchanged since 2008, when the Colorados left power, and the party itself remains a collection of factions fighting for control of state resources. Change in the political culture since 2008 however may make the gap between social demand and the capacity of the government to respond. This essay assesses whether the new government can adapt to the evolving political culture to more effectively address society's demands. Adapted from the source document.

Dr. Bruce M. Unger, professor of political science at Randolph-Macon
College, died of cancer at his home January 31, 2008. A native of
Brooklyn, and life-long Brooklyn Dodgers fan, Bruce
received his BA at Queens College in 1964, MA at Tulane University
in 1967, and Ph.D. at Tulane in 1973. He joined the faculty at
Randolph-Macon in 1968, and served 39 years on the faculty. He was
Charles J. Potts Professor of Social Sciences when he retired in
2007.

Este documento plantea preguntas de dos escuelas generales teóricas. Primero ¿es un Paraguay descentralizado un Paraguay más eficiente y democrático? Estas son declaraciones empíricas que pueden ser valoradas. Si fuera válido aquí, el caso de Paraguay ciertamente aumentaría la validez general de los reclamos hechos por la descentralización. Segundo, ¿suplanta la lógica política de la descentralización a la lógica de la dominación de la élite que el proyecto originalmente fue diseñado para realzar? Aquí me pregunto si las estructuras de incentivo para la competencia electoral local socavarían el deseo de las élites locales de desmovilizar fuerzas pluralistas, en cambio fomentarían la democratización de la participación debida a una alianza entre las élites locales y la sociedad civil local para aumentar los poderes del gobierno local (ver Graham 1992). Similarmente, ¿hallarán los partidos políticos altamente centralizados los incentivos electorales suficientemente convincentes como para construir organizaciones locales y utilizar solamente las bases locales de apoyo (Garman, Haggard, y Willis 1996)? ; Contenido Agradecimiento 3. Introducción 4. 1. Investigación y metodología 7. 2. Primeros pasos hacia la descentralización 8. 3. La Convención Constituyente 10. 4. Las elecciones y el establecimiento de las instituciones descentralizadas 13. 5. Gobierno departamental 16. 6. Relaciones con otras instituciones 18. 7. Análisis de la descentralización al nivel departamental 20. 7.1 Eficacia 20. 7.2 Democracia 23. Conclusiones 25. Apéndice: Resumen de la Encuesta de los Honorables Concejales de las Juntas Departamentales del Paraguay 26. Bibliografía 28.

Despite universal access entitlements to the public healthcare system in Ireland, over half the population is covered by voluntary private health insurance. The market operates on the basis of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover. A set of minimum benefits also exists, and two risk equalisation schemes have been put in place but neither was implemented. These schemes have proved highly controversial. To date, the debate has primarily consisted of qualitative arguments. This study adds a quantitative element by analysing a number of pertinent issues. A model of a community rated insurance market is developed, which shows that community rating can only be maintained in a competitive market if all insurers in the market have the same risk profile as the market overall. This has relevance to the Irish market in the aftermath of a Supreme Court decision to set aside risk equalisation. Two reasons why insurers' risk profiles might differ are adverse selection and risk selection. Evidence is found of the existence of both forms of selection in the Irish market. A move from single rate community rating to lifetime community rating in Australia had significant consequences for take-up rates and the age profile of the insured population. A similar move has been proposed in Ireland. It is found that, although this might improve the stability of community rating in the short term, it would not negate the need for risk equalisation. If community rating were to collapse then risk rating might result. A comparison of the Irish, Australian and UK health insurance markets suggests that community rating encourages higher take-up among older consumers than risk rating. Analysis of Irish hospital discharge figures suggests that this yields significant savings for the Irish public healthcare system. This thesis has implications for government policy towards private health insurance in Ireland.