Suchergebnisse

In December the Naval War College passed two significant milestones. One was the completion of the first course in Strategy under the new curriculum. The other was the dedication of our new auditorium, named in honor of Adm. Raymond A. Spruance. In the November-December issue of the Review, I outlined our plans for the new Strategy curriculum. This new course in centered on case studies of military history. The style of teaching was intended to put the onus on the student for digging out for himself the principles of strategy and the lessons inherent in these cases. Now that we have completed the first course, I thought you would be interested in seeing some of the results and in judging the program for yourselves.

The U.S. Navy's traditional missions are generally less relevant today than in recent decades, because of advances in technology and changes in the global environment. To meet the radically altered requirements now placed upon military forces, the Navy must transform itself, mission by mission. It is a tall order.

Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accustomed to phrases such as"sea power," "command" of the seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms "strategic deterrence," "sea control," and "presence" may seem to be just new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and missions. The primary purpose of this redefinition is to force the navy to think in terms of output rather than input.

In this issue the Naval War College Review commemorates the first anniversary of the return of our prisoners of war from North Vietnam. All of us in the military are honored to know these men, servicemen who have been asked to give more than any of us living today. I recommend, though, that we all take a cue from one of Rear Adm. Jim Stockdale's remarks in the lead article in this issue. The time has come to stop regarding these men as ex-POW's. Their interests and ours will be served best by welcoming them back to the ranks and not dwelling on the past.

Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accustomed to phrases such as "sea power," "command of the seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms, "Strategic Deterrence," "Sea Control," "Presence" may seem to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and mission s. The primary purpose of this redefinition is to force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input.

For the past 6 months, much of our attention has been devoted to the energy crisis. Some Americans have realized for the first time that seemingly boundless energy resources really do have limits, both physical and political. We have been reminded that even super­powers live in a small, interdependent world. As evidenced during the recent oil embargo, small and distant countries in that world have the means to disrupt and change our way of life.

On 24 August the college opened with a formal Convocation ceremony held on the lawn in front of Luce Hall. For this occasion those members of the faculty and staff who hold master's degrees or Ph.D. 's marched in their academic gowns and hoods. Those who were also military officers wore uniforms with the gowns. Thus, the Convocation was intended to signify the blending of military and academic endeavor and purpose in this War College.

Traces the evolution of US policy in the Middle East over the last 50 years to shed light on current & future directions. Post-WWII policy focused on relations with Saudi Arabia & Iran, & ensuring access to oil at a reasonable price, a goal that required political stability in the region. US foreign policy later moved toward an increased military role in the Middle East & more direct involvement in mediating between Israel & the Palestinians. The events of 11 September 2001 made Saudi Arabia's internal political structure a much greater concern; revealed that US support of Israel has been the basis of much of the anti-US sentiment driving terrorism; & introduced eliminating terrorism as a key objective of US policy. The potential for the Bush administration to use military force against other Middle East targets is examined, along with faltering efforts of the US in Afghanistan & Iraq; the current status of relations with Saudi Arabia; & President Bush's inclusion of the Palestinian intifada in his declared war on terrorism. J. Lindroth