Suchergebnisse

Die Rational-Choice-Theorie nimmt in vielerlei Hinsicht – etwa mit Blick auf ihre formalisierte Theoriearchitektur und ihre Fruchtbarkeit in der angewandten Sozialforschung – eine besondere Stellung in den Sozialwissenschaften ein. Zugleich wird der Ansatz gerade in der Soziologie häufig als grundlegend defizitär dargestellt und vor allem für sein implizites Menschenbild kritisiert. Diesem Band liegt das Ziel zugrunde, weitverbreitete Missverständnisse über die Rational-Choice-Theorie aufzuklären. Essentiell ist dabei der Gedanke, scharf zwischen dem zugrundeliegenden Formalismus und speziellen Anwendungen zu unterscheiden. Neben den methodologischen Grundlagen der Theorie und den Grundzügen des Formalismus werden insbesondere auch zentrale Anwendungsgebiete, etwa soziale Dilemmata, Vertrauen, kollektives Handeln und soziale Normen, behandelt. Schließlich wird auch auf die tatsächlichen Schwächen der Rational-Choice-Theorie und Möglichkeiten zu ihrer Fortentwicklung eingegangen

AbstractIt is explored if and to what extent two approaches in behavioral sciences, which are promising with respect to an evolutionary grounded, integrative action theory, are actually compatible. These two approaches are, on the one hand, evolutionary psychology, which conceptualizes human nature as a collection of evolved psychological mechanisms, each being functionally specialized with respect to a specific problem of adaptation. And on the other hand, the dual-process perspective, which holds that human behavior is driven by the interplay of two qualitatively distinct types of cognitive processes: Autonomous, fast, and associative Type 1 processes, which operate outside of the consciousness of the actor, on the one hand, and controlled, slow, and rule-based Type 2 processes of which the actor is aware. Notably, both of these approaches have descendants in modern sociological action theory, i.e., goal-framing theory (Lindenberg 2008, 2009) and the model of frame-selection (Esser 2001; Kroneberg 2011). It is argued that evolutionary psychology and the dual-process perspective are largely compatible, thereby giving rise to an evolutionary grounded, integrative action theory. Accordingly, Type 1 processes can be traced back to evolutionary old cognitive modules, which humans share with other species and which are highly efficient at solving specific problems of adaptation in a stable environment. In contrast, Type 2 processes of higher cognition are distinctly developed in humans and highly effective at dealing with a rapidly changing life space.

We provide experimental evidence on the theory of club goods. Subjects played what we call 'the club game' – that is, a two-stage game: at the first stage, each player announces her favourite club size. Depending on the profile of announced club sizes, each player either joins a club of her favourite size or stays alone. At the second stage, club members play some kind of non-linear public goods game exhibiting the property that certain club sizes favour cooperation, and hence the payoffs for the players. Among other hypotheses, the central idea of club theory can be tested this way: A population of actors should partition itself in clubs of optimal size. As it turns out, this hypothesis can be validated.

ZusammenfassungDas Gros der Wahlforschung und insbesondere der empirischen Forschung zur Frage, wie sich die Wahlabsicht für die Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) erklären lässt, berücksichtigt zwar den Einfluss kultureller Orientierungen, aber nur in Form expliziter Einstellungen, welche vermöge evaluativer Verbaläußerungen erhoben werden. In diesem Beitrag wird vor dem Hintergrund der Dual-Process-Perspektive argumentiert, dass neben expliziten Einstellungen auch implizite Einstellungen, welche assoziative Verknüpfungen von mental repräsentierten Einstellungsobjekten und ihrer Bewertung darstellen, für die Wahlabsicht der AfD von Bedeutung sind. Dem Prinzip der Katalysation nach schlagen sich implizite Einstellungen stärker in expliziten Einstellungen und auch im overten Verhalten nieder, wenn sich die Artikulation der expliziten Einstellungen oder das Verhalten im Rahmen eines eher intuitiven als reflektierten kognitiven Prozesses vollzieht. Diese handlungstheoretischen Ideen werden im Rahmen einer explorativen Studie mit 960 Befragten überprüft. Es zeigt sich, dass beide, implizite und explizite Einstellungen zum Populismus und zum Rassismus, die Wahlabsicht der AfD bedingen, wobei der Einfluss der impliziten Einstellungen, wie vom katalytischen Prinzip vorhergesagt, davon abhängt, ob die Befragten eher zu intuitiven oder aber eher zu reflektierten kognitiven Prozessen neigen.

Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question of whether and how social class and status affect prosocial behavior among status groups.We conducted dictator games in which both host-country citizens (high social status) as well as asylum seekers (low social status) make monetary donations towards their respective in- and out-groups. As a novelty, we varied the number of recipients in the dictator game (i.e. one, two or three recipients). Our results indicate that host-country citizens donate significantly more than asylum seekers and that asylum seekers receive significantly higher donations than host-country citizens. Donations vary only marginally with the number of recipients. These findings and answers to a follow-up questionnaire show that prosocial behavior among status groups, and in particular prosocial behavior from high-status towards low-status actors, might be instances of impure altruism, i.e., motivated by a warm glow of giving or a purchase of moral satisfaction.

Rationality in Social Science: Introduction -- From Pascal to Ellsberg: Paradoxes of Rationality Stimulate the Progress of Decision Theory -- Rationology, Rationality and Reason -- "Das Modell ist dafür nicht geeignet!" ("The Model is not Suitable for This!"): The Model of Frame Selection and a Corrective Replication of the Findings in the Fehr-Gächter Experiments on the Development of Cooperation in Public Good Situations -- Sociology in Times of Pandemic: Metatheoretical Considerations and the Example of the Covid-19 Crisis -- When Do People Follow the Behavior of Others? The Effects of Descriptive and Injunctive Norms, and the Werther Effect -- Revenge and Gratitude in Trust-Based Encounters. Experimental Evidence on Process-Based Reciprocity -- How More Severe Punishment Generates Less Norm Enforcement. Further Evidence of Paradoxical Effects of Norm Enforcement in Inspection Games -- Balancedness. Emerson's theory in the Upanishads, in Cooperative Game Theory, and beyond -- Endogenizing Conditions for Cooperation of Rational Egoists -- Opposing Effects of Objective and Subjective Social Status on Prosociality: Theory and Quasi-Experiment -- Green Homeowners? An Empirical Application of Fischel's Homevoter Hypothesis -- How can Employers Signal Trustworthiness to Job Seekers? Determinants of Employer Reputation.

Abstract
In previous research, both positive and negative relationships between social status and prosociality have been reported. We argue that the nature of the observed status can explain these divergent findings. In an experimental study with technical and commercial apprentices, we show that objective status can have a positive effect on prosocial behaviour and that subjective status can have a negative effect when controlling for objective status.