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AbstractWhen contentious blasphemy laws are pressed into service in fledgling democracies with illiberal tendencies such as Indonesia, critical questions arise about judicial integrity and the political nature of blasphemy trials. Judicial legitimacy in Indonesia is defined according to international standards and conventions. The focus is on judicial propriety rather than the popularity or majoritarian appeal of court decisions. In May 2017 a watershed moment occurred in Indonesia as the former governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok) was found guilty of desecrating religion and sentenced to 2 years in prison. Judgments rendered in politicized blasphemy trials such as these fail to meet standards of impartiality, and when discursive transgressions of a blasphemous nature occur there are deep ambiguities of meaning and intent. This paper contends that the revival of blasphemy as a punishable crime relates to political power calculations and electoral opportunities, and offers an analysis of blasphemy in Indonesia through the quasi-historical lens of a discursive crime premised on the fallacy that religious offence threatens public order. Blasphemy trials are further complicated by the fact that religious authorities and Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia have significant influence over judicial processes.

This article examines the variable powers, positions, and legitimacy of informal authorities in Lombok, Indonesia, most notably tuan guru (Muslim clerics) and their affiliate pamswakarsa (vigilante forces). It argues that recent accounts of tuan guru as peacemakers downplay the complex structural factors that enable outbreaks of ethno-religious violence in the first place. By analyzing successive permutations of disorder, traceable back to the colonial era, this article helps locate and give context to the current policing and political dilemmas surrounding vigilantism in Indonesia. It then demonstrates how, in the era of decentralization, local and provincial authorities endeavor to domesticate pamswakarsa groups and their charismatic leaders. Finally, this article concludes that renewed spiritual expansionism, such as the renovation of Hindu temple sanctuaries in Lombok, elicits extreme responses from tuan guru. These responses provide renewed impetus for vigilante violence, strain interisland relations, and, at times, stifle economic development. (Crit Asian Stud/GIGA)

Abstract
From 1998 onwards Indonesia's reform era (reformasi) has captured the imagination of growing numbers of observers, experts and scholars. Policies of decentralisation and enhanced public participation projects have reawakened old debates surrounding indigenous rights, power and status. This article examines the dilemma of special rights, particularly those related to the political revival of customs and traditions (adat istiadat). Calls for exigent recognition and redistributive rights for particular groups and 'unique' village communities frequently take the form of indirect regulatory negotiations and direct struggles for land. Case studies from Sulawesi are therefore used to examine heavily contested processes of decentralisation and local autonomy, which in many respects enable the revival of local adat. Distinctions are made between static and fluid views of adat, between being special by virtue of birthright on the one hand, and becoming indigenous by way of deliberate political intervention and mobilisation on the other.

Political transition theory has clear indicators for successful democratization, including the two-turnover test in elections, rule of law, press freedom and institutional reform. However, the distinction between system change and regime change remains ambiguous. After rapid political transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems, old guard elites seek to recapture power and protect their wealth in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The authors characterize this as a process of dynastic regime recovery, with elite networks seeking to control discursive spaces as part of a broader strategy to regain political power and legitimacy. Political distortions persist in rapid transitions to democracy, and this article examines the ways in which interlocking elites from the Suharto era strategically adapted to Indonesia's competitive multi-party system. The authors gathered data from 21 interviews with the Suharto family and their associates, as well as observations from an exclusive commemorative event celebrating the centenary of Suharto's birth in June 2021. The centenary celebration was a network-led revanchist effort to promote a positive narrative about Suharto's presidency, as a constituent part of a complex regime recovery strategy. The 2022 election of Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. in the Philippines indicates that there are opportunities for the rehabilitation of formerly discredited political dynasties. The recovery of the Suharto family legacy, business networks and political party coalitions has yet to ensure institutional recapture or electoral victory, but it is too soon to write a definitive political obituary. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

AbstractUnder President Xi Jinping, the strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party's political control occurs in conjunction with an evolving administrative role for government-affiliated associations. Analysing associations that are subordinate within China's strict hierarchy but which have degrees of operational freedom yields insights into the changing nature of public service and administration in China. Evidence from 63 interviews conducted from 2018 to 2022 with government departments and affiliated associations in the education sector reveals the complexity of state control and degrees of constrained autonomy achieved by affiliated associations. The government exerts control over financing, personnel appointments and core business activities but, over time, associations gain varying degrees of operational autonomy to influence the education agenda and fill gaps in public services. The interdependency and relational variance we find in the case of Ministry of Education-affiliated associations contributes to broader understandings of the complex and fragmentary nature of the Chinese state and public administration.

Under President Xi Jinping, the strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party's political control occurs in conjunction with an evolving administrative role for government-affiliated associations. Analysing associations that are subordinate within China's strict hierarchy but which have degrees of operational freedom yields insights into the changing nature of public service and administration in China. Evidence from 63 interviews conducted from 2018 to 2022 with government departments and affiliated associations in the education sector reveals the complexity of state control and degrees of constrained autonomy achieved by affiliated associations. The government exerts control over financing, personnel appointments and core business activities but, over time, associations gain varying degrees of operational autonomy to influence the education agenda and fill gaps in public services. The interdependency and relational variance we find in the case of Ministry of Education-affiliated associations contributes to broader understandings of the complex and fragmentary nature of the Chinese state and public administration. (China Q / GIGA)

The research examines the rhetorical style and political priorities in Indonesian President Joko Widodo's public speeches during his first term in office. Content analysis is used to investigate a purposive sample of 66 presidential speeches from May 2017 to May 2018. In addition, the research identifies the similarity of words to understand the selective appraisal of Indonesia's progress based on President Jokowi's utterances. In one contentious oration on May 18th, 2017, delivered to government officials, the president bluntly asked 'what's wrong with us'? The question presupposes that something is wrong in Indonesian politics, and is narrowcast to an audience of government officials, some of whom are implicated in the developmental shortcomings, administrative inefficiencies, and social conflicts that persist in Indonesia today. The president's strategic message implies that Indonesia's economic development unduly lags regional competitors; disinformation and hate speech create social divisions and political distortions; and there is a significant digital and technological divide in the country. The research result shows that the president's passion extends beyond bureaucratic reform and into contentious political topics, where selective attempts at disruptive truth-telling are made.

Evidence from Gansu, Hunan, Shandong, and Yunnan provinces shows that subnational authorities in China draw on personal relations to alleviate poverty and legitimize their rule. Through an invasive process of claiming kin, local government officials are required to sign kinship contracts with poor households. The contract links bureaucratic performance reviews to tangible outcomes, creating new incentives and pressures for officials to help lift their adopted families out of poverty. The general aspiration may be to improve bureaucratic processes by establishing direct, transparent connections between state and society, however the authors contend that the invasive and personalized nature of the kinship policy risks disrupting the existing social order and complicating local poverty relief efforts, leading to local variance, extortion and other irregularities. (J Contemp China/GIGA)