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AbstractThis research investigated the role of dispositional factors in decisions to purchase insurance and to take mitigating measures against flooding. Two dispositional factors—risk aversion in the domain of losses and time discounting rate—were found to be predictors of the decision to acquire flood insurance. The observation of a relationship between experiment‐based risk attitudes and the decision to insure oneself against flooding replicates a finding of Petrolia et al. The finding that impatience negatively impacts decisions to take out insurance against flooding is novel. However, support was not found for analogous hypotheses concerning relationships between the two dispositional variables and decisions to take mitigating measures. Evidently, factors other than individual risk aversion and time discounting rate play a crucial role in this behavior.

In study 1 different groups of female students were randomly assigned to one of four probabilistic information formats. Five different levels of probability of a genetic disease in an unborn child were presented to participants (within‐subject factor). After the presentation of the probability level, participants were requested to indicate the acceptable level of pain they would tolerate to avoid the disease (in their unborn child), their subjective evaluation of the disease risk, and their subjective evaluation of being worried by this risk. The results of study 1 confirmed the hypothesis that an experience‐based probability format decreases the subjective sense of worry about the disease, thus, presumably, weakening the tendency to overrate the probability of rare events. Study 2 showed that for the emotionally laden stimuli, the experience‐based probability format resulted in higher sensitivity to probability variations than other formats of probabilistic information. These advantages of the experience‐based probability format are interpreted in terms of two systems of information processing: the rational deliberative versus the affective experiential and the principle of stimulus‐response compatibility.

The question addressed in the present research is whether in naturalistic risky decision environments people are sensitive to information about the probability parameter. In Study 1, we showed that in naturalistic scenarios participants generally revealed little interest in obtaining information about the outcomes and probabilities. Moreover, participants asked fewer questions about probabilities for scenarios containing moral considerations. In Study 2, it was shown that, when supplied with information on probabilities, people could be sensitive to this information. This sensitivity depends on two factors. People were less sensitive to probabilities in scenarios perceived as containing ethical considerations. People were also less sensitive to probabilities when they were faced with a single‐choice situation than when they were faced with a series of lotteries with different probabilities. This can be accounted for in terms of the evaluability principle.

The research has been aimed at answering two questions: (1) What factors impact perception and acceptance of technological and environmental hazards? (2) Why are rich societies involved more in protecting their environment and health than poor societies? Data has been collected from representative samples of two countries—Poland and Sweden. The results indicate that (1) contrary to earlier findings, the inverse relations between perceived benefits and dangers of hazards has not been observed, (2) acceptance of a risk has been mostly influenced by perceived benefits, (3) rejection of a risk has been mostly influenced by its perceived harmful consequences. Concerning the second question, it has been found that: (1) perceived hazard's danger and benefit is not the only factor that impacts its acceptance, and (2) a broader economic context can impact acceptance (tolerance) of hazards. It has been found that being aware of high dangers and not very high benefits of hazardous activities, Poles still have accepted them. Thus, Poles seem to follow an old proverb: "When one does not have what one likes, one has to like what one has."

Experiments were performed on single-shot 2×2×2×2×2 games (five players with two strategies each). Variants of the following types of games were used: (1) no conflict, in which the "cooperative" strategy C is always more advantageous than the "noncooperative" strategy D; (2) Steering Others' Fate, in which any single player is indifferent between C and D but, by choosing D, increases the others' payoffs; (3) five-person Prisoner's Dilemma; (4) Justified Trust, in which it is most advantageous to choose C only if everyone else does so; and (5) five-person Chicken. As expected, the fraction of players choosing C was largest in no-conflict games and smallest in Prisoner's Dilemma. The behavioral results were compared with players' and control nonplayers' predictions about the fractions of C choices. Fractions predicted were consistently larger than those observed. In all games, Ss who chose predominantly C expected higher levels of C than those who chose predominantly D.

Previous research has demonstrated that in naturalistic risky decisions people tend to have little interest in receiving information about probabilities. The present research asked whether subjects search for and employ probabilistic information in situations that are representative of natural disasters: namely, situations where (1) they have no control over the occurrence of a negative event and (2) there might be huge losses of physical and human capital. Pseudo‐realistic scenarios involving risky situations were presented to 116 experimental participants. Based on the active information search paradigm, subjects were given only a basic description of the situation and had to acquire additional information from the experimenter. In addition to the main task, the individual risk aversion of participants was measured. We demonstrate that in pseudo‐naturalistic scenarios involving natural disasters people tend to show more interest in probabilities compared to scenarios with generally more controllable risks. Moreover, this interest increases with an increase in the importance of the situation to the decisionmaker. The importance of the situation also has a positive influence on the thoroughness of information search. The experiment detected no connection between individual risk aversion and information search.

In his famous book on a theory of justice, John Rawls argues that under some special conditions, referred to as an "original position," people would unanimously choose as a principle of distributive justice, the principle of maximizing the welfare of the worst-off individual in the society. An experiment was conducted under conditions approximating Rawls's "veil of ignorance." It was a replication of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy's experiment, using Polish instead of American students. In accordance with Rawls's prediction, most of experimental groups in both samples reached the consensus. However, the chosen principle was not the Rawlsian principle of maximizing the floor income, but the principle of maximizing the average income with the floor constraint. Moreover, in individual rankings and choices, the principle of maximizing the average income with a floor constraint received the highest ranks, while the Rawlsian principle received the lowest ranks. Our interpretation of these results is that the notion of distributive justice should not be reduced to considering only the welfare of the poorest.