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Following brain damage, information processing and consciousness can break down. This phenomenon is termed dissociation between preserved implicit (nonconscious) knowledge and impaired explicit (conscious) knowledge. Examples of the implicit/explicit dissociation are provided based on neuropsychological deficits such as cortical blindness, prosopagnosia, neglect, and amnesia. Also, models of the dissociation are discussed. The explicit/implicit dissociations are domain specific, in the sense that they always occur in a single domain only. For that reason, it is argued that there is no unitary area in the brain on which the activity of conscious experience depends. It is proposed instead that the neural substrate of conscious experience is distributed, and that the contents of consciousness depend on activity in many independent cortical areas.

Four experiments were aimed at elucidating some aspects of the preference for facelike patterns in newborns. Experiment 1 showed a preference for a stimulus whose components were located in the correct arrangement for a human face. Experiment 2 showed a preference for stimuli that had optimal sensory properties for the newborn visual system. Experiment 3 showed that babies directed their attention to a facelike pattern even when it was presented simultaneously with a non-facelike stimulus with optimal sensory properties. Experiment 4 showed the preference for facelike patterns in the temporal hemifield but not in the nasal hemifield. It was concluded that newborns' preference for facelike patterns reflects the activity of a subcortical system which is sensitive to the structural properties of the stimulus.

In four experiments we investigated the gap effect in infants within the first 3 days of life. Reaction times (RTs) to make a saccade to a peripheral target were measured on gap trials, in which the central fixation stimulus went off 500  ms before target presentation, and on overlap trials, in which the central fixation stimulus remained on. In every experiment the fixation stimulus was a flashing light. The target stimulus was a schematic face in Experiment 1, a flashing light shown at 20° eccentricity in Experiment 2, a flashing light shown at 30° eccentricity in Experiment 3, and an upside‐down schematic face in Experiment 4. In Experiments 1–3 a gap effect was found. That is, RT was faster on gap than on overlap trials. In contrast, the gap effect was absent in Experiment 4. These findings are consistent with the view that the superior colliculus plays a major role in producing the gap effect at birth.

The present study was aimed at investigating whether, because of a differential sensitivity between the upper and the lower visual fields, in a visual preference task newborns would orient more frequently and look longer at patterns with a great number of high–contrast areas in the upper or lower visual field. Newborns were presented with three pairs of geometrical stimuli, each composed of a pattern with a greater number of elements in the upper part or a pattern with more elements in the lower part. The results showed a reliable preference for the stimuli that had more elements in the upper than in the lower part. The evidence obtained suggests the possibility that, at birth, the visibility of a stimulus depends not only on its sensory properties, but also on its structural characteristics.