Suchergebnisse

In Europe and especially in the euro existed between mid 2007 to late 2009 preserve vote on how the institutions of a sometimes fragile EU and the single currency managed to the global financial crisis defy. The crisis hit over from the United States, where the dangers of applied liberal and deregulated model of financial markets and inadequate governance were insufficiently recognized. European banks, but a few, behaved more than their American peers. Also banking supervision was generally effective, especially in countries like Italy, Spain and the small Cyprus. Through an innovative and fast answer to the European Central Bank had a leading role in tackling the crisis: the European legal framework for emergency loans was modified and cross-border coordination was performed. Crucial factor was that, in countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy after, most EU and eurozone countries thanks to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Treaty of Maastricht had their debt under control. The result was that most European countries have not been hit as hard by the recession and the United States. The Anglo-American capitalism performed moderately, while the European system had shown its resilience (for the first time). Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. The role of politics is particularly difficult to discern in the domain of international financial markets, where the state's capacity to control or direct capital flows, without incurring considerable opportunity (and political) costs, appears so limited. In addressing this question, this paper argues that the process of internationalisation is first and foremost the consequence of political decision‐making (to create open markets) and that many domestic interests linked to the international market have promoted internationalisation both through their policy preferences and economic activity. The paper will then go on to argue that the threat of financial instability and crisis, a consequence of the increased volatility of relatively unregulated capital flows, has prompted political demands for more concerted inter‐state co‐operation to maintain stability. Much of this takes place through transnational agreements among state agencies, such as the central banks, and much through 'reregulation' in the guise of 'harmonisation' of regulatory and prudential supervisory policies.Some of this process has received considerable publicity, such as the harmonisation of EEC regulations to facilitate freer trade in banking and financial services as part of the preparation for the Single European Market in 1992. Likewise, the current Uruguay Round of GATT trade talks has the liberalisation of trade in financial services on its agenda. Other aspects of the process have been carried on quietly, far from public view, in such forums as the Bank for International Settlements. Such is the case of a recent agreement to harmonise minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks operating in international markets. The paper uses these three cases to support the argument about the role of politics and the state in international finance.

Abstract. The case of the French textile and clothing industry during the post‐1974 crisis period illustrates a number of issues relevant to the debate about meso‐corporatism and interest intermediation at the sectoral level in industry. It highlights the importance of attempts to understand the relationships between organised interests and the state in the analysis of the policy process. The pattern of state‐industry relations which evolved was crucial in determining the outcome of conflict between state and industry over the management of restructuring during the crisis.The inapplicability of the meso‐corporatist model to this case becomes clear. There was a conspicuous absence of either political exchange or a shared policy agenda, each an important element of corporatist patterns of policy formation, in both the formation and implementation of adjustment policies in the sector. Mutual suspicion and a struggle to control the terms of the debate yielded a low level of co‐operation. Eventually the industry was able to appropriate increased public funds on its own terms and to insist on a protective trade regime.The complexity of the case points to the need to broaden the debate over models of interest intermediation and to relate it to issues in political economy. This is particularly important with regard to the structure of the bureaucratic state and notions of state autonomy.