The article, addressed to a wide range of readers interested in the problems of modern corporate management, but above all — University teachers, graduate students and students, identifies and comments on existing approaches to the definition of corporate leadership. The result of the study is the author's classification of the world's leading companies in the automotive, pharmaceutical and oil and gas industries.
The article examines national models of higher education organization. The analysis is based on the higher education systems of the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, China and Russia. The authors proposed a number of criteria for differentiating the principles of organizing the higher education system in different countries: classifying higher education as private (satisfied on the basis of private effective consumer demand) or collective (patronized) benefits, organizing financing of the higher education system, barriers (filters) for students «at the entrance» and «at the exit», the degree of commercialization of the activities of universities, the role of the academic community. On the basis of the conducted research, ideal-typical models of the organization of higher education that exist in developed and rapidly developing countries are distinguished: the market for private services, state paternalism, the market for merit goods, the quasi-market and the hybrid model. It is concluded that the low level of funding and the total commercialization of the activities of state universities give rise to many problems of Russian higher education, first of all, such as the decline in the quality of educational services and the prestige of this education itself.
В данной статье рассмотрены вопросы влияния волатильности цены нефти на доходы экономических субъектов, связанных с продажей нефти, а также значимости цены на нефть для стабилизации курса национальной валюты. Актуальность темы обусловлена кризисными явлениями в российской экономике, вызванными нестабильностью цены на нефть и курса рубля, недоступностью зарубежного заемного капитала из-за санкций в ряде отраслей, роста затрат на военно-промышленный комплекс. Целью работы является подтверждение гипотезы о том, что экономическая нестабильность в Российской Федерации обусловлена во многом колебаниями цены нефти и курса рубля; а также нахождение способов стабилизации национальной экономики. В работе проанализированы зависимости между изменением цены нефти, курса рубля по отношению к доллару США и объему экспорта нефти Российской Федерацией. Выявленная корреляция между данными величинами позволила сделать вывод, что для повышения цены нефти и стабилизации курса рубля необходимо снижение совокупного предложения нефти на мировом рынке. Обозначены причины низкой цены на нефть и последствия для экономики Российской Федерации. Проведен анализ факторов, влияющих на цену нефти на мировом рынке, который показал, что у Российской Федерации нет рычагов воздействия, способных в достаточной мере повысить цены на энергоресурсы. В статье предложены способы стабилизации экономической ситуации в стране, основанные на внутренней макроэкономической политике, и проанализированы возможные последствия реализации данных сценариев экономического развития. Информационной основной для анализа в рамках данной статьи выступали статистические данные, полученные из открытых источников. ; This article discusses the impact of the volatility of oil prices on the income of economic entities associated with the sale of oil, as well as the importance of the price of oil to stabilize the exchange rate of the national currency. The urgency of the topic is due to the crisis phenomena in the Russian economy caused by the volatility of the oil price and the ruble exchange rate, the inaccessibility of foreign borrowed capital due to sanctions in a number of industries, and the growth of costs for the military-industrial complex. This paper aims to confirm the hypothesis that the economic instability in the Russian Federation is due in large part to fluctuations in the price of oil and the ruble exchange rate, as well as finding ways to stabilize the national economy. The author analyzed dependencies between the change in the price of oil, the ruble exchange rate against the US dollar and the volume of oil exports by the Russian Federation. The revealed correlation between these values led to the conclusion that in order to raise the price of oil and stabilize the ruble exchange rate, it is necessary to reduce the aggregate supply of oil on the world market. The analysis of the factors influencing the price of oil in the world market shows that the Russian Federation does not have levers of influence capable of sufficiently raising energy prices. The article suggests ways of stabilizing the economic situation in the country, based on domestic macroeconomic policy, and analyzes the possible consequences of implementing these scenarios of economic development. Information for the analysis within the framework of this article was statistical data obtained from open sources.
Although there are plenty of quantitative cross-national analyses on the influence of population age structure on revolutionary risks, there are currently not enough studies that examine its impact on the risks of armed and unarmed revolutions taken separately. Assuming that the dependence of potential political destabilization on the median age will differ for armed and unarmed revolutions, we propose the following hypothesis. High median age and the level of a country's economic development will negatively correlate with armed revolutions. A moderately young median age will have positive influence on the risks of non-violent rebellions, while the overall dependence of unarmed revolutions on median age will be slightly positive and curvilinear. Relying on materials from NAVCO 1.3 and the UN Population Division databases and by means of utilizing cross-tabulations, correlations and logistic regression, we analyze about 250 revolutionary episodes between 1950 and 2019. All of our hypotheses turn out to be supported. The higher the median age of the population — the less likely the occurrence will be of armed revolutionary instability. On the other hand, as the population ages, the risks of unarmed revolutionary actions first grow, but then decline.
In: Alcohol and alcoholism: the international journal of the Medical Council on Alcoholism (MCA) and the journal of the European Society for Biomedical Research on Alcoholism (ESBRA), Band 59, Heft 1
Introduction Previous studies in Izhevsk, Novosibirsk, and Kazan have found that non-beverage alcohol is a large part of alcohol consumption in Russia. Whereas those places are relatively high-income cities, there are no studies about such a problem in low-income regions of Russia. The aim of this study is to investigate correlates and factors associated with non-beverage alcohol consumption in eastern regions of Russia, e.g. the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and to assess effectiveness of implementing Russian policies to restrict consumption of non-beverage alcohol.
Materials and methods A survey of adults in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast of Russia was performed on workdays to assess non-beverage drinking patterns in summer 2022. The questionnaire included questions about socio-demographic status and alcohol use, including non-beverage alcohol consumption and drinking patterns. We use logistic regression to identify risk factors of consuming non-beverages.
Results First, ~30% of individuals suffering from alcohol problems drink non-beverage alcohol. Second, those who regularly consume non-beverage alcohol compared with those who chronically drink legal strong alcohol are on average more likely to experience the negative effects of alcohol consumption. Third, income and marriage are the main factors negatively associated with surrogate alcohol consumption. Besides, age shows a curvilinear relationship with that.
Conclusions We suggest that a modified anti-surrogate policy to increase the minimum price of pharmacy alcohol and to enforce restrictions on the sale of non-beverage alcohol is needed in Russia. Such measures could prevent an increase in non-beverage alcohol consumption in Russia against the backdrop of declining real incomes of the population.
Despite the existence of numerous hypotheses about what factors influence protesters' choice of armed vs. unarmed struggle tactics, today there is a dearth of global, quantitative cross-national studies aimed at identifying the reasons why revolutions take a violent vs. a non-violent form. The article attempts to fill one of the gaps existing here by conducting a crossnational analysis of the relationship between education and the type of revolutionary action. Based on the existing literature, the authors document several mechanisms that nudge educated people to choose unarmed forms of protest. In particular, education makes people more receptive to liberal-democratic valu es (including recognition and respect for the rights of others), promotes the development of tolerance and a culture of peaceful discussion, as well as increases human capital, which, on the one hand, makes it possible to successfully use non-violent instruments to defend one's interests, and, on the other hand, increases the relative costs of participating in armed uprisings. Hence, the authors put forward a hypothesis, according to which in countries with a higher percentage of the population with formal education, the likelihood of armed revolutionary uprisings will decrease. The analysis of 387 revolutionary events that took place in the world from 1950 to 2019 conducted via cross-tabulation, correlation and regression methods, fully confirms the hypothesis: high level of education is indeed a strong and significant predictor of the unarmed nature of revolutionary upheavals. The correlation is especially high between the proportion of revolutionary events and the average number of years of schooling (in the logged form), which approaches the level of functional depen dence. Therefore, the factor of education has the maximum influence on the nature of revolutionary uprisings precisely in the early stages of modernization.
The last decades have been marked by the emergence of non-standard forms of employment and labour market precarity in most countries of the world. The paper provides insight into new modes and forms of employment as well as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labour market configuration. The aim of this research is to examine various problems identified during the lockdown and to make recommendations intended to protect the labour market in case of emergency. The authors applied methods of classification, comparative analysis, system analysis and scientific observation. The findings of the research include the differentiation between modes and forms of employment, taxonomy of non-standard forms of employment that makes it possible to examine current changes, factors influencing the emergence of new forms of employment, analysis of labour market transformation in the time of a pandemic, measures which have to be taken at macro-, meso- and micro-levels in order to prepare for emergencies in the labour market.
The recent years have witnessed numerous studies that analyze the influence of different factors on the probability of revolutionary events. At the same time, an important set of modernization variables (GDP, urbanization, education, democratization) still remains understudied. Moreover, the results of the contemporary quantitative studies show significant discrepancies in how wealth (operationalized through GDP per capita) affects the risks of revolutionary events. Herewith scholars usually consider such events in the aggregate, without dividing them into armed and non-armed rebellions. This paper attempts to shed light on the impact of wealth on revolutionary instability, taking into account the distinguishing features of its armed and non-armed versions. On the basis of the analysis of 425 revolutionary episodes of various types over the period of 1900—2019, the authors document a strong linear negative relationship between armed revolutions and the level of GDP per capita, while the relationship between unarmed revolutions and wealth has a curvilinear nature. At first, as GDP per capita increases, the risks of unarmed revolutions increase, but after reaching a certain threshold they begin to fall. The inflection point, when the risk of unarmed revolutionary instability is the greatest, corresponds to the level of GDP per capita in the middle-income countries, which currently face the middle-income trap. In other words, their wealth stagnates at the level that is most risky for the emergence of unarmed revolutions. According to the authors' conclusion, in addition to the obvious economic problems associated with the middle-income trap, the latter also leads to the increased probability of unarmed revolutionary instability.
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) ; Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; FINEP (Brazil) ; NSFC (China) ; CNRS/IN2P3 (France) ; BMBF (Germany) ; DFG (Germany) ; HGF (Germany) ; SFI (Ireland) ; INFN (Italy) ; NASU (Ukraine) ; STFC (UK) ; NSF (USA) ; BMWFW (Austria) ; FWF (Austria) ; FNRS (Belgium) ; FWO (Belgium) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) ; MES (Bulgaria) ; CAS (China) ; MoST (China) ; COLCIENCIAS (Colombia) ; MSES (Croatia) ; CSF (Croatia) ; RPF (Cyprus) ; MoER (Estonia) ; ERC IUT (Estonia) ; ERDF (Estonia) ; Academy of Finland (Finland) ; MEC (Finland) ; HIP (Finland) ; CEA (France) ; GSRT (Greece) ; OTKA (Hungary) ; NIH (Hungary) ; DAE (India) ; DST (India) ; IPM (Iran) ; NRF (Republic of Korea) ; WCU (Republic of Korea) ; LAS (Lithuania) ; MOE (Malaysia) ; UM (Malaysia) ; CINVESTAV (Mexico) ; CONACYT (Mexico) ; SEP (Mexico) ; UASLP-FAI (Mexico) ; MBIE (New Zealand) ; PAEC (Pakistan) ; MSHE (Poland) ; NSC (Poland) ; FCT (Portugal) ; JINR (Dubna) ; MON (Russia) ; RosAtom (Russia) ; RAS (Russia) ; RFBR (Russia) ; MESTD (Serbia) ; SEIDI (Spain) ; CPAN (Spain) ; MST (Taipei) ; ThEPCenter (Thailand) ; IPST (Thailand) ; STAR (Thailand) ; NSTDA (Thailand) ; TUBITAK (Turkey) ; TAEK (Turkey) ; SFFR (Ukraine) ; DOE (USA) ; MPG (Germany) ; FOM (The Netherlands) ; NWO (The Netherlands) ; MNiSW (Poland) ; NCN (Poland) ; MEN/IFA (Romania) ; MinES (Russia) ; FANO (Russia) ; MinECo (Spain) ; SNSF (Switzerland) ; SER (Switzerland) ; Marie-Curie programme ; European Research Council ; EPLANET (European Union) ; Leventis Foundation ; A. P. Sloan Foundation ; Alexander von Humboldt Foundation ; Belgian Federal Science Policy Office ; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIABelgium) ; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium) ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic ; Council of Science and Industrial Research, India ; Foundation for Polish Science ; European Union, Regional Development Fund ; Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino) ; Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste) ; MIUR (Italy) ; Thalis programme ; Aristeia programme ; EU-ESF ; Greek NSRF ; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund ; EPLANET ; Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions ; ERC (European Union) ; Conseil general de Haute-Savoie ; Labex ENIGMASS ; OCEVU ; Region Auvergne (France) ; XuntaGal (Spain) ; GENCAT (Spain) ; Royal Society (UK) ; Royal Commission for the Exhibition of 1851 (UK) ; MIUR (Italy): 20108T4XTM ; The standard model of particle physics describes the fundamental particles and their interactions via the strong, electromagnetic and weak forces. It provides precise predictions for measurable quantities that can be tested experimentally. The probabilities, or branching fractions, of the strange B meson (B-s(0)) and the B-0 meson decaying into two oppositely charged muons (mu(+) and mu(-)) are especially interesting because of their sensitivity to theories that extend the standard model. The standard model predicts that the B-s(0)->mu(+)mu(-) and B-0 ->mu(+)mu(-) decays are very rare, with about four of the former occurring for every billion B-s(0) mesons produced, and one of the latter occurring for every ten billion B-0 mesons(1). A difference in the observed branching fractions with respect to the predictions of the standard model would provide a direction in which the standard model should be extended. Before the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN2 started operating, no evidence for either decay mode had been found. Upper limits on the branching fractions were an order of magnitude above the standard model predictions. The CMS (Compact Muon Solenoid) and LHCb(Large Hadron Collider beauty) collaborations have performed a joint analysis of the data from proton-proton collisions that they collected in 2011 at a centre-of-mass energy of seven teraelectronvolts and in 2012 at eight teraelectronvolts. Here we report the first observation of the B-s(0)->mu(+)mu(-) decay, with a statistical significance exceeding six standard deviations, and the best measurement so far of its branching fraction. Furthermore, we obtained evidence for the B-0 ->mu(+)mu(-) decay with a statistical significance of three standard deviations. Both measurements are statistically compatible with standard model predictions and allow stringent constraints to be placed on theories beyond the standard model. The LHC experiments will resume taking data in 2015, recording proton-proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 13 teraelectronvolts, which will approximately double the production rates of B-s(0) and B-0 mesons and lead to further improvements in the precision of these crucial tests of the standard model.