Suchergebnisse

In the context of a rising number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that include investment protection provisions traditionally found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), this chapter has a double purpose. First, based on an empirical analysis of 158 post-North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) PTAs, we conclude that three categories of countries/regional economic integration organisations (REIOs) exist: those that regularly include investment chapters into their PTAs (Japan, the United States, Canada, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)), those that are finding their voice in international investment law and increasingly include such chapters (India, China, the European Union and Chile) and those that have an adverse position towards it (Brazil and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)) or defer the inclusion of such provisions to further negotiations (African Plurilateralism, Morocco and South Africa). Second, we look at the drivers behind including/ excluding investment protection provisions in/from PTAs. Some drivers will be readily apparent from the data collected for the purpose of answering the first question, while other drivers will need a more detailed discussion. These drivers are: (a) the weaker party accepts/uses templates of more powerful states; (b) states/REIOs wish to pursue more comprehensive and resource-friendly negotiations; (c) states/REIOs want to achieve a more coherent application of international economic law.

Abstract
The ability to ensure compliance with investor-state arbitral awards is often regarded as one of the strengths of the international investment regime. Yet, there have been few systematic studies of compliance to assess the extent to which states have actually complied with adverse investor-state compensation awards. This paper presents a new dataset that enables empirical research on compliance with these decisions; it is the first publicly available dataset to focus on what happens after awards are handed down, and in this way complements other databases on international investment law. This paper explains the data collection process (and its associated challenges), discusses the design choices made in selecting inputs and variables, presents a descriptive overview of the data, and examines how variables can be used in future research. Moreover, various cases are used as illustrations of the challenges of collecting and coding data on post-award processes and we explore what missing data can tell us about compliance dynamics.