Suchergebnisse

By 2021, the nature of the key factors that will determine the dynamics of the EU–China relations in the medium term has become clearer. The pandemic accelerated many ongoing processes in the world, revealed "weak points" in national and regional economies and security, and exposed the true intentions of international actors. The authors proceed from the working hypothesis that an ideologized rigid approach with elements of pragmatism will dominate in the EU–China relations in the post-crisis period. The balance in the formula of these relations "partner, competitor, rival" will significantly depend on the position of the United States, as well as the European Union's compliance with the "bloc discipline". Competition in the field of technology will be of key importance, but the struggle for political and ideological leadership in the changing world order will also become more acute. The political response of the EU and China to technological challenges will represent a mix of protectionism and neo-techno-nationalism. Politicians in the European Union feel that toughness toward Beijing is well received by the voters. At the same time, the EU member states diverge in their approaches to China, although the efforts are made to harmonise policies both in the European Union and in the transatlantic community. In its turn, the PRC feels more confident in the technological and political competition. The pace of China catching up with the technological abilities of the EU is impressive, though significant gaps remain. Beijing does not have intentions of de-coupling from the West and keeps a strong interest in being present in the EU markets, but it becomes more selective with regard to foreign investments at home. Meanwhile, the global shift of world politics to Asia will require adjustment on the part of the European Union. A possible approach already tested in expert discussions is further engagement with trading partners and blocs in the region, especially the newly established Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The EU–China relations and their influence, in particular, on Russia were the subject of case study organized by the Center for Situational Analysis of IMEMO RAN. For details see: Analysis and Forecasting. IMEMO Journal, 2021, no. 2. (Available at: https:// www.afjournal.ru/index.php?page_id=464#).

The article discusses the method of situation analysis of international relations, developed in the 1960s in the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations by Academician Evgeniy Primakov. It has incorporated many elements of existing problem-solving methods such as "brain storm", "Delphi", and others. Its key innovation is understanding the international political situations under analysis as integral dynamic subsystems of international system. It proceeds in three stages: first, building a scenario of a situation development; second, getting a large number of expert assessments representing various fields of social sciences; third, producing a final document with critical summary of the assessments. Primakov encouraged organizers of situation analysis to have experts focused on the issues of practical importance, and then prepare the results of the situation analysis in a concise, understandable form to make them useful in the decisionmaking process. He viewed the method as an effective means of communicating expert knowledge to decision makers. The article reviews the method as it has been practiced in the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations. It gives the intellectual roots of its development, which include "grounded theory" by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss; systems theory by Talcott Parsons and a variant of its application to international relations by Thierry de Montbrial. The more direct roots of the method are various problem-solving techniques practiced in world's leading international relations think-tanks such as RAND Corporation. The article also overviews the major principles of situation analysis: 1) participants must have high level of expertise; 2) situational analysis is multidisciplinary; 3) situational analysis allows focusing on key aspects of a problem when there is no clear, unambiguous understanding of it and when the views of experts vary widely; 4) to obtain significant analytical results, it is necessary to move above the situation under analysis in search of wider generalizations; 5) situational analysis is opposite to propaganda, it must be averted to conformism and partisanship; 6) situation analysis should be aimed at realizing national interests; 7) situation analysis is directed towards future. In addition to the general principles of situation analysis, the article gives two specific examples of its application. The first example is the phenomenon of the extreme-right political movements in the European Union. In this case the situation analysis gives a balanced assessment of what is happening in Russia's neighbourhood. The second is Russia's adoption of trade restrictive measures in response to the "sanctions" from Western countries because of the Ukrainian crisis. The situation analysis shows contradictory effects of the sanctions for the Russian economic development. These cases are small but important illustrations of global changes in both the internal life of sovereign states and the relations between them. The post-bipolar world obviously goes through a transformation, which many assess in terms of a multipolar or polycentric world order. The configuration of future polycentricity is not defined in advance and will depend on decisions of leading global players. Situation analysis can contribute to understanding and forecasting them.

This forecast examines the major trends in Russia's relations with the world and in the Russian view of the world in 2016. The forecast looks firstly at Russia's role in the world in the context of the extant and emergent state of geopolitics. In a confused international environment, caught between the multiple, discordant and disorderly games of checkers of the present and the emerging design of a new grand chessboard for international relations, Russia and the West have been forced into cooperation. While far from easy and far from guaranteed to work – or last – this situation does offer the possibility of overcoming divides to pursue mutual interests. These interests become particularly apparent in the context of increased shared threats and the need to act jointly against them, the uncertainties created by rising powers, and the difficulties that Russia finds itself in. The key role of new mega-regional trade agreements in this emerging great game is also emphasised in the subsequent sections of the forecast, which deal, respectively, with foreign policy and political economy. The foreign policy analysis sees the US in flux in a presidential election year, and the EU caught at the crossroads of its own failure to capitalise on integration and a migration crisis of unprecedented proportions. Meanwhile, foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is characterised more by stasis than by substantial change, with frozen conflicts and stagnant reforms in Ukraine and limited room for manoeuvre for other players the order of the day. The Russian involvement in the Middle East, however, is anything but stagnant, with the military operations in Syria having dramatic effects in both the situation in Syria and global and regional geopolitics. The sustainability of this quest for influence, however, is questioned by the attitude of other players, but also by Russia's own internal weaknesses, notably its serious and deepening economic crisis.