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Under what conditions do religious groups engage in peace activism? Religious groups engage in peace activism if the associated costs are low and they compete with either conflict party over the interpretation of their religious content concerning war and peace. Peace activism is a promising action as peace activists maintain their positive self-evaluation. I introduce a novel dataset of peace activism for 511 religious groups in 128 countries from 1990 to 2008. Conditional fixed effects and logistic models support my hypotheses. The findings highlight the role of rational considerations in the decision to conduct peace activities by representatives of religious groups.

Under what conditions do religious groups engage in peace activism? Religious groups engage in peace activism if the associated costs are low and they compete with either conflict party over the interpretation of their religious content concerning war and peace. Peace activism is a promising action as peace activists maintain their positive self-evaluation. I introduce a novel dataset of peace activism for 511 religious groups in 128 countries from 1990 to 2008. Conditional fixed effects and logistic models support my hypotheses. The findings highlight the role of rational considerations in the decision to conduct peace activities by representatives of religious groups.

Under what conditions is religious peace activism effective? Infamous inter-religious violence in Nigeria, Indonesia or Syria reminds us of the difficulties of religious groups living peacefully together.

Warum kommt es zu Friedensengagement von Religionsgemeinschaften in innerstaatlichen Gewaltkonflikten? Friedensnormen allein können das Verhalten von Religionsgemeinschaften nicht erklären. Die Studie zeigt vielmehr, dass die Beziehungen der Religionsgemeinschaften zu den Konfliktparteien und die Konkurrenz der Gemeinschaft zu anderen religiösen Gruppen bzw. zwischen den eigenen Eliten bestimmend sein können. Eine Fuzzy-QCA Analyse von 65 Religionsgemeinschaften in 21 Gewaltkonflikten unterstützt diese Annahme. Eine tiefergehende Betrachtung aller 12 Gemeinschaften mit einem Friedensengagement lässt komplexere Zusammenhänge vermuten, was auch die Ergebnisse der Feldforschung in der Elfenbeinküste nahelegen. Die Studie zeigt, dass Opportunitätsstrukturen einen großen Einfluss auf die Handlungsmotive von Religionsgemeinschaften besitzen. Religiöse Normen sind für Friedensengagement von Bedeutung, können dieses aber alleine nicht erklären

This paper analyzes the role of religion with regard to the violence experienced during the past 20 years in Côte d'Ivoire. It seeks to explain the differences in the level of violence over time by focusing on religion as an identity marker and as a social force that is mobilizable by religious and political actors. Religious identities were part of the growing in-/ out-group mechanism utilized in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s, while the political elites tried to politicize religion. In reaction to the violence and politicization, the religious elites founded an interreligious organization in the 1990s, and were successful in preventing a religious war.

Right-wing populist (RWP) movements have been on the rise in Western democracies. Outside of party politics, such movements regularly organize demonstrations against political elites and minority groups. At the same time, civil society coalitions have mobilized against these movements. Yet we know little about the effect of counter-demonstrations on RWP protest activities. We derive competing theoretical expectations from previous work. On the one hand, counter-mobilization reduces mobilization because the original movement is less likely to achieve its goals (expected utility/costs). On the other hand, clashes and standoffs between opposing movements facilitate mobilization through polarization and anger (identity/emotions). We empirically analyze movement–countermovement dynamics using a new city-level event dataset on street protests by the German Pegida movement and its opponents. In our quantitative analysis, we investigate how counter-mobilization is associated with the onset of Pegida protests, their intensity in terms of participant numbers, and their demobilization. Counter-mobilization does not prevent protest onset, but large counter-demonstrations are associated with larger subsequent Pegida protests, and violence against Pegida supporters reduces the likelihood that they will stop protesting.

Dieses Kapitel diskutiert anhand des Beispiels politischen Protests die Ursachen und Folgen staatlicher Gewalt und Gewalt gegen den Staat. Zunächst zeigen wir mithilfe quantitativer Protestereignisdaten, dass Gewalt auf beiden Seiten eher die Ausnahme als die Regel ist. Demonstrationen sind überwiegend ein friedlicher Ausdruck politischen Engagements. Dennoch kommt es regelmäßig zu gewaltsamen Ausschreitungen. Basierend auf Erkenntnissen der international vergleichenden Protestforschung diskutieren wir mögliche Erklärungsfaktoren von Gewalt, darunter Opportunitätsstrukturen, strategische und normative Überlegungen sowie Eskalationsdynamiken. Anschließend zeigen wir mögliche Konsequenzen von Gewalt auf. Beispielsweise kann Gewalt zu weniger Akzeptanz sowohl einer sozialen Bewegung als auch staatlicher Institutionen führen. Sie kann einen direkten Effekt auf Protestdynamiken haben und einen indirekten Einfluss auf Wahlergebnisse nehmen. Den Medien kommt eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Rahmung und Beschreibung von Gewalt zu. Ein besseres Verständnis dieser Dynamiken kann helfen, Konflikte auf und abseits der Straße konstruktiver zu lösen.

AbstractRight‐wing populist (RWP) movements have been on the rise in Western democracies. Outside of party politics, such movements regularly organize demonstrations against political elites and minority groups. At the same time, civil society coalitions have mobilized against these movements. Yet we know little about the effect of counter‐demonstrations on RWP protest activities. We derive competing theoretical expectations from previous work. On the one hand, counter‐mobilization reduces mobilization because the original movement is less likely to achieve its goals (expected utility/costs). On the other hand, clashes and standoffs between opposing movements facilitate mobilization through polarization and anger (identity/emotions). We empirically analyze movement–countermovement dynamics using a new city‐level event dataset on street protests by the German Pegida movement and its opponents. In our quantitative analysis, we investigate how counter‐mobilization is associated with the onset of Pegida protests, their intensity in terms of participant numbers, and their demobilization. Counter‐mobilization does not prevent protest onset, but large counter‐demonstrations are associated with larger subsequent Pegida protests, and violence against Pegida supporters reduces the likelihood that they will stop protesting.