Suchergebnisse

Defining and measuring far right Euroscepticism -- A theory of far right Euroscepticism -- Rejectionist Euroscepticism : the French National Front -- Conditional Euroscepticism : the Greek popular orthodox rally -- Compromising Euroscepticism : the Italian national alliance

"What explains the dramatic rise of the extreme, ultranationalist Golden Dawn in a country that has experienced Nazi invasion and a military dictatorship? This book places the rise of the Golden Dawn in the context of the Eurozone crisis and argues that its rise is not merely the product of economic malaise. Rather, the success of the Golden Dawn is dependent on the extent to which it was able to propound plausible solutions to the three sets of crises--economic, political and ideological--that culminated in an overall crisis of the nation-state and democracy in Greece. Within this context, the authors examine the Golden Dawn's strategic response to the crisis in terms of the offering of a "nationalist solution" through the employment of the twin fascist myths of social decadence and national rebirth in its discourse. It is through these two myths that the Golden Dawn promises the disillusioned an escape from their social, economic and overall human desolation"--

This article traces the trajectory of party Euroscepticism in Greece drawing upon theories of issue competition. It demonstrates that the economic dimension of the multiple crises facing the European Union (EU) contributed to a Eurosceptic shift in public opinion, the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties, new parties populating the Europhile end of the spectrum, and the formation of a coalition government united not by ideological affinity but by a common Eurosceptic and anti-austerity agenda. Mainstream parties maintained their pro-EU agendas and challenger parties offered both pro- and anti-EU policy options to the electorate. The prospect of power resulted in the progressive softening of Euroscepticism among challenger parties. EU issue salience was relatively high across the party system and remained so during the crisis. Although Greek parties justified their pro- and anti-EU attitudes using a number of frames, economic arguments were prevalent at the height of the crisis and challenger parties of the left intensified their claims of the EU interfering in national politics. The findings have implications for our understanding of the evolving nature of Euroscepticism and the ways in which it may feature in domestic party politics.

This article traces the trajectory of party Euroscepticism in Greece drawing upon theories of issue competition. It demonstrates that the economic dimension of the multiple crises facing the EU contributed to a Eurosceptic shift in public opinion; the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties; new parties populating the Europhile end of the spectrum; and the formation of a coalition government united not by ideological affinity but by a common Eurosceptic and anti-austerity agenda. Mainstream parties maintained their pro-EU agendas and challenger parties offered both pro- and anti-EU policy options to the electorate. The prospect of power resulted in the progressive softening of Euroscepticism among challenger parties. EU issue salience was relatively high across the party system and remained so during the crisis. Although Greek parties justified their pro- and anti-EU attitudes using a number of frames, economic arguments were prevalent at the height of the crisis, and challenger parties of the left intensified their claims of the EU interfering in national politics. The findings have implications for our understanding of the evolving nature of Euroscepticism and the ways in which it may feature in domestic party politics.

AbstractThis article shows that key to understanding the referendum outcome are factors such as a profoundly eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU and lack of unity within the 'Leave' campaign. The Brexit referendum is more than just about domestic issues and government approval. Utilitarian concerns related to economic evaluations of EU integration coupled with support of or opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole but also to EU freedom of movement are expected to swing voters.

Euroscepticism has been treated as a marginal phenomenon in European Union studies. It has been portrayed as exceptional, belonging to the realm of pariah politics. This article contests this view arguing that although the term was first coined during the mid-1980s in Britain, its features were present since the early stages of integration. Pointing to its changing nature over time, it calls for a holistic approach that would examine the phenomenon beyond the study of party politics and public opinion. It urges scholars to explicitly treat Euroscepticism as an 'independent' as well as a 'dependent' variable. The next generation of Euroscepticism should be performing comparative analysis identifying and explaining different patterns of opposition to the EU, and focusing on their implications for the process of European integration, the direction of EU policy, domestic European politics and the development of EU studies. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article argues that radical right parties can be seen as displaying three patterns of opposition towards European integration: rejecting, conditional and compromising. These three patterns are identified through the careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration and the EU. These include the idea of a common identity of European peoples, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire to build a future European polity. In light of this conceptualization of radical right opposition to European integration, the article conducts a qualitative analysis of party literature of 12 radical right parties from 10 European countries during the latter part of the 2000s.