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The third part of the article aims to specify the phenomenological aspects of the problem of relevance. The paper focus upon four major areas of concern: investigation of basic concepts such as social reality, human action, and social interaction (I); investigation of the philophical roots of the problem by focusing reflectively on the perceptual field, and attempting to describe the primary locus of self-evidence (II); analyses of fundamental matters of political philosophy as state, community, society, individual (III); and finally, investigation of the relationship between the freedom and equality, and of various aspects of this fundamental relationship in contemporary Lithuanian society. ; Trečioje esė dalyje nagrinėjama relevantiškumo problema. Pirma, relevantiškumas eksplikuojamas kaip gebėjimas nuskaidrinti "pamatinę metodinę įžvalgą", vadovaujantis nuostata, kad analizė, įgyvendinta transcendentalinėje sferoje, taikytina ir natūraliosios laikysenos sferoje. Antra, tiriamos relevantiškumo problemos filosofinės ištakos, o tiksliau, aki-vaizdos problema. Trečia, relevantiškumo eksplikaciniai principai taikomi fenomenologiškai skaidrinant Tocqueville'io tezę (kad lygybė turi polinkį iš esmės pažeidinėti laisvės teises), skiriant keturis bendruosius laisvės nepakantumo nelaisvei ir nelaisvės artimumo laisvei postulatus ir tris konrečios analizės lygmenis. Kritiškai svarstoma skirtis tarp fenomenologijos ir liberalizmo.

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The first part of the article aims to specify some reflexive aspects of phenomenologically grounded understanding of sociology. The article seeks to elaborate the internal structure of the problem of rationality and to draw attention to the taken for granted, "seen but unnoticed", character of ordinary social life in terms of methodologically complicated relationship between scientific mind and common sense. This article aims to provide an argument that the specification of three criteria – a) rationality of social world, b) radical reflexivity, c) epoche of the natural attitude – are the main sources of methodological radicalization of phenomenologically grounded social theory.

The second part of the article aims to specify the paradox of subjectivity and to explicate the phenomenological foundations of the methodology of the social sciences. There are four main problems. They are following: first, the problem of the relation between sociology and philosophy; second, the problem of the relation between "I" and "It"; third, the problem of the relation between ideal types and practical typification; fourth, the problem of the relation between phenomenological epoché and epoché of the natural attitude.

The task of this article is to renew the discussion about the theoretical structure which includes both analytical and normative elements. The main theoretical problem analyzed in the article is the identifi­cation of analytical and normative elements in the structure of critical social theory and the analysis of the relationship between these elements in contemporary practice theories. The article seeks to answer the ques­tion why the concept of critique in contemporary practice theories is changed by the concept of reflexivity. The article aims to emphasize the implications of this "innocent" terminological change for contemporary critical social theories, distinguished from early Critical Theory of Frankfurt School.

The second part of the article aims to articulate and explicate the parallels between post-empiricist scientific philosophy and post-analytical sociology, and between the conception of naturalistic epistemology in philosophy and the conception of pragmatic rationality in sociology. The article argues that the methodological problem of rationality in sociology is the part of the larger epistemological relationship between philosophy and science. Normative relationship between the norms of rationality and the criteria of scientific objectivity is analyzed in two main perspectives of contemporary sociology – analytical and post-analytical.

Rationality seems to be the meeting point of sociology and philosophy. "Rationality" is a controversial concept. Historically, the problems of rationality, normativity, social action, and meaning-adequacy in sociology have its closest relationships with epistemology. The aim of this essay is to articulate and explicate the parallel "problems of rationality" in sociology and philosophy. This is done in two parts. The first looks at sociologists' attempts to articulate conceptually the relation between rationality and normativity. The problem of the relationship of rationality and normativity in sociology appears early in a classical and modern sociology but appears consequently in many more hidden ways in connection with epistemological naturalism. The article argues that the radical critique of epistemology and philosophy in contemporary neopraxiological empiricism is misdirected due to a misconception about the relationship between rationality and a priori.

Recenzija
Jokubaitis, Alvydas. 2012.
Vertybių tironija ir politika.
Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla,182 psl.

The aim of this essay is to articulate and explicate the relations between sociological theory and the phenomenological approach. This is done in two parts: the first looks at Schutz's attempts to articulate a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude; the second explicates the methodological postulates formulated by Schutz for the construction of social scientific constructs. It is suggested that the nature of the conventional sociological inquiry in Lithuania must be reconsidered if the subjective view of actor is to be retained as relevant to both philosophical and sociological inquiry.
Key words: a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, Alfred Schutz, social theory, phenomenology in Lithuania, the three relevant horizons of social action: philosophy, sociology and culture.

Santrauka. Paskutinėje, trečioje, dalyje kritiškai svarstomos trivializacijos, reliatyvizmo ir empirizmo dilemos, su kuriomis, kaip teigiama, susiduria vėlyvoji etnometodologija. Taip pat nagrinėjama santykio tarp subjektyvumo ir objektyvumo problema, kuri rodo, kad EM, neproblemiškai taikydama reliatyvizuojančią Alfredo Schützo racionalumo formų analizę, ją radikaliai endogenizuoja, vengdama išorinių palyginamumo kriterijų. Socialinio veiksmo prasmės problema redukuojama į situacinius sveiko proto žinojimo struktūrų aprašymus. Todėl radikaliai keičiasi socialinio veiksmo prasmės, pagrindinės socialinės teorijos kategorijos, statusas: socialinio veiksmo sąlygų supratimo problema pakeičiama konkrečių "aprašomojo mąstymo" sprendinių sociolingvistika. EM pažadai siekti aiškumo identifikuojant santykį tarp analitinių sąvokų ir sveiko proto sąvokų lieka paraštėse. Į klausimą, kaip atsekti kelią, nueinamą darant sociologines išvadas, vėlyvoji EM neatsako. Kompensuodama "nejaukią tylą" EM intensyviau eksploatuoja epistemologinio anti-realizmo natūrfilosofiją; Durkheimo fundamentalų principą nominaliai keičia fundamentaliu fenomenu; konstruoja nerealistines dvinares perskyras, kurios neproblemiškai atkartoja jos ankstyvąsias polemines formuluotes. Kritinėse dalyse artikuliuojami konkretūs pavyzdžiai, liudijantys, kad etnometodologija, konstruodama neįprastą ne teorijos sampratą, juda ironijos, teorinio principo, kurio pabrėžtinai vengia, link.ABSTRACTHAROLD GARFINKEL AND THE POSTPHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION (III)The aim of this essay is to articulate and explicate the latter day radical version of ethnomethodology (EM), and critically assess the ethno-"methodological" presuppositions, main concepts, and especially an uncommunicative distinction between so called classical accountability and natural accountability. There are four dilemmas that confront Harold Garfinkel in his attempts to explicate the epistemological foundations of fundamental "radical phenomenon". They are following: first, the "dilemma of trivialization", including an unarticulated relation between the abstractedness and concreteness; second, the dilemma of relativism; third, the dilemma of empiricism; fourth, the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity. The conclusion is that, despite the very interesting attempts of classical ethnomethodology to explicate empirically the phenomenology of social action, the latter day radical version of ethnomethodology give up the problem of meaningful and intelligible conditions of social action, and instead reflects Garfinkel's engagement with 1) a radical form of micro-linguistic a-theory and 2) a naturalist version of epistemological anti-realism.

This article is written in honour of Harold Garfinkel (October 29, 1923–April 21, 2011), a thinker who has been greatly influential, directly and indirectly, in shaping many fields of academic study. The aim is to explicate the question 'What is Ethnomethodology?' by making explicit the early (1967) and late (2002) versions of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. This is done in two parts: the first looks at Garfinkel's attempts to articulate and operationalise different sociological conceptions of social action; the second turns to Harold Garfinkel and Anne Rawls's re-specification of Durkheim. The article argues that this 'radical new beginning' represents an opportunity for sociologists to focus on the unexamined relations between the various postphenomenological conceptions of social action, the critical tradition of social theory, and the 'visible, however unnoticed' core of ethnomethodological 'theory'.

Review: Nekrašas, Evaldas. 2010. Pozityvus protas. VU: VU leidykla.