How do measures to increase turnout affect election outcomes? I use a novel approach to analyze how these measures influence both voter turnout and the candidates' political positions. In general, lowering the net expense of voting reduces political polarization. If the net expense of voting is made very low, then candidates no longer have an incentive to take partisan positions to motivate turnout and will converge at the median voter's ideal point. For small changes in the net expense of voting, however, decreasing the cost of voting and penalties for not voting (two common measures) can result in drastically different political outcomes. Counter intuitively, measures that make voting cheaper might not increase turnout: since these measures decrease the difference between the candidates' political positions, they also decrease the benefit of voting.
While scholars and pundits alike have expressed concern regarding increasing social polarization based on partisan identity, there has been little analysis of how social polarization impacts voting. In this paper, we incorporate social identity into a principal-agent model of political representation and characterize the influence of social polarization on partisan voting. We show that social identity has an indirect effect on voting through voters' beliefs regarding the ex post decision of political representatives on top of a direct effect through an expressive channel. We conduct a laboratory experiment designed to identify the relative effect of the two channels. We find that social polarization causes partisan voting, and that up to fifty-five percent of partisan voting is due to the indirect effect of social identity.
While scholars and pundits alike have been pointing to a trend of increasing partisan affect in the US, there has been very little analysis as to how partisan affect impacts the decisions of voters. We hypothesize that affective polarization may effect voting both through an expressive channel, as voters become more likely to vote instinctively, and through an instrumental channel, as voters expect candidates to take decisions that are more favorable towards their partisan in-group. To explore this hypothesis, we conduct a laboratory experiment designed to separate between the expressive and instrumental impact of affective polarization, and find evidence that affect significantly impacts subjects' voting decision through both channels. Importantly, however, we show that the instrumental impact of affective polarization depends on the underlying degree of polarization in policy preferences. Additionally, in contrast to the existing literature, our study demonstrates that affective polarization has a clear negative impact on social welfare by decreasing the likelihood that high valence candidates win elections. Lastly, we compare the impact of affect between groups that are formed using a neutral prime (minimal groups) and groups that are formed using the subjects' stated partisan identity. Surprisingly, we find no difference in voting behavior between the two treatments, implying that among a group of individuals that are otherwise relatively homogenous (university students) the impact of partisan identity is no greater than an arbitrary label.
We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. Since decisions are made by unanimity, bargaining power over the allocation becomes a function of contributions, which generically causes inefficiency in the presence of income asymmetry between member nations. This link between the budget allocation and contributions explains patterns of inefficient spending in the EU, e.g. why resources are diverted to low‐productivity projects in high‐income countries: the option of veto creates a trade‐off between efficiency on the contributions margin and efficiency on the allocation margin.
In 2014 over $60 billion was mobilized to help developing nations mitigate climate change, an amount equivalent to the GDP of Kenya. Interestingly, breaking from the traditional model of bilateral aid, donor countries distributed nearly fifty percent of their aid through multilateral aid funds (OECD, 2015). In this paper, we show that by delegating aid spending to an international fund, donor countries mitigate a "hold-up" problem that occurs when donor countries are tempted to allocate aid based on, say, a regional preference. That is, under bilateral aid, donor-country bias decreases the incentive of recipient countries to invest in measures such as good governance that increase the effectiveness of aid. By delegating allocation decisions to a fund, however, donor countries commit to allocating aid via centralized bargaining, which provides recipient countries with an increased incentive to invest. Additionally, we show that allocating funding by majority rule further increases recipient-country investment, since higher investment increases the probability that a recipient's project will be selected by the endogenous majority coalition, and detail conditions under which majority is the optimal voting rule.
In 2014 over $60 billion was mobilized to help developing nations mitigate climate change, an amount equivalent to the GDP of Kenya. Interestingly, breaking from the traditional model of bilateral aid, donor countries distributed nearly fifty percent of their aid through multilateral aid funds (OECD, 2015). In this paper, we show that by delegating aid spending to an international fund, donor countries mitigate a "hold-up" problem that occurs when donor countries are tempted to allocate aid based on, say, a regional preference. That is, under bilateral aid, donor-country bias decreases the incentive of recipient countries to invest in measures such as good governance that increase the effectiveness of aid. By delegating allocation decisions to a fund, however, donor countries commit to allocating aid via centralized bargaining, which provides recipient countries with an increased incentive to invest. Additionally, we show that allocating funding by majority rule further increases recipient-country investment, since higher investment increases the probability that a recipient's project will be selected by the endogenous majority coalition, and detail conditions under which majority is the optimal voting rule.
We study fiscal spending by supranational unions, where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget. We explore the link between the allocation and nations' contributions that occurs since bargaining power is endogenous, and generically causes inefficiency. Interestingly, redistribution arises endogenously, despite nations being purely self-interested. However, there exists a trade-off between increasing equality and decreasing efficiency, which becomes more severe as the centralized budget increases. We also analyze partial ex-ante commitment through alternative decision-making institutions: Both majority rule and exogenous tax rules can improve efficiency.
In this note, we argue that the Eurozone needs an institutional exit mechanism to enhance Eurozone stability, and propose modifications to the Dobbs' NEWNEY mechanism, the only mechanism that satisfies the twin properties of eliminating incentives for intra-Eurozone capital flight and maintaining Eurozone price stability. Our modifications eliminate moral hazard, allow for a fair distribution of costs (between and within countries) and are also appropriate for the exit of a fiscally strong country. ; Wir befürworten einen institutionellen Exit-Mechanismus für die Eurozone, nicht zuletzt um die Stabilität der Eurozone zu stärken, und schlagen Modifikationen zu Dobb's NEWNEY Mechanismus vor, dem einzigen Mechanismus, der Anreize zu Kapitalflucht innerhalb der Eurozone eliminiert und Preisstabilität garantiert. Unsere Modifikationen eliminieren moral hazard und erlauben es, die Kosten eines Exits gerecht zu verteilen, sowohl zwischen Ländern als auch innerhalb eines Landes. Der modifizierte Mechanismus eignet sich nicht nur für den Exit eines fiskalisch schwachen, sondern auch für den Exit eines fiskalischen starken Lands.
We use a novel approach to address the question of whether a union of sovereign countries can efficiently raise and allocate a budget, even when members are purely self-interested and participation is voluntary. The main innovation of our model is to explore the link between budget contributions and allocation that arises when countries bargain over union outcomes. This link stems from the distribution of bargaining power being endogenously determined. Generically, it follows that unstructured bargaining gives an inefficient result. We find, however, that efficiency is achieved with fully homogenous countries, and when countries have similar incomes and the union budget is small. Moreover, some redistribution arises endogenously, even though nations are purely self-interested and not forced to participate in the union. A larger union budget, however, entails a tradeoff between equality and efficiency. We also analyze alternative institutions and find that majority rule can improve efficiency if nations who prefer projects with high public good spillovers are endogenously selected to the majority coalition. Exogenous tax rules, such as the linear tax rule in the EU, which is designed to increase efficiency on the contribution margin, can also improve overall efficiency despite decreasing the efficiency of the allocation of funds. ; Wir nutzen einen neuen Ansatz um der Frage nachzugehen, ob eine Union aus souveränen Staaten effizient ein Budget erheben und verteilen kann, auch wenn alle Mitgliedstaaten ausschließlich ihren Eigennutzen maximieren und die Mitgliedschaft freiwillig ist. Die Hauptneuerung unseres Modells ist die Erforschung des Zusammenhanges zwischen Beiträgen zum gemeinsamen Budget einerseits und dessen Allokation andererseits, der aus dem Verhandlungsprozess resultiert. Dieser Zusammenhang entsteht, da die Verteilung relativer Verhandlungsmacht endogen ist. Das bewirkt, dass ein unstrukturierter Verhandlungsprozess fast immer zu ineffizienten Resultaten führt. Ausnahmen ergeben sich wenn alle Staaten homogen sind, sowie wenn die nationalen Einkommen ähnlich und das gemeinsame Unionsbudget vergleichsweise gering sind. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir, dass ein gewisses Maß an Umverteilung entsteht, obwohl alle Staaten ausschließlich eigennützig handeln und freiwillig teilnehmen. Mit einem wachsenden Budget ergibt sich allerdings ein Konflikt zwischen Gleichheit und Effizienz. Desweiteren analysieren wir alternative Institutionen und zeigen dass ein Mehrheitsprinzip effizienzsteigernd sein kann, sofern die Staaten welche Projekte mit dem höchsten Gemeinnutzen bevorzugen eine Mehrheitskoalition bilden. Exogen bestimmte Beitragssätze, wie etwa die proportionale Steuerregel in der EU, welche zur Steigerung der Effizienz auf der Abgabeseite eingeführt wurde, können ebenfalls insgesamt vorteilhaft sein, obwohl gleichzeitig die Effizienz der resultierenden Mittelverteilung sinkt.
While scholars and pundits alike have been pointing to a trend of increasing partisan affect in the US, there has been very little analysis as to how partisan affect impacts the decisions of voters. We hypothesize that affective polarization may effect voting both through an expressive channel, as voters become more likely to vote instinctively, and through an instrumental channel, as voters expect candidates to take decisions that are more favorable towards their partisan in-group. To explore this hypothesis, we conduct a laboratory experiment designed to separate between the expressive and instrumental impact of affective polarization, and find evidence that affect significantly impacts subjects' voting decision through both channels. Importantly, however, we show that the instrumental impact of affective polarization depends on the underlying degree of polarization in policy preferences. Additionally, in contrast to the existing literature, our study demonstrates that affective polarization has a clear negative impact on social welfare by decreasing the likelihood that high valence candidates win elections. Lastly, we compare the impact of affect between groups that are formed using a neutral prime (minimal groups) and groups that are formed using the subjects' stated partisan identity. Surprisingly, we find no difference in voting behavior between the two treatments, implying that among a group of individuals that are otherwise relatively homogenous (university students) the impact of partisan identity is no greater than an arbitrary label.
In 2014 over $60 billion was mobilized to help developing nations mitigate climate change, an amount equivalent to the GDP of Kenya. Interestingly, breaking from the traditional model of bilateral aid, donor countries distributed nearly fifty percent of their aid through multilateral aid funds (OECD, 2015). In this paper, we show that by delegating aid spending to an international fund, donor countries mitigate a "hold-up" problem that occurs when donor countries are tempted to allocate aid based on, say, a regional preference. That is, under bilateral aid, donor-country bias decreases the incentive of recipient countries to invest in measures such as good governance that increase the effectiveness of aid. By delegating allocation decisions to a fund, however, donor countries commit to allocating aid via centralized bargaining, which provides recipient countries with an increased incentive to invest. Additionally, we show that allocating funding by majority rule further increases recipient-country investment, since higher investment increases the probability that a recipient's project will be selected by the endogenous majority coalition, and detail conditions under which majority is the optimal voting rule.
