Suchergebnisse

Estudos recentes têm demonstrado conexões entre a frequência do uso de redes sociais e a participação política. No entanto, não há uma elucidação clara de como esse uso de redes sociais se traduz em um aumento da atividade política. O presente artigo examina três possíveis explicações para essa relação, no âmbito do comportamento de protesto dos cidadãos: a informação (redes sociais como uma fonte de notícias), a expressão de opiniões (uso das redes sociais para expressar opiniões políticas) e o ativismo (juntando-se a causas e descobrindo informações para a mobilização por meio de redes sociais). Para colocar essas relações à prova, este trabalho utiliza dados de pesquisa de opinião, coletados no Chile em 2011, durante manifestações que exigiam mudanças amplas em políticas educacionais e energéticas. Os resultados sugerem que o uso de redes sociais para a expressão de opiniões e para ativismo pode mediar a relação entre o uso geral das redes sociais e o comportamento de protesto. Estes resultados podem aumentar nosso conhecimento sobre os usos e efeitos das redes sociais e fornecer novas evidências sobre o papel das plataformas digitais como facilitadoras da ação política direta.

Recent studies have shown a positive link between frequency of social media use and political participation. However, there has been no clear elaboration of how using social media translates into increased political activity. The current study examines three explanations for this relationship in the context of citizens' protest behavior: information (social media as a source for news), opinion expression (using social media to express political opinions), and activism (joining causes and finding mobilizing information through social media). To test these relationships, the study uses survey data collected in Chile in 2011, amid massive demonstrations demanding wholesale changes in education and energy policy. Findings suggest that using social media for opinion expression and activism mediates the relationship between overall social media use and protest behavior. These findings deepen our knowledge of the uses and effects of social media and provide new evidence on the role of digital platforms as facilitators of direct political action.

Existing research on which citizens are most and least likely to exhibit media priming effects is inconclusive. Using data from the 2006 Canadian election, this study examined the moderating role of voters' political knowledge, interest in politics, news attention, and discussion frequency. Results show priming was not constant across political involvement variables. It was strongest for citizens with moderate levels of knowledge and discussion, but was negatively related to interest. Compared to pessimistic and optimistic accounts of voters' ability to resist media influence, the findings suggest a more nuanced perspective on citizen "competence."

To explain the participatory effects of news exposure, communication scholars have long relied upon the "virtuous circle" framework of media use and civic participation. That is, news consumption makes people more knowledgeable, and trustful toward institutions and political processes, making them active and responsible citizens, which then leads them to engage in various political activities. In a social media environment, however, the applicability of the "virtuous circle" is increasingly dubious. A mounting body of empirical research indicates that news consumption via social media does not necessarily yield actual information gains. Instead, it often fosters a false perception of being well-informed and politically competent, thereby stimulating political engagement. Furthermore, selective information consumption and interaction within like-minded networks on social media frequently exacerbate animosity toward opposing political factions, which can serve as a catalyst for political involvement. In light of these findings, we propose replacing the "virtuous circle" framework for a "self-righteous" one. In this new model, social media news users develop a heightened sense of confidence in their knowledge, regardless of its accuracy, and consequently become more inclined to engage in politics by reinforcing the perception that the opposing side is inherently wrong and that achieving victory is imperative.

This trend study describes changes and continuities in the stratification of usage of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp in Chile between 2009-2019—the decade that witnessed the rise of social media. Using the Youth, Media and Participation Study—a probabilistic survey conducted on an annual basis among 1,000 individuals aged 18 to 29 living in the three largest urban areas in Chile (N = 10,518)—we analyze how frequency of use and type of activities conducted on social media has varied over time along socioeconomic status, gender, and age cohort. Instead of a uniform trend towards less (or greater) inequality, the results show that each platform exhibits a unique dynamic. For instance, whereas SES-based inequality in frequency of use has decreased on Facebook over time, it has remained stable on WhatsApp and increased on Twitter and Instagram. In addition, significant differences in the likelihood of conducting different activities (e.g., chatting, commenting news, sharing links) remained across groups, even on platforms such as Facebook where frequency of use has equalized over time.

This study tests the generalizability of agenda-setting theory in less developed democracies by analyzing data on public opinion, television news coverage, presidential policy, and real-world indicators from Chile between 2000 and 2005. After tracking attention to five different issues—crime, unemployment, health, poverty, and education—we estimate both average and issue-specific agenda-setting effects using time-series, cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The results show that there are multidirectional influences between the public, television news, and the president. Both the public and the president appeared responsive to prior news coverage, and while news coverage was not influenced by public attention, it was affected by presidential rhetoric. While these processes differed from one issue to another, overall there was a top-down pattern of agenda adoption: Policy preferences are "negotiated" between the president and the news media, with no noticeable input from the public. From a comparative perspective, the evidence shows that television news in Chile are considerably powerful and that citizens' priorities are basically ignored by the elites, although their maneuvering is still constrained by objective conditions.

Influencing Public Opinion -- Reality and the News -- The Pictures in our Heads -- Networks of Issues and Attributes -- Why Agenda Setting Occurs -- How Agenda Setting Works -- Shaping the Media Agenda -- Consequences of Agenda Setting -- Communication and Society.

Abstract
Previous research has shown that corruption diminishes citizens' level of political support and engagement. We extend this line of reasoning and evaluate whether previous levels of perceived corruption can influence subsequent levels of political knowledge. We test this proposition with data from a two-wave panel probability survey applied in Chile between 2016 and 2017, just after a 2-year period in which an avalanche of corruption scandals shook the country. Our estimates confirm that perceived corruption reduces subsequent political knowledge, while controlling for prior knowledge. This pattern is particularly strong among non-ideologues and people ideologically distant from the incumbent government. Given the status of political knowledge as a democratically valuable trait, our results uncover some normatively disturbing consequences of corruption.

Contrary to popular narratives, it is not clear whether using social media for news increases belief in political misinformation. Several of the most methodologically sound studies find small to nonexistent effects. However, extant research is limited by focusing on few platforms (usually Facebook, Twitter or YouTube) and is heavily U.S. centered. This leaves open the possibility that other platforms, such as those that rely on visual communication (e.g., Instagram) or are tailored to strong-tie network communication (e.g., WhatsApp), are more influential. Furthermore, the few studies conducted in other countries suggest that social media use increases political misperceptions. Still, these works use cross-sectional designs, which are ill suited to dealing with omitted variable bias and temporal ordering of processes. Using a two-wave survey fielded in Mexico during the 2021 midterm elections (N = 596), we estimate the relationship between frequency of news exposure on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp, and belief in political misinformation, while controlling for both time-invariant and time-dependent individual differences. In contrast to political discussion, information literacy and digital skills, none of the social platforms analyzed exhibits a significant association with misinformed beliefs. We also tested for possible indirect, moderated, and reciprocal relationships, but none of these analyses yielded a statistically significant result. We conclude that the study is consistent with the "minimal media effects" paradigm, which suggests that efforts to address misinformation need to go beyond social platforms.