Suchergebnisse

Résumé Cet article a pour objectif de mieux cerner les fondements institutionnels et organisationnels de la Responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise [RSE]. Nous cherchons dans un premier temps à comprendre les origines de l'appel généralisé en faveur de la RSE qui marque l'époque contemporaine. Nous distinguons un appel institutionnel symptomatique du déficit de régulation de l'ancien modèle fordiste et, plus largement, un appel sociétal, dû à une accélération du dévoilement des effets externes négatifs. Nous essayons ensuite de comprendre pourquoi les entreprises adhèrent massivement à ce projet de responsabilisation et décrivons les conditions qui autorisent l'opérationnalisation d'un tel projet. Nous dressons, pour terminer, l'inventaire des limites que nous semble poser le projet de régulation proposé par la RSE.

International audience ; In this article, we build on the stakeholder-politics literature to investigate how corporate scandals transform political contexts and give impetus to the contentious movements of fringe stakeholders against multinational corporations (MNCs). Based on Adut's scandal theory (2005), we flesh out three scandal-related processes that directly affect political-opportunity structures (POSs) and the generation of social movements against MNCs: convergence of contention towards a single target, publicisation of deviant practices, and contagion to other organisations. These processes reduce the obstacles to collective actions by fringe stakeholders by pushing corporate elites to be more sensitive to their claims, by decreasing MNCs' capability to repress contentious movements, by forcing the targeted MNCs to formalise a policy to monitor and eradicate the controversial practices and by helping fringe stakeholders find internal and external allies to support their claims. This conceptual model of scandals as catalysts of contentious actions contributes to a better understanding of stakeholder politics by unveiling the role of the political context in the coordination of fringe stakeholders.

International audience ; In this article, we build on the stakeholder-politics literature to investigate how corporate scandals transform political contexts and give impetus to the contentious movements of fringe stakeholders against multinational corporations (MNCs). Based on Adut's scandal theory (2005), we flesh out three scandal-related processes that directly affect political-opportunity structures (POSs) and the generation of social movements against MNCs: convergence of contention towards a single target, publicisation of deviant practices, and contagion to other organisations. These processes reduce the obstacles to collective actions by fringe stakeholders by pushing corporate elites to be more sensitive to their claims, by decreasing MNCs' capability to repress contentious movements, by forcing the targeted MNCs to formalise a policy to monitor and eradicate the controversial practices and by helping fringe stakeholders find internal and external allies to support their claims. This conceptual model of scandals as catalysts of contentious actions contributes to a better understanding of stakeholder politics by unveiling the role of the political context in the coordination of fringe stakeholders.

International audience In this article, we build on the stakeholder-politics literature to investigate how corporate scandals transform political contexts and give impetus to the contentious movements of fringe stakeholders against multinational corporations (MNCs). Based on Adut's scandal theory (2005), we flesh out three scandal-related processes that directly affect political-opportunity structures (POSs) and the generation of social movements against MNCs: convergence of contention towards a single target, publicisation of deviant practices, and contagion to other organisations. These processes reduce the obstacles to collective actions by fringe stakeholders by pushing corporate elites to be more sensitive to their claims, by decreasing MNCs' capability to repress contentious movements, by forcing the targeted MNCs to formalise a policy to monitor and eradicate the controversial practices and by helping fringe stakeholders find internal and external allies to support their claims. This conceptual model of scandals as catalysts of contentious actions contributes to a better understanding of stakeholder politics by unveiling the role of the political context in the coordination of fringe stakeholders.

Face aux difficultés récurrentes en matière de revenus, les coopératives agricoles françaises ont fait le pari de la diversification. Les facteurs de réussite de leurs stratégies en la matière sont peu étudiés, ce qui freine d'autant leur compréhension. En prenant appui sur la théorie des ressources, les auteurs dégagent quatre grandes stratégies de diversification des coopératives agricoles. Ils montrent que leur réussite dépend de la capacité de la coopérative mère à identifier les ressources et les compétences sur lesquelles elle peut s'appuyer pour bâtir une stratégie créatrice de valeur. Ils soulignent également les difficultés de pilotage que ces stratégies génèrent pour les dirigeants élus. Difficultés qui peuvent se traduire par une perte de contrôle et d'influence.

Cet article propose une mise en perspective historique des évolutions de la raison d'être des coopératives agricoles françaises. Les auteurs montrent que celles-ci, au fil de leur histoire, ont transformé leurs missions et services essentiels en fonction des attentes et des défis qui s'exprimaient dans leur environnement socio-économique. Ils détaillent également les principales ruptures, dans la conception de cette raison d'être, qui jalonnent le parcours de la coopération agricole française et conduisent aux tensions et remises en question contemporaines. En montrant comment s'organise le travail de définition de la raison d'être, cet article apporte un éclairage original sur l'émergence, avec l'épidémie de Covid-19, de nouveaux défis agricoles et alimentaires qui questionnent à nouveau les services et missions de base des coopératives agricoles.

International audience ; For many organizations, animals are indispensable resources and without their presence these organizations would be unable to fulfill their mission and achieve their objectives. Despite this importance, organizational theory and management research have largely rejected animals outside the boundaries of the discipline. Our research focuses on the central place of animals in certain organizations that we describe as biosocial. Based on the analytical developments of boundary-work, our article makes two contributions to the emerging theory of biosocial organizations. First of all, we highlight a variety of biosocial organizations that do not pursue the same objectives and grant different status to animals. We also highlight the many externalities associated with the functioning of biosocial organizations that strain the equilibriums of the earth system and are at the root of political tensions and ethical questions. In response to the scientific and industrial developments of biosocial organizations and their societal and environmental footprints, our research highlights the need to integrate these organizations as research objects within the theory of organizations and management research. We also bring original developments for boundary-work by showing the importance of taking an interest in the boundaries of living organisms that are challenged by biosocial organizations and which lead to questioning the very notion of the human species."

International audience ; For many organizations, animals are indispensable resources and without their presence these organizations would be unable to fulfill their mission and achieve their objectives. Despite this importance, organizational theory and management research have largely rejected animals outside the boundaries of the discipline. Our research focuses on the central place of animals in certain organizations that we describe as biosocial. Based on the analytical developments of boundary-work, our article makes two contributions to the emerging theory of biosocial organizations. First of all, we highlight a variety of biosocial organizations that do not pursue the same objectives and grant different status to animals. We also highlight the many externalities associated with the functioning of biosocial organizations that strain the equilibriums of the earth system and are at the root of political tensions and ethical questions. In response to the scientific and industrial developments of biosocial organizations and their societal and environmental footprints, our research highlights the need to integrate these organizations as research objects within the theory of organizations and management research. We also bring original developments for boundary-work by showing the importance of taking an interest in the boundaries of living organisms that are challenged by biosocial organizations and which lead to questioning the very notion of the human species."

Although workers' cooperatives are regarded as credible alternatives to private companies to reform capitalism, scholars have only started to document the struggles inherent to cooperativization – the process by which private companies transition to cooperative forms. This article analyses how executives prevent actual cooperativization in practice by shaping and capturing governance structures. Relying on 35 interviews, observations, and focus groups of two private firms having adopted cooperative forms, we document a set of governance practices used by executives to prevent cooperativization: general assembly disempowerment, board neutralization, and executive committee entrenchment. We then explain how these practices interact to form a spiral of democratic governance prevention that generate spurious workers cooperatives. These results contribute to cooperative studies by explaining the role of executives and governance in preventing cooperativization. Our study enlarges the repertoire of worker cooperatives pathologies and offers political and organizational levers to limit the phenomena of cooperativization prevention and executives' capture of governance structures.