Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner's dilemma game under incomplete and complete information
In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 1-25
ISSN: 1545-5874
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In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 1-25
ISSN: 1545-5874
Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We therefore build a model of how individuals in a finitely repeated PD with incomplete information about their partner's preference for mutual cooperation decide about cooperation. We study cooperation in simultaneous and sequential PDs. Our model explains three behavioral regularities found in the literature: (i) the frequent cooperation in one-shot and finitely repeated N-shot games, (ii) cooperation rates declining over the course of the game, and (iii) cooperation being more frequent in the sequential PD than in the simultaneous PD.
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In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 35, Heft 1-3, S. 1-25
ISSN: 1545-5874
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 415-441
In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 415-441
In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]
In: Dijkstra , J , Van Assen , M A L M & Stokman , F N 2008 , ' Outcomes of collective decisions with externalities predicted ' , Journal of Theoretical Politics , vol. 20 , no. 4 , pp. 415-441 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629808093774
In collective decision making bilateral deals can increase or decrease the likelihood of finding compromises, depending on whether such deals have externalities. Positive externalities mean third actors profit from bilateral deals, whereas negative externalities mean bilateral deals hurt third actors. We develop the first model of collective decision making that takes externalities into account. The model computes the expected outcomes of the issues to be decided and construes four coalitions of actors on each pair of issues. Then it searches for a set of alternative expected outcomes, such that no coalition can further increase the payoffs of one of its members, either (i) without decreasing the payoffs of one of its members, or (ii) without decreasing the payoffs of any actor. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is used to pick a single outcome. The model is tested on data from decisions in the European Union.
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In: Social behavior and personality: an international journal, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 453-471
ISSN: 1179-6391
We carried out 2 studies to evaluate the relationship between attachment style and crying in adults. Data were collected from 2 independent large samples, measuring as 2 different operationalizations crying in general and in response to music. The results in both studies showed a consistent
pattern. As anticipated, the group with a dismissive attachment style cried less than the other groups, and the preoccupied attachment style group cried more intensely than the secure group. The preoccupied and fearful attachment style groups reported the most negative emotions while crying,
whereas the secure group reported more crying over positive emotions. These results show that attachment style is a determinant of adult crying behavior.
In: Klein , R A , Vianello , M , Hasselman , F , Adams , B G , Adams , R B , Alper , S , Aveyard , M , Axt , J R , Babalola , M T , Bahník , Š , Batra , R , Berkics , M , Bernstein , M J , Berry , D R , Bialobrzeska , O , Binan , E D , Bocian , K , Brandt , M J , Busching , R , Rédei , A C , Cai , H , Cambier , F , Cantarero , K , Carmichael , C L , Ceric , F , Chandler , J , Chang , J-H , Chatard , A , Chen , E E , Cheong , W , Cicero , D C , Coen , S , Coleman , J A , Collisson , B , Conway , M A , Corker , K S , Curran , P G , Cushman , F , Dagona , Z K , Dalgar , I , Dalla Rosa , A , Davis , W E , de Bruijn , M , De Schutter , L , Devos , T , de Vries , M , Doğulu , C , Dozo , N , Dukes , K N , Dunham , Y , Durrheim , K , Ebersole , C R , Edlund , J E , Eller , A , English , A S , Finck , C , Frankowska , N , Freyre , M , Friedman , M , Galliani , E M , Gandi , J C , Ghoshal , T , Giessner , S R , Gill , T , Gnambs , T , Gómez , Á , González , R , Graham , J , Grahe , J E , Grahek , I , Green , E G T , Hai , K , Haigh , M , Haines , E L , Hall , M P , Heffernan , M E , Hicks , J A , Houdek , P , Huntsinger , J R , Huynh , H P , Ijzerman , H , Inbar , Y , Innes-ker , Å H , Jiménez-leal , W , John , M , Joy-gaba , J A , Kamiloğlu , R G , Kappes , H B , Karabati , S , Karick , H , Keller , V N , Kende , A , Kervyn , N , Knežević , G , Kovacs , C , Krueger , L E , Kurapov , G , Kurtz , J , Lakens , D , Lazarević , L B , Levitan , C A , Lewis , N A , Lins , S , Lipsey , N P , Losee , J E , Maassen , E , Maitner , A T , Malingumu , W , Mallett , R K , Marotta , S A , Međedović , J , Mena-pacheco , F , Milfont , T L , Morris , W L , Murphy , S C , Myachykov , A , Neave , N , Neijenhuijs , K , Nelson , A J , Neto , F , Lee Nichols , A , Ocampo , A , O'donnell , S L , Oikawa , H , Oikawa , M , Ong , E , Orosz , G , Osowiecka , M , Packard , G , Pérez-sánchez , R , Petrović , B , Pilati , R , Pinter , B , Podesta , L , Pogge , G , Pollmann , M M H , Rutchick , A M , Saavedra , P , Saeri , A K , Salomon , E , Schmidt , K , Schönbrodt , F D , Sekerdej , M B , Sirlopú , D , Skorinko , J L M , Smith , M A , Smith-castro , V , Smolders , K C H J , Sobkow , A , Sowden , W , Spachtholz , P , Srivastava , M , Steiner , T G , Stouten , J , Street , C N H , Sundfelt , O K , Szeto , S , Szumowska , E , Tang , A C W , Tanzer , N , Tear , M J , Theriault , J , Thomae , M , Torres , D , Traczyk , J , Tybur , J M , Ujhelyi , A , Van Aert , R C M , Van Assen , M A L M , Van Der Hulst , M , Van Lange , P A M , Van 't Veer , A E , Vásquez- Echeverría , A , Ann Vaughn , L , Vázquez , A , Vega , L D , Verniers , C , Verschoor , M , Voermans , I P J , Vranka , M A , Welch , C , Wichman , A L , Williams , L A , Wood , M , Woodzicka , J A , Wronska , M K , Young , L , Zelenski , J M , Zhijia , Z & Nosek , B A 2018 , ' Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings ' , Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science , vol. 1 , no. 4 , pp. 443-490 . https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918810225
We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen's ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.
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