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Governmental organizations face the challenge to integrate different sectoral policy perspectives and interests to deal effectively with the wicked issues of late-modern societies. This article delves into attempts of governmental organizations to realize such integrated policies and unravels the intra-organizational dynamics of collaborating on policy integration. Based on two in-depth case studies from The Netherlands, one focusing on public transport for specific target groups in the city of Rotterdam and the other focusing on a national policy program for criminal youth groups, we show how attempts at policy integration take place in the periphery of bureaucracies by temporary program teams. After the abolishment of the program team, the integrated policy easily volatilizes because of the lack of foothold and ownership in the line organization. Ironically, policy integration becomes a differentiated activity in the margins of public organizations rather than a joint exercise of sectoral organizational units. We present three explanatory hypotheses of this dynamic of marginalization. First, from a system-psychodynamic perspective, the line organization and the program team maintain distance from each other to reduce the tensions that are inherent in policy integration. Second, from an institutional perspective, the line organization marginalizes policy integration to protect their sectoral and vested interests. Third, from an innovation perspective, however, innovative policy integration does need the margins of organizations to protect itself against conservative reflexes from bureaucracies at risk of becoming marginalized and alienated. To facilitate a productive dynamic of policy integration in governmental organizations, this article concludes with providing the components for such an organizational design.

Abstract
Innovative policy measures often imply institutional adjustments. Whether such adjustments are accomplished often depends upon the presence of institutional entrepreneurship: actors who take responsibility to initiate the necessary actions to redesign existing institutional practices. The question arises under which conditions can institutional entrepreneurship be developed? And, what might be the cause of lacking institutional entrepreneurship?
In this article, the latter question is examined through in-depth collaborative research project for exploring alternative, adaptive flood risk strategies for flood proofing the unembanked area of the north-end of the city district Feijenoord in Rotterdam. Due to climate change, these areas are increasingly vulnerable to flooding. The traditional, institutionalized solution of raising the ground level before initiating new spatial developments does not suffice in the long term. Therefore, the city government explored alternative strategies for more adaptive ways of dealing with flood risks. Together with representatives of key stakeholders in the area, two key strategies for the unembanked areas were elaborated. These strategies have significant implications for the distribution of costs, risks and responsibilities and necessitate alternative governance architectures that exceed the current institutional structures.
During the research project, it became clear that the developed alternative strategies fundamentally differed from the current institutional system. Thus, institutional redesign was necessary. This proved to be virtually impossible, especially because none of the involved actors was willing nor capable of undertaking entrepreneurial activities to start such redesign. This observation led us to further investigate into the causes and the consequences of the absent entrepreneurship.

Le temps est souvent considéré comme le cadre indépendant par rapport auquel les processus de gouvernance évoluent. Dans le présent article, en revanche, nous considérons le temps comme un facteur qui influence l'évolution des processus d'innovation dans la gestion de l'eau. En nous basant sur deux exemples néerlandais, nous analysons les perceptions du temps et la gestion du temps. Les gestionnaires publics gèrent leur temps en essayant de fixer des délais, en synchronisant différents calendriers ou en imposant leur horizon temporel au processus. Il arrive que les calendriers des différents acteurs soient incompatibles, ce qui peut entraver les processus de gouvernance. L'analyse du temps aide à expliquer la dynamique des processus de gouvernance et, dans le présent article, nous allons voir que l'alignement des calendriers est une activité déterminante pour réaliser des innovations dans la gouvernance. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Le temps est un facteur déterminant dans les processus d'innovation. Les acteurs ont souvent des perceptions différentes du temps (horizons temporels et délais). La gestion du temps classique vise essentiellement à budgétiser le temps. Dans le présent article, nous plaidons en faveur d'une gouvernance sensible au facteur temps. L'une des étapes élémentaires consiste à expliquer les différents horizons temporels des acteurs, les cycles et le budget temps. Les gestionnaires doivent aligner les horizons temporels à court terme nécessaires sur des marchés compétitifs sur les visions à moyen terme nécessaires pour développer comme il se doit les innovations et les intégrer dans l'environnement stratégique. L'adaptivité (adaptive governance) dans le traitement du temps est importante afin de synchroniser le développement des innovations avec les évolutions sur le marché et dans les organisations gouvernementales.

Time is often considered to be an inert background against which governance processes evolve. Instead, this article approaches time as a factor that influences the development of innovation processes in water governance. Drawing on two Dutch cases, we analyse perceptions of time and the management of time. Public managers manage time by trying to fix deadlines, by synchronizing different timelines or by imposing their time horizon on the process. Different actors' timeframes may interfere with one another, and this may hinder governance processes. The analysis of time helps to explain the dynamics of governance processes, and this article shows that the alignment of timeframes is a crucial activity in realizing innovations in governance. Points for practitioners Time is a crucial factor in innovation processes. Actors often have different perceptions of time, including different time horizons and deadlines. Classic time management mainly aims at budgeting time. This article argues for time sensitive governance. An elementary step is to explicate actors' various time-horizons, time cycles and time-budget. Managers need to align short-term time horizons needed in competitive markets, with medium-term views required to carefully develop innovations and embed them in the policy environment. Adaptivity in dealing with time is important to synchronize the development of innovations with developments in the market and governmental organizations.

The discursive framing of projects is an oft-used strategy to claim legitimacy and create support for proposed measures. By giving a project an appealing 'label', politicians and policy makers try to prevent criticism. However, policy labels are thrown out like 'boomerangs' with a view to gaining leverage, resources, and legitimacy. The thrower, however, cannot control how the boomerang comes back. This paper sheds light on the consequences of these 'backfiring labels' with the help of two illustrative case studies: a 'calamity polder' for controlled flood storage (Ooijpolder) and a 'bypass' for the river IJssel near Kampen, respectively. Interestingly, the wider frames from which these labels originate differ and give rise to different dynamics, but with the same outcome: the label reaped the opposite effect. We analyze the way in which this process of strategic 'labelling' takes place, its discursive power, its impact on the governance process in question, and how policy makers react upon backfiring consequences.

This article describes the results of a comparative case study of two competence development trajectories within Dutch public administration organizations. These two trajectories are rather different: One can be seen as a more theory-driven training approach whereas the other can be seen as practice-driven coaching. Their theoretical distinctions are elaborated upon, and the ways in which these differences impact upon their contributions to individual and organizational learning processes are analyzed. The article concludes with some observations on the relative value of both approaches as well as some conclusions about the ways in which the two approaches can strengthen each other and enhance individual and organizational learning.

This article analyzes the discursive strategies surrounding the implementation of the Dutch water safety program 'Room for the River'. When this program was announced, it was heralded as a paradigm shift fitting in with the ongoing transition to 'living with water'. Yet announcing a paradigm shift is not the real thing. When a policy is made, it is still a dead letter. For it to become implemented, people have to act on it as if it is a reality. It needs to be socially produced – and reproduced. The present article looks at how the new river policy initiative is 'translated' to the local level, how discourse coalitions 'pro' and 'contra' develop and how they discursively defend their claims. In this 'translation process' elements of the original policy narrative are selected and reinterpreted to fit into the specific purposes of local stakeholders. While its protagonists have been active in promoting the program as a successful 'paradigm shift', others have questioned this claim. This contribution inventories the different narratives of success and failure on Room for the River, by homing in on an indicative case study. We show how elements of the official policy narrative are used, broadened, questioned or reinterpreted by local actors to defend their specific point of view. Their narratives try to weld discursive alliances between catchy rhetorical devices, normative values and sources of expertise. They make selective use of the dominant narrative of current river management speak, and 'shop' between scientific and policy venues to support these claims. Points for practitioners Policy ideas and labels are inevitably translated and modified as they 'land' in the local arena. A 'success' label may influence but cannot determine local acceptance and implementation of a policy. Locally, labels are likely to become tangled with other labels and interpretations. Multi-objective policies prove particularly vulnerable to criticism from 'purist' and one-issue opponents. Project managers should anticipate the dynamics of reframing and be able to adjust that discourse and labeling where necessary lest they become burdens.

Résumé Dans le présent article, nous analysons les stratégies discursives qui entourent la mise en œuvre du programme néerlandais de protection contre les inondations intitulé « Ruimte voor de River » (Plus d'espace pour le fleuve). Lorsque ce programme a été adopté, on l'a présenté comme un changement de paradigme s'inscrivant dans la transition en cours vers la « cohabitation avec l'eau ». L'annonce d'un changement de paradigme ne correspondait cependant pas à la réalité. Lorsqu'une politique est définie, elle est encore une lettre morte. Pour qu'elle soit mise en œuvre, les gens doivent y donner suite comme s'il s'agissait d'une réalité. Elle doit être socialement produite — et reproduite. Dans le présent article, nous analysons comment cette nouvelle initiative stratégique est « traduite » au niveau local, comment des coalitions discursives « négatives » et « positives » se développent et comment elles défendent leurs revendications sur le plan discursif. Dans ce « processus de traduction », des éléments du discours stratégique sont sélectionnés et réinterprétés pour cadrer avec les objectifs propres aux parties prenantes locales. Tandis que ses partisans n'ont eu de cesse de promouvoir le programme en le présentant comme un « changement de paradigme » positif, d'autres ont contesté cette affirmation. Notre article dresse l'inventaire des différents discours positifs et négatifs à propos de Plus d'espace pour le fleuve en se penchant sur une étude de cas révélatrice. Nous allons voir comment les éléments du discours stratégique officiel sont utilisés, élargis, remis en question ou réinterprétés par les acteurs locaux afin de défendre leur point de vue. Leurs discours tentent de créer des alliances discursives entre des dispositifs rhétoriques accrocheurs, des valeurs normatives et des sources d'expertise. Ils font un usage sélectif du discours prédominant d'alors en matière de gestion des rivières et recherchent, dans les tribunes scientifiques et politiques, les idées qui leur permettront d'appuyer leurs revendications. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Les idées et autres appellations stratégiques sont inévitablement traduites et modifiées lorsqu'elles « atterrissent » sur la scène locale. Les appellations « positives » peuvent avoir une influence sur l'acceptation et la mise en œuvre locales d'une politique, mais elles ne peuvent la déterminer. Au niveau local, les appellations sont susceptibles de s'enchevêtrer peu à peu dans d'autres appellations et interprétations. Les politiques à objectifs multiples s'avèrent particulièrement exposées aux critiques des « puristes » et des adversaires focalisés sur une question unique. Les gestionnaires de projets doivent anticiper la dynamique de la reformulation et être en mesure d'adapter le discours et les appellations le cas échéant, lorsqu'ils craignent qu'ils ne deviennent des fardeaux.

AbstractThis article analyzes the history of conflict and cooperation on the river Scheldt. Dutch-Flemish relations over the shared Scheldt estuary go back for centuries. Only in the past 10 years has there been intensive negotiation on a joint vision for its future which takes the form of a cooperative multi-stakeholder platform incorporating public, private and NGO representatives. Yet, relations have not always been cooperative; negotiations have been tense at times. After discussing the merits of a learning- versus a fighting-oriented analysis and capturing its dynamics in a TWINS matrix, this study proposes an approach that combines collaboration with competition, or learning and fighting. The case analysis finds that relations were often conflictual and cooperative simultaneously and warns against undue optimism about the multi-stakeholder process on the Scheldt estuary.