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L'Australie aura un choix à faire après la fin de la guerre au Vietnam.
Certains Australiens souhaitent un désengagement de leur pays dans le Sud-Est asiatique, tandis que d'autres pensent au contraire que l'Australie, nation asiatique, doit accentuer son aide aux nations de cette région du monde et ne doit pas se retrancher dans une forteresse, avec des préoccupations égoïstes.
Les liens historiques avec la Grande-Bretagne se dénouent. Faut-il renforcer ceux, stratégiques, qui lient l'Australie aux Etats-Unis ?
Dès aujourd'hui, il semble que l'Australie se sente assez forte pour supporter une immigration modérée de non-européens, et surtout, assez adulte pour prendre une position indépendante vis-à-vis de ses alliés traditionnels.

Implementation of President Gerald Ford's "Pacific Doctrine", as announced on December 7, 1975, involves the US in a continuing, flexible commitment to the balance of power in the Asian and Pacific region. While ready to accept the interest of non-Communist countries in Southeast Asia in developing greater strategic self-reliance, US military power is also constructing a new defense parameter off the Asian mainland. The first leg of this new defense parameter is in the Indian Ocean, and centers on the US military facility on the island of Diego Garcia. The other and second leg of this parameter connects Japan and Indonesia, and centers on the islands of Guam and of the newly created Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas.

Two rival governments, each backed by their own armed forces and mass movement style "national front" organisations, as well as by foreign supporters, are contending for control of Cambodia. One faction is the government of "Democratic Kampuchea", headed by Pol Pot as premier and secretary of the "Kampuchea Communist Party", which seized power with its capture of the capital city of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, deposing the US backed government of Lon Nol. The other faction is the "Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Government", headed by Heng Samrin, a former Kampuchea Communist Party provincial executive committee member in Eastern Cambodia. Heng Samrin proclaimed his government when his followers, heavily backed by several tens of thousands of invading Vietnamese troops captured Phnom Penh on January 8, 1979. Both factions have their national front groups, Pol Pot's being called the "Democratic and Patriotic Front for National Unity", and Heng Samrin's bearing the name of "Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation". Pol Pot's regime has been reduced to an underground guerilla movement which continues to be officially recognized by People's China and most non-Communist Southeast Asian governments, among whom suspicion of Hanoi's control over Cambodia is quite marked. Chinese military supplies reportedly are reaching Pol Pot's guerillas through the small Thai ports and maze of islands off the Gulf of Siam. Heng Samrin's government not only has the backing of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, but of the USSR and most of the Soviet bloc nations, with the exception of Rumania. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam on February 16, 1979, intended as a punitive "lesson" has not resulted in a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, however. On February 20, 1979 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the "Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Government" of Heng Samrin signed a friendship treaty which regulates Phnom Penh's satellite status in relation to Hanoi. It is unlikely, however, that People's China will indefinitely ...

Confronted by a persistent Communist guerilla movement (NPA - New People's Army), the Philippine government of President Corazon Aquino, since assuming office in February 1986, has attempted to channel existing civilian and para-military organizations into a controlled counter-insurgency structure. It has three levels. At the top are the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), numbering about 44,000, and operating under direct supervision of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The CAFGU are designed to take the place of the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF), organized in 1967 under the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos. Poorly supervised, and frequently employed as private "armies" of wealthy businessmen, estate owners, and local political tycoons, the CHDF acquired an odious reputation because of its human rights abuses. Below CAFGU is the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO), now numbering about 20,000 and not primarily used in armed combat with the NPA, serving instead as a supportive civilian watch and village improvement organization. Unlike CAFGU, its members are not regularly supervised by the AFP. Budget allocations are such that the organizational structure and degree of formal government control over CAFGU and CVO remains haphazard. This means that, as in the past, free wheeling vigilante organizations continue to be an important (and third level) element in the government's counter-insurgency program. Philippine vigilantism has deep historic and social roots in the country's feudal traditions. Modern "pop-culture" imagery, including that derived from motion pictures and rock music, also pervades many vigilante groups, as does an aura of romanticized, "macho" adventurism, identified here as "the Rambo mystique." There are about 200 vigilante groups with distinctive community, religious, or more traditional "private army" origins now operating in the Philippines. They are of continuous concern to government and private human rights organizations because of their frequent ...

Since 1975 and the Communist capture of Saigon, about 570 000 refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, have moved into Thailand. Some estimates go substantially higher because unrecorded or illegal crossings have continued until this day. There are Thai fears that some of the refugees have helped the Communist Party of Thailand. Thai efforts to control the refugees' presence by according them "legal" or "illegal" status and regulate their repatriation (as in the case of most Kampuchean refugees) or transfer them to "third countries" have been only partially successful. In February, 1980 Thailand closed its border with Kampuchea, barring further entry of migrants. However, there has developed a floating mass of refugees in border camps just inside Kampuchea. These number between 180 000 and 200000, and exert steady pressure on the Thai frontier. The border camps, along with some refugee camps inside Thailand itself, have become recruiting and military staging grounds for various armed units of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the principal alliance of anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean groups. Also because of Thai and other ASEAN support for the CGDK, the Vietnamese army in Kampuchea and its ally, the government of the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" of President Heng Samrin, are increasingly concerned over the border refugee camps. In the first half of 1983 the Vietnamese attacked such border refugee camps as Nong Chan, Phnom Chat, and O Smach, all of which at the time also were headquarters of CGDK military units. The heightened Thai-Kampuchean border tension, and clashes between Thai and Vietnamese military, and between Vietnamese and CGDK units, have raised the spectre of another "Lebanon". Because, for their own security, Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea may have to engage in extensive anti-CGDK operations in the future which would, even more than they already have, spill over into Thailand. The increasingly politicized Thai refugee problem awaits an international diplomatic agreement over ...

The decision of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) to boycott the Presidential election of February 7, 1986 produced a major leadership crisis and tactical change in the Party. The accession to power of Mrs. Corazon Aquino on a wave of popular support and enthusiasm was perceived as a major leadership miscalculation by the CPP Central Committee and Politburo during their meetings in April and May, 1986. The original decision to boycott the election had been based on the view that Mrs. Aquino and the forces behind her did not represent any major difference or potential for fundamental change from the policies of President Ferdinand Marcos. It was apparent, however, from the role of the Philippine Armed Forces, the influential Catholic Church, the business community and other social strata that Mrs. Aquino had managed to become a symbol of much desired reforms in the political and economic system. By ignoring Aquino and her election, the sweep of "people's power" that had brought Marcos down seemed to be bypassing the CPP. As a result, Rodolfo Salas and Rafael Baylosis, principal CPP leaders since the late 1970s, and architects of an uncompromising "hardline" policy of confrontation - including terrorism - against the government, lost much influence. Salas was replaced as CPP chairman by Benito Tiamzon, the Eastem Visayas regional party leader and trade union activist. At the same time, the CPP appointed Saturnino Ocampo and Antonio Zumel as party representatives in forthcoming peace talks and amnesty discussions with the Aquino government. Clearly, the leadership crisis remains unresolved (both Salas and Baylosis remain Central Committee members), but the CPP appears committed indefinitely to a policy of "negotiating while fighting", a not unfamiliar Communist tactic. Clashes between Communist guerillas and Philippine military, meanwhile, appear to be slackening somewhat.

Despite intense diplomatic activity between Vietnam and her Southeast Asian neighbors to reach a compromise in their conflict resulting from the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the Hanoi government shows every indication of seeking to secure a permanent military and political presence in Kampuchea. Also because of the devastation brought by four years of the Pol Pot regime (1975-79), and the extermination of much of the skilled and educated social strata in Kampuchea, the Hanoi government has sent some 40,000 Vietnamese party cadres, civil officials and professionally trained to direct public affairs. Additionally, some 100,000 Vietnamese farmer s have migrated into Kampuchea, settling in such key provinces as Kompong Speu, Takeo, and Kompong Cham. Additional tens of thousands of Vietnamese settlers have moved into cities and the disputed frontier area. As fighting between the Vietnamese and resistance groups affiliated with the ''Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" intensifies, the Hanoi regime also has been expanding its logistical-military network. This includes the construction of a new road network — popularly called the "New Ho CM Minh Trail" — linking the Vietnamese cities of Hue and Vinh, across Southern Laos, with Northwestern Kampuchea. Additionally, during the early weeks of 1983, a twenty-five kilometres long trench, studded with landmines and bamboo spikes has been constructed just inside the Kampuchean frontier, running from the village of Kop beyond the village of Yeang Dangkum — a region of frequent guerilla clashes. Al on g with the 180,000 man force of regular military maintained by Vietnam in Kampuchea, these measures indicate intentions of Hanoi's consolidation of power. Especially in Southeast Asia fears have arisen of a permanent Vietnamese "colonization" process in Kampuchea.

In the Southeast Asian area modalities of political dependence have developed which involve the distinctive typology of clients, silent partners, and proxies. These modalities govern the relationship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. They also are operative in the international interaction between the members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (Asean) and the Western major powers. A set of strategic cooperative arrangements, as well as direct military assistance between Asean, the Commonwealth and the U.S., has its counterpart in similar relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Hanoi dominated lndo-China alliance. As a result, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Southeast Asia is expressed politically and strategically primarily through the proxy relationships with the lndo-China states and key Asean members respectively. In turn, there are strong undercurrents in Asean seeking an accommodation with Hanoi, in order to minimize the conflict potential in the region generated by opposing U.S. and Soviet strategic interests. Particularly the relatively warming relationship between the U.S. and People's China has strengthened the Asean fears of China s long-term intentions in the region. An independent Vietnam, free from its proxy-client status toward the Soviet Union, could act as a buffer between China and the Southeast Asian region. Since Hanoi, if only for long-standing nationalistic reasons, wishes to be free from its currently necessary dependence on Moscow, Asean's accommodationist interests may well meet with appreciation in Hanoi in the future. This would tend to lessen the effect of the American-Soviet confrontation in the area.

'Cambodia Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development' by Grant Curtis is reviewed.