Suchergebnisse

The first Pacific Islands offshore financial centre was born in 1966 on Norfolk Island. This paper analyses the historical trajectory of Norfolk Island's tax haven in terms of its dialectical tensions with the Australian federal government — tensions between self‐determination and subordination which emerge from Norfolk's anomalous status as a self‐governing external territory of Australia. Promoters of Norfolk Island's tax haven have seen its potential to become a major global offshore financial centre blocked by the Australian federal government. Yet, at major critical junctures (in 1976, 1991 and 2000) the Australian federal campaigns that threatened Norfolk's residential tax haven disintegrated in the face of concerted local opposition, although the danger has never entirely disappeared. The island's political economy and external relations are likely to remain inextricably bound to its tax haven.

The first Pacific Islands offshore financial center was born in 1966 on Norfolk Island. This paper analyzes the historical trajectory of Norfolk Island's tax haven in terms of its dialectical tensions with the Australian federal government -- tensions between self-determination & subordination which emerge from Norfolk's anomalous status as a self-governing external territory of Australia. Promoters of Norfolk Island's tax haven have seen its potential to become a major global offshore financial center blocked by the Australian federal government. Yet, at major critical junctures (in 1976, 1991, & 2000) the Australian federal campaigns that threatened Norfolk's residential tax haven disintegrated in the face of concerted local opposition, although the danger has never entirely disappeared. The island's political economy & external relations are likely to remain inextricably bound to its tax haven. 4 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Examines attempts to create new sovereignties in the South Pacific by developing offshore financial centers (OFCs) through secession. A prime example was the partnership between NV multimillionaire Michael C. Oliver (alias Moses Olitsky) & an indigenous New Hebrides movement, which attempted to make the New Hebrides (later Vanuatu) a libertarian tax haven utopia. Oliver also tried to build a sea city on the Minerva Reefs, 350 kilometers southwest of Tonga's capital. Questions about the nature of national sovereignty raised by claims over artificially created areas developed by private individuals/companies that do not profess allegiance to another international jurisdiction are discussed. When the Minerva project failed, Oliver targeted Abaco, in the Bahamas, which brought him into conflict with the US Senate & the CIA, & sent him back to the Pacific, particularly the uninhabited islets known as the Palmyra Atoll. An exploration of Oliver's later ventures includes establishment of the secessionist Republic of Vemarana during the independence of Vanuatu in 1980. The impact of Oliver's legacy on today's OFCs is discussed. J. Lindroth

Pacific Islands offshore financial centers (OFCs) are
battling against the danger that international organizations will cut
them off from the global financial system. Since 1999 the image of
the region's tax havens has been most shaped by the "horror story"
of Nauru—the media's account of how Nauru has been involved
with the Bank of New York and other banks in tens of billions of
dollars of Russian money laundering, tax evasion, and illegal capital
flight. In the late 1990s left-of-center governments led international
organizations toward a much more aggressive attack on offshore financial
centers. Soon international organizations began blacklisting offshore
centers and threatening sanctions—with Pacific Islands being
prominent targets. The advent of the conservative Bush administration in
America defused a number of threats to offshore centers from international
organizations, as the United States began to object to Europe's anti-tax
haven agenda. While the attacks of 11 September 2001 led international
organizations to rebuke offshore centers for helping to finance terrorism,
OFC promoters contended that the anti-OFC
campaign had been so weakened and qualified since the Bush presidency that
it might soon collapse. The future of Pacific Islands offshore centers may
rest on the outcome of political struggles in the United States, Europe,
and international organizations. Two things are clear: that the dominant
media image of a number of Pacific Islands states may continue to be
shaped by perceptions of their offshore financial centers (making them
targets of moral indignation), and that their international relations
may at times be held hostage to the issue of their tax havens.

Risk havens in offshore financial centres play an increasingly important role in capitalist risk management. They gain strength from cycles in the insurance industry (during hard markets) and from the mystified notion of a 'litigation explosion' that is used to reduce the rights of injured plaintiffs, particularly in times when insurers experience low income from investments. The captive insurance company (which has become the most prominent in Bermuda) and the asset protection trust (pioneered in the Cook Islands) have become important instruments through which the wealthy increase their own security and reduce the compensation that they pay for misfortunes that befall the general population. While risk havens promote laissez-faire, the article concludes that democratic socialism provides the most equitable and efficient solution to the problems of risk and insurance. democratic socialist perspective, risk havens are not part of the solution. They are part of the problem.

Books reviewed in this article:Jim Davidson and Peter Spearritt, Holiday Business: Tourism in Australia since 1870Mansel G. Blackford, Fragile Paradise: The Impact of Tourism on Maui, 1959‐2000