Suchergebnisse

Brexit has far-reaching consequences for Europe and the European single market for financial transactions. In particular in this field, the UK has had a strong influence in drafting European policies and legislation as the City of London has acted as the financial hub in Europe for several decades. As a result, the UK has spearheaded the call for more market friendly legislation with the support of some other EU member states. This went against the wishes of several other EU member states, where a stronger rule-based approach to financial markets was strongly preferred, in particular after the financial crisis clearly demonstrated weaknesses in the macroeconomic oversight of European financial markets. With the UK leaving, the call for more stringent legislation will gain momentum as the political leadership among the remaining 27 EU member states will shift and might be looking to curtail the long-standing dominant position of the UK in the field of financial industries. In this light, several leaders of EU27 member states have already voiced their support for their nations' financial hub to become the next City of London. This would lead to a substantial change in leadership in European finance post-Brexit. This contribution assesses the impact of Brexit on the changes in political leadership on the governance of European financial markets, as they might ultimately be reflected in the institutional outcomes and policies.

Brexit has far-reaching consequences for Europe and the European single market for financial transactions. In particular in this field, the UK has had a strong influence in drafting European policies and legislation as the City of London has acted as the financial hub in Europe for several decades. As a result, the UK has spearheaded the call for more market friendly legislation with the support of some other EU member states. This went against the wishes of several other EU member states, where a stronger rule-based approach to financial markets was strongly preferred, in particular after the financial crisis clearly demonstrated weaknesses in the macroeconomic oversight of European financial markets. With the UK leaving, the call for more stringent legislation will gain momentum as the political leadership among the remaining 27 EU member states will shift and might be looking to curtail the long-standing dominant position of the UK in the field of financial industries. In this light, several leaders of EU27 member states have already voiced their support for their nations' financial hub to become the next City of London. This would lead to a substantial change in leadership in European finance post-Brexit. This contribution assesses the impact of Brexit on the changes in political leadership on the governance of European financial markets, as they might ultimately be reflected in the institutional outcomes and policies.

This thematic issue on the causes and modes of European disintegration seeks to answer two main questions: What are the causes of (potential) European disintegration across countries? And what are the actual and potential modes of European disintegration? The articles on the causes of EU disintegration go beyond the immediate causes of Brexit, to date the prime example of European disintegration. They address, for instance, the impact of ignoring the results of referendums on EU treaty changes. The articles demonstrate that the extensively studied proximate causes of Brexit may be different from more long-term drivers of potential disintegration in the UK and other member states. The second question raises a point that has been largely overlooked. Going beyond the growing literature on Brexit, differentiated integration, and non-compliance, the articles on the modes of European disintegration address issues such as (temporary) opt-outs from the Schengen agreement. The thematic issue is innovative not only due to the questions it raises but also by deploying a multi-disciplinary social science perspective. Contributions are quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical from a wide array of social science disciplines. Taken together, the contributions to this thematic issue advance scholarly understanding of European (dis)integration.

This contribution seeks to explore what disintegration can mean for a language, with a focus on Brexit and the English language. Linguistic differences are often instrumentalized as drivers of disintegration. However, in the case of Brexit, disintegration will also affect the status of the English language. Due to the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, English will no longer be a first official language of any European member state; it is only the second official language in Ireland and Malta. This has important political and legal repercussions, that affect the future of the English language in the EU after Brexit. Based on desk research, we see two avenues for the future of the English language within the EU: it could be replaced by another major European language (German/ French), or could become a real European lingua franca. The latter option seems most reasonable as the English language has taken a firm foothold among young (and older) Europeans but entails that by taking back control of its decision-making processes by leaving the EU, the UK will lose the little control over the English language it currently still has. This tendency was already taking place both internationally as within the EU but will greatly accelerate after Brexit.

This article aims to explore the contours of Gibraltar, a uniquely situated region in Europe and a non-self-governing British overseas territory. It explores the basis for Gibraltar's continued and maintained presence within the EU after Brexit. Gibraltar's full accession into the Schengen area, which was expected to be implemented by the end of 2022, is a significant departure from the disintegration that was observable elsewhere in Brexit negotiations but also does not align with the United Kingdom's staunch resistance to Schengen more generally. This move will potentially result in Gibraltar having more features in common with what the EU refers to as outermost regions, which are remote areas within the EU where special provisions exist. To that end, this variation in approach by the United Kingdom has placed Gibraltar in an altogether different category of its own and invites new questions about the region's specificity and status, as well as about the process of disintegration more generally. We argue that Gibraltar's desire to join the Schengen area has presented challenges to the ongoing predicament of Brexit and has exacerbated its outlier position within the EU. This has given rise to specific questions that this article aims to address: What is the current situation of Gibraltar regarding the United Kingdom and the EU? And, what can the case of Gibraltar teach us in terms of disintegration? This article also examines, from a political science perspective, how reclassifying territories can be employed as a vector to facilitate the United Kingdom's efforts to disintegrate from the EU, but underscores the ongoing issues surrounding the reclassification of Gibraltar and its people, with every effort to do so proving challenging.