The beauty of the enrichment action is that it offers well-trained lawyers a useful tool for filling gaps in our legal system. Enrichment actions should only be grounded on the basis of positive arguments within the system. I will argue that in most cases where laymen (or judges for that matter) at first sight think that an action based on unjustified enrichment could and should succeed, the well-trained lawyer would deny such an action. In most developed legal systems there are specific techniques to make sure that the legal professional is able to decide which claim must be granted and which claim must be denied. In this paper the focus is on two specific requirements for the action of unjustified enrichment: the French principle of subsidiarity and the principle of impoverishment as applied in Dutch enrichment law. In both French and Dutch law the understanding and interpretation of the two techniques is dependant on the basic assumption about the role of the action for unjustified enrichment within the legal system. Is it an ultimate remedy for situations which are not covered by the ?normal? rules of the system or is it an equity device which can alter the normal application of the rules of the legal system?
Man-made disasters like the Dutch Enschede Fireworks case often raise several questions; How did this happen? Who is responsible? How can we prevent this from happening again? And more important, who pays for the damages? Supervisors' liability has taken a different turn than was to be expected in the Netherlands. Municipality and state are not liable for failure of supervision on any basis. The Court appears to feel an aversion to state liability in man-made mass torts. This aversion can be explained by the fact that in almost all cases of failure of supervision the 'real cause' has to be found with the actual offender, not with the failing supervisor. Furthermore supervisors' liability might open the floodgate to claims. Even though the reluctance of the court to impose supervisors' liability can be elucidated, according to the above reasoning, the Dutch system is ambiguous when it comes to supervisors' liability. How do other jurisdictions deal with this? What are their judicial points of view with regard to supervisors' liability? Are there any emergent general rules for supervisors' liability or is the issue dealt with on a case by case basis? And does this make other systems, as indistinct as the Dutch system or not when we examine the Dutch fireworks case of Enschede? In this Article we will examine these issues and consider relevant legislation from three different European domestic jurisdictions. State liability throughout the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany, will be compared in light of the Dutch Fireworks disaster.
Abstract: The 1965 Dutch Supreme Court case known from its facts as the 'Kelderluik' or 'Cellar Hatch'case is both a legendary and landmark case in Dutch law. The opened cellar hatch is archetypical of liability for all situations of increased danger. The scenario's facts have a simplicity which also presents it as perfect for a comparison of responses between legal systems. Over sixty years ago, the American Judge Learned Hand formulated a number of rules of thumb to determine the standard of care that would be required of a ship owner concerning his/her duty to ensure that a ship did not break loose from its mooring ropes: 'to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions'. These rules of thumb are embraced by law and economics scholars as illustrative of the surplus value theory of law and economics. We are sceptical about the practical value of this approach. However, these rules of thumb by Learned Hand are strikingly similar to the Dutch response in the 1965 Cellar Hatch case. In this paper, we undertake a brief comparison with English, French and German law in order to fi nd out if those legal systems give a comparable response to the same situation. Résumé: Le cas du tribunal supérieur des Pays–Bas de 1965, aussi connu sous le nom de « trou dans la cave » ( Kelderluik), est légendaire et fondamental en droit néerlandais. Le trou ouvert dans la cave est incontestablement un archétype de la responsabilité civile dans les situations du danger aggravé. Les faits de l'espèce sont très simples, et sont dès lors un cas idéal pour comparer les différents les systèmes juridiques. Il y a 60 années, le juge américain Learned Hand a formulé une série des règles grossières pour déterminer le standard de diligence attendu d'un propriétaire de bateau pour assurer que le bateau ne se désamarre pas: Pour éviter que des blessures soient causées trois variables doivent être considérées: (1) la probabilité que le bateau se désamarre : (2) la gravité de la blessure résultant du désamarrage: (3) le fardeau de prendre des mesures adéquates. Les règles grossières, sont considérées par les juristes et les économistes, comme une illustration de la plus–value de leur apport. Nous sommes un peu sceptiques concernant l'intérêt pratique de ces règles. Toutefois ces règles grossières de Learned Hand sont très similaires à la jurisprudence hollandaise dans leur cas due « trou dans la cave » de 1965. Dans cet article, nous allons comparer les systèmes juridiques de l'Angleterre, de la France et de l'Allemagne afi n d'en évaluer les similitudes. Mot–clés: La responsabilité délictuelle, danger aggravé, formule de Learned Hand Zusammenfassung: Der als Kellerluken–Fall (Kelderluik–Fall) des niederländischen Obersten Gerichtshofes bekannte Fall von 1965 ist nicht nur ein legendärer, sondern auch ein grundlegender Fall im niederländischen Rechtssystem. Seither gilt die geöffnete Kellerluke in jeder Situation erhöhter Gefahr als
