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People hold strong moral objections to commercial bodily marketsthe buying and selling of the human body and its components (e.g., prostitution; commercial surrogacy; trade of kidneys, blood plasma, sperm, ovum, and hair). This research takes a descriptive approach to understand why people object to the marketing of the human body and how their moral objections differ across the political spectrum. The authors propose that liberals and conservatives find bodily markets to be morally wrong; however, the two groups object to bodily markets for different reasons. Liberals are more sensitive to exploitation concerns, but conservatives are more sensitive to violation of sanctity concerns in these markets. Real-world observational data and controlled experiments test these predictions. The findings show how sociopolitical leaders utilize the different moral objections to persuade their respective audiences, such as how conservative versus more liberal pastors sermonize differently on prostitution. Second, results show how targeted marketing campaigns encourage liberals and conservatives to participate in consumer advocacy and donate to political causes. Third, findings outline how liberals and conservatives support different regulatory laws that penalize buyers versus sellers. Finally, results show how the different moral objections manifest for live bodily products but not for dead bodily products. ; Accepted version

Abstract
Prosocial organizations have different moral objectives. Some seek to promote welfare (e.g., Red Cross), but others seek to promote justice and equality (e.g., ACLU). Additionally, these organizations can induce different positive emotions to motivate donations. If organizations are seeking to promote different moral objectives using positive emotions, which positive emotion will be the most effective for their respective campaigns? We demonstrate how the congruency between the moral domain of an emotion and the moral objective of an organization plays a role in influencing prosocial behaviors. Charities that seek to increase care in society (e.g., disaster-relief charities) should utilize compassion in their promotion campaigns, but charities that seek to promote fairness and equality in society (e.g., human rights charities) should utilize gratitude in their promotion campaigns. One field study (N = 2,112) and four experiments (N = 2,100) demonstrate that utilizing a positive emotion congruent with the charity's moral objective increases monetary donations and preferences. The preferences are driven by the moral concerns made salient by the respective emotions. Further, the preferences attenuate when exchange norms are made salient. Altogether, these results underscore the importance of considering moral congruence in consumption contexts.

ABSTRACTHow do you respond when receiving advice from somebody with the argumentation "my gut tells me so" or "this is what my intuition says"? Most likely, you would find this justification insufficient and disregard the advice. Are there also situations where people do appreciate such intuitive advice and change their opinion accordingly? A growing number of authors write about the power of intuition in solving problems, showing that intuitively made decisions can be of higher quality than decisions based on analytical reasoning. We want to know if decision makers, when receiving advice based on an intuitive cognitive process, also recognize the value of such advice. Is advice justified by intuition necessarily followed to a lesser extent than an advice justified by analysis? Furthermore, what are the important factors influencing the effect of intuitive justification on advice taking? Participants across three studies show that utilization of intuitive advice varies depending on advisor seniority and type of task for which the advice is given. Summarizing, the results suggest that decision makers a priori doubt the value of intuitive advice and only assess it as accurate if other cues in the advice setting corroborate this. Intuitively justified advice is utilized more if it comes from a senior advisor. In decision tasks with experiential products, intuitively justified advice can even have more impact than analytically justified advice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract
We investigate a psychological factor regulating consumers' switching in response to poor service quality: chronic global self-esteem. Whereas high-self-esteem consumers tend to switch to other providers in response to poor service quality, low-self-esteem consumers often do not. This happens because low-self-esteem consumers who experience poor service become risk-averse, and therefore reluctant to engage in new committed service relationships. Indeed, low-self-esteem consumers' likelihood to switch to an alternative provider in response to poor service quality increases when this provider offers a less risky, low commitment (vs. more risky, high commitment) contract. Moreover, experimentally reducing low-self-esteem consumers' risk aversion increases their likelihood to switch to alternative providers in response to poor service quality. Finally, low-self-esteem consumers' risk aversion mediates their reluctance to switch in response to poor service. We rule out failure severity perceptions, power, autonomy, affect, and action orientation as alternative explanations. The implication of this research for public policy makers is that promoting competition (by offering consumers options and by reducing switching costs) may not be enough to protect the welfare of low-self-esteem consumers. We also suggest ways in which firms can untie vulnerable consumers from negative service relationships.

Abstract
As in other social sciences, published findings in consumer research tend to overestimate the size of the effect being investigated, due to both file drawer effects and abuse of researcher degrees of freedom, including opportunistic analysis decisions. Given that most effect sizes are substantially smaller than would be apparent from published research, there has been a widespread call to increase power by increasing sample size. We propose that, aside from increasing sample size, researchers can also increase power by boosting the effect size. If done correctly, removing participants, using covariates, and optimizing experimental designs, stimuli, and measures can boost effect size without inflating researcher degrees of freedom. In fact, careful planning of studies and analyses to maximize effect size is essential to be able to study many psychologically interesting phenomena when massive sample sizes are not feasible.