Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Editorial Introduction -- List of Tables and Figures -- Author Biography -- Nonprofit Organization Governance -- Abstract -- Keywords -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Review of the Literature -- 2.1 Previous Review Articles -- 2.2 An Analysis of the Recent Nonprofit Organization Governance Literature (2011-2014) -- 2.3 Governance Challenges for Nonprofit Organizations -- 3 Theoretical Perspectives -- 3.1 Main Theoretical Perspectives -- 3.2 Management Theories -- 3.2.1 Managerial Hegemony Theory -- 3.2.2 Upper Echelons Theory -- 3.3 Psychological Perspectives -- 3.3.1 Organizational Commitment Theory -- 3.3.2 Psychological Contract Theory -- 3.3.3 Functional Motives Theory -- 3.3.4 Shared Mental Model Theory -- 3.3.5 Group Relations Theory -- 3.4 Sociological Perspectives -- 3.4.1 Social Construction Theory -- 3.4.2 Social Capital Theory -- 3.4.3 Sociological Modernization Theory -- 3.4.4 Negotiated Order Theory -- 3.4.5 Nonprofit Professionalization Perspectives -- 3.5 Conclusion -- 4 Integrating Theoretical Perspectives -- 4.1 A Paradox Perspective -- 4.2 Stakeholder Accountability -- 4.3 Environmental Dependence -- 4.4 Volunteer Reliability -- 4.5 Board Group Dynamics -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Appendix: Key Articles in Top Nonprofit Journals.

Organizational governance has become a popular and important topic in the nonprofit sector literature. This review focuses on the governance of non-membership, paid-staff nonprofit organizations (also called nonprofit agencies), which are characterized by a hierarchical structure, where the board has the ultimate power and the responsibility to ensure that governance functions are carried out. Such agency boards are usually self-perpetuating, unlike the situation in voluntary membership associations, where the members usually elect the board. We contribute to the literature on the governance of nonprofit organizations in three major ways. First, we discuss research themes identified by previous review articles, analyze empirical and conceptual contributions from the recent nonprofit organization governance literature, and identify a number of governance challenges for nonprofit organizations. Second, we present a wide array of theoretical perspectives from different disciplines that may be useful when studying the governance of nonprofit organizations. From a practical viewpoint this is important, as it may assist researchers in the theoretical framing of their papers and help them in the formulation of theory-based hypotheses. Third, we integrate a number of theoretical perspectives by using a paradox perspective. We focus on four important contemporary governance challenges in nonprofit organizations: (1) stakeholder accountability, (2) environmental dependence, (3) volunteer reliability, and (4) board group dynamics. By using a multi-theoretical approach to analyze the ambiguities, paradoxes, and dilemmas associated with these governance challenges, we provide more general theory-based frameworks for the governance of nonprofit organizations than currently available in the literature.

This article analyzes the roles an advocacy coalition undertakes to support nonprofit organizations to cope with the challenges caused by lockdown and physical distance measures to stop COVID-19. We find that social workers and nonprofit members of the coalition created different kinds of solutions and innovative practices to support vulnerable target groups when confronted with the COVID-19 crisis and the resulting lockdown regulations. In particular, we show that the coalition was pushed to diversify its activities, leading to the development of three roles: a direct and indirect advocacy role, a brokerage role to provide information on new practices, and a crowdfunding role to provide finances for material aid. We conclude by emphasizing the implications of our analysis for both theory and practice.

By integrating literature on governance processes with literature on network integration, we investigate the governance of mandated lead-organization public–nonprofit service networks. We argue that the relationship between the governing public actor and the participating nonprofit organizations as well as the governance processes involved are dependent upon the level of integration that is established in the network in terms of the centrality of the leading public agency and the density among the nonprofit actors. We formulate four propositions and distinguish archetypes of governance that guide further research and practice.

This study explores how perceived interactions in the boardroom are associated with perceptions of board effectiveness in nonprofit organizations. The relationships between board chair leadership, board meeting practices, board group dynamics, and the perceived effectiveness of the board in several governance roles and responsibilities are investigated. The results show that interactions in the boardroom matter: they are generally positively associated with both board chairs' and chief executives' perceptions of board effectiveness. Based on these results, several practical implications are formulated for boards seeking to improve their effectiveness.

AbstractThe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) health crisis imposes severe pressures on nonprofit organizations, which must be resilient to respond effectively to extreme environmental tensions. We combined resource dependence theory with stakeholder theory to frame to what extent nonprofits experienced resource pressures through various stakeholder channels and the nonprofit governance responses. We empirically investigated international medical research and education nonprofits during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Our results indicate resource decreases in nearly all stakeholder channels. In response, nonprofit boards increased activity levels by mainly focusing on adapting organizational offerings and increasing support to the organization. Managerial executives also increased their activity levels, by focusing on safeguarding financial stability, planning and adapting operations to confinement measures.

AbstractMost principal–agent literature of nonprofit organizations has focused on the relationship between board members and managers. However, in addition to the role as an agent of the board, the manager also performs a role as principal with respect to the nonprofit employees. By using a discrete choice experiment, we identify the objectives of managers and employees in nonprofit organizations and assess the presence of agency problems in this relationship. Our sample consists of 76 headmasters, 161 teachers, and 39 administrative employees in 74 secondary nonprofit schools in Belgium. We find that the six objectives set out in the experiment play an important role for both headmasters and subordinate staff. However, the results also indicate that some of these objectives are significantly more important for the headmasters. In sum, our results suggest that agency theory and stewardship theory are not necessarily in conflict with each other but can be combined into a more general governance framework for nonprofit organizations. Consequently, we argue that incentive structures that incorporate different types of objectives can facilitate the recruitment and retention of employees in nonprofit organizations.

The purpose of this article is to provide a more comprehensive principal–agent theory of nonprofit organizations by combining agency theory with aspects of stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and empirical literature on the governance and management of nonprofit organizations. First, the use of a stakeholder perspective allows us to identify the principals of a nonprofit organization and to divide nonprofit principal–agent relationships into different categories. Next, we discuss the assumptions and prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory and suggest that a complementary use of these theories can contribute to the research of principal–agent relationships. By discussing empirical literature from a stewardship–agency perspective, we are able to address issues of nonprofit accountability. We conclude by giving suggestions for further research and by stressing the importance of a recruitment policy to avoid internal agency problems.

ABSTRACTDirectors on boards of nonprofit organizations can have additional director positions in other nonprofit organizations. When several of these interlocking directors exist for a group of nonprofit organizations, a board network is formed. We investigate to what extent similarity between organizations in terms of size, funding structure and operational activities relates to the presence of shared board members between organizations. For a network of 610 organizations we test and confirm that board networks are not formed at random, but that similarity of organizational characteristics explains interlocking behaviour, and that clusters of similar organizations exist within the overall nonprofit sector. Given this observation we propose three areas for further research. In particular we discuss opportunities regarding potential effects of network clustering, the causal direction of the relationship found, and the complementarity of the board network to other social networks in the nonprofit sector.