Search results

This deliverable analyses the impact of the European Ombudsman in the European Union's democratic life through his power to investigate cases of maladministration committed by European institutions. Accordingly, this deliverable is structured as follows. The first part is devoted to explore the creation of the European Ombudsman, the rationale behind his establishment, and the development of this 'personalised' body. The report then moves to an assessment of the European Ombudsman's investigative powers, coupled with a specific focus on the relations with his national peers. This section then proceeds by highlighting quantitative data on the complaints lodged to the European Ombudsman since his creation. The second part verifies whether the European Ombudsman constitutes a case of democratic empowerment. Indeed, an assessment of the European Ombudsman's body of decisions shows that he is more and more acting not only as a 'watchdog' of European institutions but even of European agencies. The third part provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the personal, geographical origin and subject matter of complaints complemented by the targets of inquiries. In particular, citizens of some States are more active than other in submitting a complaint, the Commission is still the most targeted institution, while the major allegation of maladministration pertains to access to documents and lack of transparency. The fourth part investigates possible barriers that European citizens might encounter in lodging a complaint to the European Ombudsman. In this respect, considering the lack of locus standi before the European Ombudsman and the fact that the proceedings is free of charge and can be conducted in the language chosen by the applicant, we argue that there are no barriers to be overcome. The fifth part, through an assessment of the few cases decided by the European Court of Justice and considering the specific relationship the European Ombudsman has with the Parliament, seeks to position him with the so-called ...

AbstractTwelve years ago, Robert Kagan asked "Should Europe worry about adversarial legalism?" He answered this question with a qualified "no," and identified a number of sources of resistance to such a trend. More recently, he broadened the issue in this journal by asking whether European countries experience an "Americanization" of their legal systems. The articles in this Symposium on the Americanization of European Law all revisit that question. The present article introduces the topic, discusses the elements that make up adversarial legalism, and summarizes and compares the findings of the articles in the Symposium. The articles find an increase in one dimension of adversarial legalism, namely, more legalism, that is, more litigation, more formalism, and more verdicts interfering with politics, but hardly any increase in adversarialism. Tenacious pre‐existing national legal and political cultures and institutions resist a further move in the direction of American style adversarial legalism. The mix of more litigation, more legalism, and more politicization, overlaid on the pre‐existing hierarchic authority of courts and legal functionaries has, however, strengthened the societal and political power of the judiciary vis‐à‐vis other powers. A professional elite is increasingly making the political choices that in a democratic society ought to be made by democratic representatives. Perhaps Europe should worry about this.

There have been three links between consociationalism & corporatism in the Netherlands. An isomorphic one, whereby both show remarkable structural similarities; a nested one, whereby corporatist structures were building stones of the various pillars; & a causal one, in the sense that one emerged out of the other. These links & roots in consociationalism have given Dutch corporatism its specific character, & distinguish it from that found in other corporatist countries such as Austria & the Scandinavian countries. Ideal-typical consociationalism may have disappeared in the Netherlands, but four of its basic elements, a civil society well-organized in associations, collegiate government, subsidiarity, & consensualism, still typify Dutch politics. These have characterized -- & still do characterize -- Dutch society more widely, including its systems of law & of corporatist economic governance, which has been much broader than mere macro-level wage bargaining. The Dutch economy was a coordinated or concerted economy, at all levels of aggregation & in many policy fields, not just industrial relations. And this broader concept of corporatism has contributed to the relatively strong economic performance of the country during the larger part of the twentieth century. 1 Table, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. The paper offers a refined and systematic concept of state‐business relations based on the 'policy network'idea. The major dimensions of policy networks are presented as (1) number and type of actors, (2) function of networks, (3) structure, (4) institutionalization, (5) rules of conduct, (6) power relations, (7) actor strategies. Certain popular conventional policy making arrangements (e. g. sectoral corporation, sponsored pluralism, clientelism) are examined in terms of the network dimensions.

Abstract.The themes of the earlier article by Van Waarden are applied to the empirical examples of the USA & the Netherlands. State — industry policy networks are explained by nationally specific characteristics of the actors involved: organized societal interests and state agencies. Policy networks are seen as the product of different political, administrative and cultural institutions. Their historical emergence is discussed.

Developed is a refined & systematic concept of state-business relations based on the nation of policy network. The major dimensions of policy networks are identified: (1) number & type of actors, (2) function of networks, (3) structure, (4) institutionalization, (5) rules of conduct, (6) power relations, & (7) actor strategies. Certain popular conventional policy-making arrangements (eg, sectoral corporation, sponsored pluralism, & clientelism) are examined in terms of these network dimensions. 2 Tables, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

Several variables relevant to the analysis of state-industry policy networks are demonstrated, drawing on secondary data from the US & the Netherlands. The historical evolution of such networks is traced, & differences in the forms they take in each country are explained by nationally specific characteristics of the actors involved: organized societal interests & state agencies. Policy networks are seen as the product of different political, administrative, & cultural institutions. 1 Table, 82 References. Adapted from the source document.

Why have some countries have been more successful in welfare state reform than others? This book examines the experiences of various countries in reforming their welfare states through renegotiations between the state and peak associations of employers and employees. This corporatist concertation has been blamed for bringing about all the ills of the welfare state, but lately corporate institutions have learned from their bad performances, modified their structures and style of operation, and assumed responsibility for welfare state reform. Consensual bargaining is back on the agenda of both policy makers and of social science. This topical volume with its internationally respected panel of contributors will appeal to all those interested in the welfare state and labour relations. It includes chapters focusing on the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and Ireland as well as a section looking at the role of corporatist concertation in the European Union.

AbstractIn 1997 Robert Kagan questioned whether European countries had to fear the coming of American style adversarial legalism. He answered this question with a qualified "no." Today we are no longer so sure the answer is "no," even in a country that Kagan considered the antipole of US adversarial legalism, the Netherlands, traditionally characterized by informal and consensual conflict resolution. In the present article we chart a trend of increasing juridification and legalism, that is, more formal and legal conflict resolution, in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2008. The trend is related to major changes in economic governance institutions, which generated a shift from corporatism toward lawyocracy; from power of the associations of civil society toward power of courts, lawyers, and judges. Yet the newly dominant system of governance is modified and merged with elements of the old system, producing a specific Dutch version, which one could call "corporatist lawyocracy." We identify two types of liberalization as major driving forces: social liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by economic liberalization in the subsequent decades. If one considers economic liberalization a product of neoliberal "Reaganomics," the legal changes are in a way an "American export product," although a different one than the lawyering styles of large international American law firms mentioned by Kelemen and Sibbitt in 2004.

How much did national competition policies converge between 1950 & 2000, & what were the forces behind this? These are the questions the paper attempts to answer, for three countries whose competition policies differed substantially at the outset: Germany, Austria, & the Netherlands. The paper measures the degree of convergence of national competition policies, & concludes that there has been convergence toward the stricter EU anti-trust norms. This can be explained by neither negative ('the market') nor positive ('the state') integration, as competition policy is one of the few policy areas where the EU has never explicitly tried to harmonize national legislation. Other forces must have been at work. We investigate the role of various actors, which each play a role in three theories of European integration: (1) institutionalism, which stresses the importance of the central European institutions; (2) neofunctionalism, which focuses on international business; & (3) the epistemic community approach, which highlights the importance of transnational expert communities. We find that convergence has been mainly the work of subtle 'topdown' pressure from the CEC & the ECJ ('the courts'), combined with the emergence of an epistemic 'community' of legally trained officials, which has been a channel for the exchange of information, ideas, solutions, & arguments between the systems & levels of law. EU case law provided an important model, experiment, & source of norms for this community. 2 Tables, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

Modern societies have in recent decades seen a destabilization of the traditional governing mechanisms & the advancement of new arrangements of governance. Conspicuously, this has occurred in the private, semi-private, & public spheres, & has involved local, regional, national, transnational, & global levels within these spheres. We have witnessed changes in the forms & mechanisms of governance by which institutional & organizational societal sectors & spheres are governed, as well as in the location of governance from where command, administration, management, & control of societal institutions & spheres are conducted. We have also seen changes in governing capabilities (ie, the extent to which societal institutions & spheres can, in fact, be steered), as well as in styles of governance (ie, the processes of decision making & implementation, including the manner in which the organizations involved relate to each other). These shifts tend to have significant consequences for the governability, accountability, responsiveness, & legitimacy of governance institutions. These developments have been generating a new & important research object for political science (including international relations). One of the crucial features of these developments is that they concern a diversity of sectors. In order to get a thorough understanding of 'shifts in governance,' political science needs, & is also likely to adopt, a much stronger multidisciplinary orientation embracing politics, law, public administration, economics, & business administration, as well as sociology, geography, & history. 110 References. Adapted from the source document.

Chapter 8 by Anna Gerbrandy and Rutger Fransen deals with competition law and the European Union (EU) democratic deficit. The chapter discusses the constraints imposed by competition rules on the process of democratic empowerment of citizens in the EU. In particular, it examines the various ways in which civil society and individual citizens are involved in the increasing push for responsible business conduct (RBC) initiatives and how the current approach to the application of EU competition rules has had a restrictive influence on the implementation of these initiatives. This task first involves understanding the EU competition rules that are relevant for cooperation mechanisms between firms when seeking to attain public aims (in particular, for environmental protection and sustainability). In doing so, the chapter identifies barriers which EU citizens, including companies, face when implementing RBC initiatives. Second, the chapter examines this so-called 'competition law problem' through the underlying theories on European integration, the role of private firms as political actors, as well as the relationship between member states and the EU when implementing national policy goals through RBC initiatives. Finally, the chapter will provide an outlook on how to ensure the focus on 'market' Europe does hinder the movement toward greater democratic involvement of EU citizens in setting social and environmental policy goals.