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In many democratic polities, constitutional courts significantly shape the political landscape. Yet, how they are able to do so is a puzzle: With limited resources at their disposal, and no direct powers of enforcement, judges must rely on the willingness of executives and legislators to comply with their decisions and to respect judicial authority. This essay surveys recent literature that has explored the conditions that sustain judicial authority. I contrast explanations that highlight the benefits that independent courts can provide to other policy makers ("endogenous explanations") with explanations that emphasize the constraints that keep executives and legislators from undermining the judiciary ("exogenous explanations"). I conclude by exploring the role of strategic judicial behavior in maintaining and expanding judicial power.

In many democratic polities, constitutional courts significantly shape the political landscape. Yet, how they are able to do so is a puzzle: With limited resources at their disposal, and no direct powers of enforcement, judges must rely on the willingness of executives and legislators to comply with their decisions and to respect judicial authority. This essay surveys recent literature that has explored the conditions that sustain judicial authority. I contrast explanations that highlight the benefits that independent courts can provide to other policy makers ('endogenous explanations') with explanations that emphasize the constraints that keep executives and legislators from undermining the judiciary ('exogenous explanations'). I conclude by exploring the role of strategic judicial behavior in maintaining and expanding judicial power. Adapted from the source document.

Der Verfasser entwickelt eine Sicht auf Verfassungsgerichte, die solche Gerichte als politische Institutionen versteht, deren Handlungen und Effektivität wesentlich durch das politische Umfeld geprägt sind, in dem sie stehen. Er überprüft diese These am Beispiel des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts unter Rückgriff auf die Originaldaten für alle 259 Entscheidungen, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht zwischen 1983 und 1995 zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit von Bundesgesetzen getroffen hat. Die empirische Untersuchung bestätigt die Wirkung des politischen Umfelds auf die Entscheidungsstärke des Gerichts: In einem politischen Umfeld, in dem es wahrscheinlicher ist, dass gesetzgebende Mehrheiten sich öffentlichem Druck ausgesetzt sähen, wenn sie Entscheidungen des BVerfG zu umgehen versuchen sollten, ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass das Gericht aggressiven Gebrauch von seinem Vetorecht macht, bedeutend höher. (ICE2)

This article develops an imperfect information model of the interactions between legislatures & constitutional courts. The model addresses legislative anticipation of judicial review, legislative reactions to judicial rulings, & the impact of anticipation of such reactions on judicial behavior. The most important finding is that the nature of legislative-judicial relations depends crucially on the political environment in which court & legislature must act, as well as on judicial preferences. Several results are tested in a logit analysis of decisions by the German Constitutional Court from 1983 to 1995. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

The constitutions of many parliamentary democracies provide for abstract judicial review, a proceeding that allows a specified parliamentary minority to initiate judicial review against legislation in the absence of a concrete case. The paper analyzes the impact that this proceeding has on legislative bargaining, using a simple game-theoretic model. The main conclusion is that the most important effects of abstract review are indirect and anticipatory. Furthermore, abstract review results in more moderate legislative proposals than would be expected in its absence. In this sense, it promotes what Lijphart has called `consensus democracy'. Finally, the model reveals that such moderation depends on the degree of judicial deference towards the legislature. Surprisingly, a court that is not deferential will be appealed to less than a deferential court, even though its influence on policy is larger.