Suchergebnisse

Abstract:In this article I examine the role of social class for poverty transitions. Social class has traditionally been an important predictor of social inequalities, but it is sometimes argued that it has lost its relevance for explaining precariousness and economic risk in contemporary societies. This paper reviews the debate regarding the relevance of social class, the literature on life course dynamics as well as the tensions and links between the social stratification framework and the dynamic perspective on economic risk. In the empirical partI assess the importance of life events as predictors of poverty in combination with social stratification variables. The results show that the risk of experiencing poverty triggering life events is not equally spread across populations, but rather varies across welfare states and linked to social class, gender and education level. Secondly, random effects discrete-time hazard models in thirteen European countries show the relative importance of life course events and social stratification determinants as predictors of poverty entry.

The aim of this article is to investigate the change of the influence of social background variables on values with respect to primary relations. In the context of an individualising society, a weakening impact of social background on individual value orientations is often uttered. This research aims to empirically test this expectation. Multivariate regression analyses are pursued with the three waves of the European Value Studies dataset. Models which pool together the three waves of the survey, allow us to estimate the changing effect of social background over time, Additionally, effects of age, cohort and period can be distinguished. The main conclusion of the research is the unchanging influence of social background variables over time. The effects of social class, age, education level, church commitment and marital status on family values are found to persist during the last two decades of the 20th century.

With the aftermath of the economic crisis starting to fold out, the extent and the conditions under which the experience of economic hardship thwarts subjective well-being spark academic interest. In this paper, we examine the cushioning impact of three immaterial buffers embedded within civil society—namely social networks, religiosity, and confidence in politics—in combination with the cushioning role of the welfare state. Analyzing the 2010 wave of the European Social Survey, the results confirm that the experience of economic hardship is inversely related to happiness. All three proposed protective measures cushion the negative impact of economic strain on happiness, whereby the positive effect of social networks and confidence in politics is stronger in countries with lower levels of social expenditure. The latter finding provides some evidence for the crowding out-thesis but mainly suggests that a strong welfare state can take over the role of protective buffers in civil society, which is helpful as such buffers are less present among the most vulnerable social groups. The results of the analysis are discussed in relation to social science research and public policy.

While economic downturns have adverse effects on young people's life chances, empirical studies examining whether and to what extent human values, social attitudes and well-being indicators respond to sudden economic shocks are scarce. To assess the claim that human values are less affected by economic shocks than social attitudes and well-being, two distinct yet related studies based on the European Social Survey (ESS) are conducted. The first employs a fixed effects pseudo-panel analysis of the 2008–2014 ESS-waves to detect whether changes over time in the socio-demographic group's unemployment risk and national youth unemployment affect individual dispositions to varying degrees. The second study captures micro- and cross-national effects in the 2010 ESS cross-section. Unique for this set-up is that we can test whether the findings hold for over-time changes in youth unemployment within countries (pseudo-panel), as well as for cross-country differences in youth unemployment (multilevel). Both studies indicate that political trust, satisfaction with the economy and subjective well-being are lowered by economic risk and hardship, while social trust and self-rated health are less affected by changes in youth unemployment. Secondly, human values are immune to economic risk, underscoring that values transcend specific situations and are therefore resistant against sudden economic shocks.

This study examines whether unemployment insurance benefit generosity impacts divorce, drawing on full population administrative data and a Swiss reform that reduced unemployment insurance maximum benefit duration. We assess the effect of the reform by comparing the pre- to the post-reform change in divorce rates among unemployed individuals who were affected by the reform with the change in divorce rates among a statistically balanced group of unemployed individuals who was not affected by the reform. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that the reform caused a 2.8 percentage point increase in divorce (a 25% increase). Effects were concentrated among low-income couples (+58%) and couples with an unemployed husband (+32%) though gender differences are attributable to men's breadwinner status. Female main breadwinners were more strongly affected (+78%) than male main breadwinners (+40%). Results confirm the 'family stress model' which posits that job search and financial stress cause marital conflict. Policymakers should consider a broad array of impacts, including divorce, when considering reductions in unemployment insurance generosity.

We use representative longitudinal panel data from the Dutch European Values Survey (EVS) to study whether the COVID-19 pandemic shifted opinions about how a woman's full-time employment impacts family life. The data was collected before the COVID-19 pandemic in 2017 and in May 2020. The analysis focuses on groups whose unpaid and paid work situation changed abruptly with the COVID-19 pandemic: parents with coresident children, and those who experienced a change in paid workload that clashes with traditional gender role expectations, namely women whose workload increased and men whose workload decreased or who stopped working. We found that groups that faced an abrupt change in their paid and unpaid work routines that clashed with their previously held gender attitude changed their gender attitude in alignment with the new paid or unpaid work situation. For women in couple households with children, this meant that they saw a halt in their progression toward gender egalitarian attitudes. For those who experienced a change in paid workload that clashes with traditional gender role norms, it meant stronger progression toward gender egalitarian attitudes. The results are interpreted on the basis of cognitive dissonance theory and exposure theory and placed in the context of previous findings.

Some participants of the public debate have argued that the world before and after the coronavirus crisis will look fundamentally different. An underlying assumption is that this crisis will alter public opinion in such a way that it leads to profound societal and political change. Scholarship suggests that while some policy preferences are quite volatile and prone to change under the influence of crises, core values formed during childhood are likely to remain stable. In this article, we test stability or change of a well-selected set of opinions and values before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We rely on a unique longitudinal panel study whereby the Dutch fieldwork of the European Values Study 2017 web survey serves as a baseline; respondents were re-approached in May 2020. The findings indicate that values remain largely stable. However, there is an increase in political support, confirming the so-called rally effect . We conclude our manuscript with a response to the futurists expecting changes in public opinion because of the coronavirus crisis.

Some participants of the public debate have argued that the world before and after the coronavirus crisis will look fundamentally different. An underlying assumption is that this crisis will alter public opinion in such a way that it leads to profound societal and political change. Scholarship suggests that while some policy preferences are quite volatile and prone to change under the influence of crises, core values formed during childhood are likely to remain stable. In this article, we test stability or change of a well-selected set of opinions and values before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We rely on a unique longitudinal panel study whereby the Dutch fieldwork of the European Values Study 2017 web survey serves as a baseline; respondents were re-approached in May 2020. The findings indicate that values remain largely stable. However, there is an increase in political support, confirming the so-called rally effect. We conclude our manuscript with a response to the futurists expecting changes in public opinion because of the coronavirus crisis.