Suchergebnisse

Nous avons été particulièrement intéressés par deux aspects de cet ouvrage : la capacité propre à l'auteur de redonner une certaine rationalité à l'État et de ce fait à l'institutionnalisation du politique… et, d'autre part, à cette théorie de l'efflorescence citoyenne qui transforme le citoyen en ce qu'il ne devrait jamais cesser d'être, une promesse engendrée par le politique. Nous pouvons souligner l'originalité et la pertinence qui consistent à repenser l'État en dépassant ou en rénovant les théories habituelles, comme celles qui concernent le contrat social. Un contrat, dont Laurence Van

An interview with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of Denmark Mikhail Vanin. Adapted from the source document.

Under repeated market interaction, reputation and competition may drive out of the market those firms that do not comply with their quality promises. One may thus presume that competitive pressure improves average market quality. This paper shows that the opposite may be true in an endogenous entry, repeated interaction, linear demand oligopoly model, in which introductory prices may be used as quality signals. Cheating firms may enter the market, fool even rational consumers, and exit the market when discovered, implying a failure of the basic reputation mechanism and an increasing time path of prices. Markets for closer substitutes tend to have a lower initial average quality and less trusting consumers, whereas the number of competitors has no clear relationship with average quality.

This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods. It shows that the intuition that low and rising prices grant compliance with quality promises extends to this setting, provided that high quality is sufficiently important to buyers.