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This article proposes a political economy approach to the grammar of institutions, by building on the study of contracts in economics. First, I argue that more attention needs to be paid to the costs and benefits of institutions, thus allowing researchers to derive empirically testable hypotheses on the evolution of institutions. In this vein, the role of conditions in studying the grammar of institutions becomes central. Second, I propose, validate, and test an innovative method to study the grammar, based on computational linguistics. This method allows extracting the elements of the grammar in an automated and unsupervised manner, paving the way to large‐N analyses. In so doing, this article seeks to bridge the gap between public policy and political economy.

Public policy scholars argue that in highly tangible policies, such as tobacco control, the public learns from the direct experience of the beneficial effects of the policy. Empirical evidence supports this argument, suggesting that in the United States the introduction of tobacco control measures makes people more inclined to further regulation. By relying on a set of cases which allows testing the effects of the introduction of tobacco control measures across European countries on a series of relevant variables, this study confirms that the introduction of tobacco control measures makes the public more inclined to further regulation. Yet, when the effects of these policies are disaggregated between smokers and nonsmokers, results show that these positive effects are driven by smokers. This puzzle suggests that different effects than mass attitudinal policy feedback effects, driven by learning from direct experience, might explain the positive reaction to tobacco control. This study puts forward a behavioral theory of policy feedback, which suggests that smokers react positively to the introduction of tobacco control measures because they see these measures as commitment devices, which can help them quit smoking. Evidence for this argument is found by demonstrating that the introduction of tobacco control measures increases smokers' welfare.

Although the EU provides valuable political opportunities for business, firms act at European level in different degrees and in different ways. This variation in the Europeanization of business has so far been partially overlooked by the literature. In this work I propose an institutionalist theory of the Europeanization of business by focusing on how national political institutions mediate the impact of the institutional structure of the EU on business behaviour. Findings from a large-N analysis across several countries demonstrate that firms in decentralized countries tend to be more active at EU level. National political institutions affect also how firms act at EU level. Indeed, those firms used to act individually at national level tend to act collectively at EU level. This work aims at a more nuanced institutionalist account of Europeanization, by bridging the gap between the traditional literature on comparative politics and the one on European interest representation.

This article argues for a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of corporate lobbying within the European Union (EU). Although there is broad consensus among scholars on the emergence of a new type of European lobbying, studies have not sufficiently addressed the underlying economic rationale. Indeed, many authors emphasise the shift towards a system based on direct lobbying; however, these concentre only on systemic and non-economic causes. Direct lobbying dynamics are perceived mainly in two ways: either as a consequence of a conscious political strategy of the European institutions in response to the ?interest overload? of the mid-1990s or as a normal phase of the development of interest group populations. Advocating an economics-based analytical approach to European corporate lobbying, this contribution to the debate provides one of the very first attempts to uncover the influence of economic factors on direct corporate lobbying by building on the seminal work proposed by Bernhagen and Mitchell. These authors, very familiar with the American tradition of corporate lobbying studies, were the first to apply a ?standard model of corporate political behaviour? to the European context by examining the various determinants of direct lobbying. This article goes further: it analyses the empirical database constructed by Bernhagen and Mitchell, with a multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying. Indeed, the main contribution of this study is in its analysis, namely, the operationalisation of the dependent variable ?direct lobbying?. It proposes a multi-strategy/multi-venue operationalisation of the dependent variable aiming to overcome the pitfalls that characterise dichotomous and uni-dimensional operational definitions, in order to answer the research question: ?What are the economic determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU?? Such a multi-dimensional operationalisation of the dependent variable has required the unpacking of some of the elements taken for granted in the discussion on corporate lobbying. This article argues that the researcher needs to take into consideration the various direct lobbying strategies and their relative weights (that is, the multi-strategy operationalisation). For example, accreditation to the EP is not equal to the establishment of a company representation office in Brussels. Furthermore, another possible level of action of a firm's strategy, namely, the industry one, should also be considered (that is, the multi-venue operationalisation): direct lobbying should be analysed as a preference over other lobbying approaches rather than in absolute terms. The findings show how such an expanded operationalisation casts light on the economic determinants of European corporate lobbying. First of all, the Olsonian argument finds empirical support: industry concentration determines lobbying strategies. Second, asset mobility/specificity influences a firm's preference to lobby directly vis-à-vis other venues.

This paper argues in favour of a more thorough analysis of a specific set of dynamics taking place in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the latter being conceived as an informal organizational framework aimed at mutual learning (de Burca and Zeitlin, 2003) and policy change (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Radaelli, 2000). The aim of this paper is to uncover the missing link between these two elements, which has hitherto been black-boxed by the literature. Theoretical tools from International Relations (IR) theories (i.e. constructivist institutionalism) are borrowed in order to circumvent such a fallacy. The premises are the same as the ones hitherto employed by scholars studying the OMC (e.g. Jacobsson, 2004): can norms and values assume a binding character even outside the 'territorially bounded democratic government' (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008) and thus leading to policy change? If so, how does this phenomenon take place? Nevertheless, the approach is different, in that it builds on two closely interrelated factors: the concept of socialisation with its micro-processes (Johnston, 2001; Johnston, 2008) and the institutional characteristics of social environments (Rogowski, 1999). Accordingly, this paper will address the question: is the OMC in European employment policy a social environment conducive of socialisation?

This article focuses on one of the most salient aspects of the EU-ACP relations, namely the conditionality of aid assistance and it traces the origins of conditionality in the influence of the neoliberal doctrine widespread within the World Bank. The analysis of the World Bank as a social environment bolstered by the use of cognitive mapping of assertions of European officials and official documents is used to appraise the functioning of the microprocesses of socialisation. Accordingly, with a structure-centred constructivist approach this article argues that the EU development policy toward the ACP countries was influenced by the conceptions and practices within the World Bank. Nevertheless, the novelty of the approach utilised here is the focus on the mechanisms of propelling of the socialised norms and doctrines rather than their content: a thorough analysis of the microprocesses of socialisation is applied to the World Bank. The acknowledgment of the origins of the conditionality, which has become typical of the EU's development policy, is crucial in order to appreciate the history and the future of the relations between the EU and its former colonies.

This article explores the strategic management of government affairs in companies active in the European Union (EU). The article relies on a unique large-N dataset on the functioning and staffing of EU government affairs. The analysis shows that companies delegate government affairs functions to in-house managers with specific competences, who stay in office for long periods and who have an extensive knowledge of the core competences of the company, thanks to their educational background and work experience in the private sector. These findings suggest that how companies strategically manage and staff government affairs in Brussels rests on the distinct structure of business-government relations in the EU, which are based on the exchange of technical information and the establishment of credibility and long run trust arrangements.

By applying event history analysis to a unique large sample of more than 300 government affairs managers working for companies active in the European Union (EU), this article investigates whether managers with work experience in the public or nonprofit sector are more likely to progress in their career in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that experience takes place. The findings suggest that managers with experience in the public and nonprofit sector are less likely to progress in their careers. This effect becomes stronger when the stage of the career at which the manager had experience in the public sector is taken into consideration. These findings are contrary to the expectations from the public and private management literature and suggest that we should see less revolving door activity in Brussels. We propose that these findings are driven by the distinct EU public policy process and the variance in individual and organizational incentives in the EU public sector.

By applying event history analysis to a unique large sample of more than 300 government affairs managers working for companies active in the European Union (EU), this article investigates whether managers with work experience in the public or nonprofit sector are more likely to progress in their career in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that experience takes place. The findings suggest that managers with experience in the public and nonprofit sector are less likely to progress in their careers. This effect becomes stronger when the stage of the career at which the manager had experience in the public sector is taken into consideration. These findings are contrary to the expectations from the public and private management literature and suggest that we should see less revolving door activity in Brussels. We propose that these findings are driven by the distinct EU public policy process and the variance in individual and organizational incentives in the EU public sector.

AbstractThis article investigates the revolving doors phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It proposes a management approach that treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision makers. By using sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public and private companies across 26 countries, three different ideal‐typical managers are identified: those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs; those who make a career through the private sector; and those who establish themselves in national political institutions. This identification confirms that EU institutions need different types of information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government affairs, what the authors term 'sliding doors' – namely the separation of careers, especially between the public and private sectors – is discerned.