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Lo spettro della competitività: le radici istituzionali del declino italiano
In: Saggi 170
In: Economia
In: Economia e mercati
Governare l'incertezza: scelte pubbliche e cambiamento istituzionale
In: Filosofia politica 3
Systemic corruption and disorganized anticorruption in Italy: Governance, politicization, and electoral accountability
In: Civitas: revista de ciências sociais, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 408-424
ISSN: 1984-7289
TThis paper provides, trough different indicators, empirical evidence on the presumably high relevance of corruption in Italian politics and administration, providing an explanation of how this "obscure" side of Italian politics – a pervasive market for corrupt exchanges – has found its way to regulate its hidden activities within an informal institutional framework, i.e. systemic corruption. A general theoretical framework for the analysis of limits and "windows of opportunity" in Italian anticorruption policies will then be provided, crossing the degree of salience and politicization of corruption issue to explain how in different periods such variables shaped such policy arena. Finally, it will be shown how occasionally this dark side of Italian politics clashed with the clean side of politics, focusing on the reasons of the weak political accountability of Italian politicians involved in corruption scandals in the last decades.
Systemic corruption and disorganized anticorruption in Italy: Governance, politicization, and electoral accountability ; Corrupción sistémica y anticorrupción desorganizada en Italia: Gobernanza, politización y accountability electoral ; Corrupção sistêmica e anticorrupção desorganizada na Itália: G...
TThis paper provides, trough different indicators, empirical evidence on the presumably high relevance of corruption in Italian politics and administration, providing an explanation of how this "obscure" side of Italian politics – a pervasive market for corrupt exchanges – has found its way to regulate its hidden activities within an informal institutional framework, i.e. systemic corruption. A general theoretical framework for the analysis of limits and "windows of opportunity" in Italian anticorruption policies will then be provided, crossing the degree of salience and politicization of corruption issue to explain how in different periods such variables shaped such policy arena. Finally, it will be shown how occasionally this dark side of Italian politics clashed with the clean side of politics, focusing on the reasons of the weak political accountability of Italian politicians involved in corruption scandals in the last decades. ; Este artículo proporciona, a través de diferentes indicadores, evidencia empírica sobre la presumiblemente alta relevancia de la corrupción en la política y administración italiana, y proporciona una explicación de cómo este lado "oscuro" de la política italiana, un mercado difuso de intercambios corruptos, se abrió camino en regular sus actividades ocultas dentro de una estructura institucional informal, es decir, corrupción sistémica. Luego se proporcionará un marco teórico general para el análisis de límites y "ventanas de oportunidad" en las políticas anticorrupción italianas, cruzando el grado de relevancia y politización del tema de la corrupción para explicar cómo, en diferentes períodos, estas variables dieron forma a esta arena política. Finalmente, se mostrará cómo este lado oscuro de la política italiana ocasionalmente colisionó con el lado limpio de la política, enfocándose en las razones de la débil responsabilidad. ; Este artigo fornece, através de diferentes indicadores, evidências empíricas sobre a presumivelmente alta relevância da corrupção na política e na ...
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Challenges in the study of corruption: approaches and policy implications / Desafios no estudo da corrupção: abordagens e implicações políticas
Abstract: In the last decades a chain of scandals fuelled a growing popular awareness of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decision-making in public policies – in terms of growing ineffectiveness and inequality – not only in less developed and authoritarian regimes, but also in advanced capitalist democracies. This article offers a critical review of the three main theoretical paradigms of analysis of corruption, the economic, cultural and neo-institutional approach, focusing on the latter. A typology provides a general scheme of interpretation of the "institutional" equilibria within systemic corruption, which may provide also a guide for anticorruption policies. Reversing the neoliberal logic which recommends a reduction of the State's role, popular mobilization from below can be considered as the potentially most effective anticorruption strategy in order to break down the robust equilibria of systemic corruption, increasing politicians' responsiveness to the public expectation of stronger integrity in the public sphere.keywords: corruption, anticorruption policy, bottom-up mobilization, neo-institutionalism, principal-agent, neoliberal paradigmResumo: Nas últimas décadas uma série de escândalos impulsionou o crescimento popular da consciência quanto à relevância da corrupção como um fator escondido que afeta negativamente as decisões políticas e econômicas – tomadas em sede de políticas públicas – em termos de um aumento da ineficácia e desigualdade – não apenas em regimes autoritários e subdesenvolvidos, mas também em avançadas democracias capitalistas. Esse artigo oferece uma revisão crítica dos três principais paradigmas teóricos de análise da corrupção, o econômico, o cultural e a abordagem neoinstitucional, com foco no último. A tipologia fornece um esquema geral de interpretação do equilíbrio institucional dentro de uma corrupção sistêmica, que também pode prover guia para políticas anticorrupção. Revertendo a lógica neoliberal que recomenda a redução do papel do Estado, uma mobilização popular vindo de baixo pode ser considerada como a estratégia anticorrupção potencialmente mais efetiva como meio de quebrar o robusto equilíbrio da corrupção sistêmica, aumentando a responsabilidade dos políticos perante as expectativas do público quanto a uma forte integridade na esfera pública.Palavras-chave: corrupção; políticas anticorrupção, mobilização de baixo para cima; neoinstitucionalismo; agente principal; paradigma neoliberal.
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Between systemic corruption and anticorruption: political scandals and electoral accountability in Italy
In: Crisis as a Permanent Condition?, S. 203-236
Three paradigms for the analysis of corruption
In the last decades a growing awareness emerged of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decision-making processes. In spite of a lively scientific debate there is no general consensus on a commonly accepted definition of what corruption is. The A. distinguishes three main paradigms, focusing on different (though not irreconcilable) variables. The first is the economic paradigm, which usually takes the principal-agent model of corruption as its founding pillar. In this paradigm corruption is considered the outcome of rational individual choices, and its spread within a certain organization is influenced by the factors defining the structure of expected costs and rewards. A second approach – the cultural paradigm – looks at the differences in cultural traditions, social norms and interiorized values which shape individuals' moral preferences and consideration of his social and institutional role. These are a leading forces that can push a corrupt public or private agent (not) to violate legal norms. A third neo-institutional approach considers also mechanisms which allow the internal regulation of social interactions within corrupt networks, and their effects on individuals' beliefs and preferences. Though the corrupt agreements cannot be enforced with legal sanctions, several informal, non-written rules, contractual provisos and conventions may regulate the corrupt exchange between agent and corruptor. The A. underlines that corruption is the outcome of a multitude of individual and collective choices which change public opinion towards corruption and its diffusion throughout the state, markets and civil society. There is no univocal recipe to deal with anti-bribery measures, since corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Reforms aimed at dismantling systemic corruption have to be finely tuned against its hidden governance structures, i.e. its internal regulation of exchanges and relationships. Otherwise, a vicious circle may emerge: the more an anti-corruption policy is needed, because corruption is systemic and enforced by effective third-parties, the less probable its formulation and implementation. Only when official rules are complemented by coherent informal institutions, bottom-up initiatives, they tend to produce the expected outcomes and make anticorruption regulation more effective.
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Legalita violata o sviluppo potenziale? Policy paradigmse politiche di contrasto del lavoro irregolare in Italia
In: Rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche, Heft 1, S. 83-118
ISSN: 1722-1137
Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration and institutions, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 632-634
ISSN: 0952-1895
Istituzioni, costi di transazione e organizzazioni mafiose
In: Polis: ricerche e studi su società e politica in Italia, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 363-384
ISSN: 1120-9488
Corruption, Political Parties, and Political Protection
Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.
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Scambio politico ed economia soggettivista. Il contrattualismo procedurale di James Buchanan
In: Il politico: rivista italiana di scienze politiche ; rivista quardrimestrale, Band 61, Heft 3, S. 485-518
ISSN: 0032-325X
Mafia, deviant masons and corruption: shifty brotherhoods in Italy
In: Routledge studies in organised crime
Lo Zen e l'arte della lotta alla corruzione: le dimensioni della corruzione, quanto ci costa e come combatterla sul serio
In: I saggi di Altraeconomia