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The Dissertation covers the aspect of term limits of head of state and its links with the principles of national sovereignty, separation of powers and supremacy of the constitution in various forms of state government. The analysis of the concept of powers and term limits of head of state, put into the context of development of the global legal thought, uncovers progress in the scientific understanding of the concept and paves the way to the key arguments of the Paper (the right to establish term limits of authorities lies with the nation (John Locke); the term limit of authority is inversely proportional to the greatness of power (Charles Montesquieu). The study into the features and dynamics of constitutional regulation of term limits of head of state is based on the analysis of the relevant provisions in over 500 constitutions; as a result, the study establishes the development trends in the definition of term limits enshrined in the said constitutions. Another part of the study looks into the reasons behind the violations of constitutional provisions on term limits of head of state and analyses the dynamics of the said violations in monarchies and republics as forms of government, paying attention to the criterion of greatness of authority of head of state. On the basis of the present research, the author establishes the effectiveness of direct and inverse application of the rule formulated by Charles Montesquieu (the greatness of power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration). The work confirms the research assumption that vulnerability of constitutional provisions on term limits of head of state is proportional to the greatness of power. The author proposes to address this problem of constitutional regulation by using the inverse rule to the axiom of Montesquieu (the smaller the power, the less important its duration).

This article, based on the teleological method, could be characterised as a compressed doctrine of presidential term limits that consists of the discussions of the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and Federalists/Anti-Federalists during the process of ratification of the draft Constitution. The analysis of the thoughts of various American statesmen on the constitutional regulation of the executive tenure during the period of 1775–1790 demonstrates the importance and objectives of the executive tenure for the future of the US constitutional system. The early doctrine of the US presidential term limits consists of three steps, which could be defined as understanding, discussion, and finding the solution to the issue. The first step relates to the constitutional conventions of the states in the period of 1775– 1780, when the problem of the term limits of the executive was raised jointly with the issue of the powers of state governors' institutions. Their relative modesty, in comparison to the terms and powers of other institutions, is explained by the fears of the American statesmen related to the dangers of monarchy and tyranny. The said feelings and the importance of the national executive were the key factors in the first sessions of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention. Most delegates were conservative on the structure of the executive, elections, and the term limits, proposing a collegial body, single term, and elections at the parliament. However, the idea that a weak executive might not be effective prompted harsh political debates between the representatives of the states. [.]

This article, based on the teleological method, could be characterised as a compressed doctrine of presidential term limits that consists of the discussions of the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and Federalists/Anti-Federalists during the process of ratification of the draft Constitution. The analysis of the thoughts of various American statesmen on the constitutional regulation of the executive tenure during the period of 1775–1790 demonstrates the importance and objectives of the executive tenure for the future of the US constitutional system. The early doctrine of the US presidential term limits consists of three steps, which could be defined as understanding, discussion, and finding the solution to the issue. The first step relates to the constitutional conventions of the states in the period of 1775– 1780, when the problem of the term limits of the executive was raised jointly with the issue of the powers of state governors' institutions. Their relative modesty, in comparison to the terms and powers of other institutions, is explained by the fears of the American statesmen related to the dangers of monarchy and tyranny. The said feelings and the importance of the national executive were the key factors in the first sessions of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention. Most delegates were conservative on the structure of the executive, elections, and the term limits, proposing a collegial body, single term, and elections at the parliament. However, the idea that a weak executive might not be effective prompted harsh political debates between the representatives of the states. [.]

Avinjono popiežių nelaisvė ir augančio absoliutizmo ženklai Prancūzijoje ir Anglijoje inspiravo pirmuosius mąstytojų ginčus dėl valdovo įgaliojimų trukmės ir subjekto (tautos, jos atstovybės), galinčio juos nutraukti nepriklausomai nuo valdovo valios. XV a. pradžioje bažnytiniams susirinkimams atstatydinus popiežius, buvo sukurti pirmieji valdovo įgaliojimų nutraukimo precedentai. Jie lėmė tolesnes Europos mokslo pasaulio diskusijas dėl galimybių nutraukti ne vien bažnytinio, bet ir pasaulietinio valdovo įgaliojimus.
Ispanijos ir Anglijos absoliutizmo krizės XVI a. pabaigoje ir XVII a. viduryje sudarė prielaidas įgyvendinti tautos ar jos atstovybės teisę nutraukti valdovo įgaliojimus. Drauge šie įvykiai atskleidė tolimesnės tokios institucijos veiklos organizavimo problemas. Jų sprendimas buvo neatsiejamas nuo tautos suvereniteto ir jo atstovavimo klausimų nagrinėjimo. Thomo Hobbeso, Johno Locke'o ir kitų mąstytojų (Charleso L. Montesquieu, Franciso Hutchesono) darbai apie suvereniteto kilmę, jo įgyvendinimą monarchijos sąlygomis didino parlamento, jo priimamų konstitucinių aktų reikšmę, tarp jų ir galias nustatyti bei kontroliuoti valdovo įgaliojimų trukmės sąlygas.
Jungtinėje Karalystėje susiformavusi instituciškai (pirmiausia parlamentu) ir teisiškai (konstituciniais aktais) apribota valdovo įgaliojimų trukmės sistema palaipsniui paplito kitose Europos ir pasaulio monarchijose. Šiuo metu parlamentinėms ir dualistinėms santvarkoms sudarant monarchijos valdymo formos daugumą, jų valdovų įgaliojimų trukmės reikalavimai iš esmės atitinka tautos suvereniteto, valdžių padalijimo ir konstitucijos viršenybės principų reikalavimus.

The Dissertation covers the aspect of term limits of head of state and its links with the principles of national sovereignty, separation of powers and supremacy of the constitution in various forms of state government. The analysis of the concept of powers and term limits of head of state, put into the context of development of the global legal thought, uncovers progress in the scientific understanding of the concept and paves the way to the key arguments of the Paper (the right to establish term limits of authorities lies with the nation (John Locke); the term limit of authority is inversely proportional to the greatness of power (Charles Montesquieu). The study into the features and dynamics of constitutional regulation of term limits of head of state is based on the analysis of the relevant provisions in over 500 constitutions; as a result, the study establishes the development trends in the definition of term limits enshrined in the said constitutions. Another part of the study looks into the reasons behind the violations of constitutional provisions on term limits of head of state and analyses the dynamics of the said violations in monarchies and republics as forms of government, paying attention to the criterion of greatness of authority of head of state. On the basis of the present research, the author establishes the effectiveness of direct and inverse application of the rule formulated by Charles Montesquieu (the greatness of power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration). The work confirms the research assumption that vulnerability of constitutional provisions on term limits of head of state is proportional to the greatness of power. The author proposes to address this problem of constitutional regulation by using the inverse rule to the axiom of Montesquieu (the smaller the power, the less important its duration).

The article examines the concept of the Seimas (the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) resolution, its legal force, and practices of constitutional proceedings. Scientific research is undertaken with the goal to reveal its essential characteristics, as well as to detect possible legal regulation gaps and practice-based issues of implementation. While analyzing the evolution of centuries-old state parliamentarism, the state of the Seimas resolution and (or) of equivalent legislation was identified in times of the Republic of Both Nations, the restoration of the state of Lithuania and of inter-war independent republic. Therefore, the Seimas resolution is the historical source of Lithuanian constitutional law. The concept of the Seimas resolution is enriched by its significance in March 1990, when the act of independence was adopted and published, as well as its direct provision in the constitution of 1992. This legal act addresses the relationship between the state authorities (distrust of government) and operational matters of the parliament itself (pre-term elections). The Seimas resolution is not an ordinary by-law. Having analysed more than twenty years of Lithuanian parliamentary experiences, the resolution should rather be considered as the primary means of expression of the political will of the Seimas. Depending on the importance of the issue, the will could be derived from the constitution itself and its principles, as well as from the representation of people's sovereignty. One of the most important areas of implementation of the Seimas resolution is the parliamentary oversight. By adopting respective resolutions, the Seimas may require reports from the accountable state authorities; it also may assess their performance or assign them various tasks. Some very important seimas resolutions (for example on elections results or impeachment petition to the constitutional court) could be voted with simple majority of participating members of seimas.

The article examines the concept of the Seimas (the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) resolution, its legal force, and practices of constitutional proceedings. Scientific research is undertaken with the goal to reveal its essential characteristics, as well as to detect possible legal regulation gaps and practice-based issues of implementation. While analyzing the evolution of centuries-old state parliamentarism, the state of the Seimas resolution and (or) of equivalent legislation was identified in times of the Republic of Both Nations, the restoration of the state of Lithuania and of inter-war independent republic. Therefore, the Seimas resolution is the historical source of Lithuanian constitutional law. The concept of the Seimas resolution is enriched by its significance in March 1990, when the act of independence was adopted and published, as well as its direct provision in the constitution of 1992. This legal act addresses the relationship between the state authorities (distrust of government) and operational matters of the parliament itself (pre-term elections). The Seimas resolution is not an ordinary by-law. Having analysed more than twenty years of Lithuanian parliamentary experiences, the resolution should rather be considered as the primary means of expression of the political will of the Seimas. Depending on the importance of the issue, the will could be derived from the constitution itself and its principles, as well as from the representation of people's sovereignty. One of the most important areas of implementation of the Seimas resolution is the parliamentary oversight. By adopting respective resolutions, the Seimas may require reports from the accountable state authorities; it also may assess their performance or assign them various tasks. Some very important seimas resolutions (for example on elections results or impeachment petition to the constitutional court) could be voted with simple majority of participating members of seimas.

The article examines the concept of the Seimas (the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) resolution, its legal force, and practices of constitutional proceedings. Scientific research is undertaken with the goal to reveal its essential characteristics, as well as to detect possible legal regulation gaps and practice-based issues of implementation. While analyzing the evolution of centuries-old state parliamentarism, the state of the Seimas resolution and (or) of equivalent legislation was identified in times of the Republic of Both Nations, the restoration of the state of Lithuania and of inter-war independent republic. Therefore, the Seimas resolution is the historical source of Lithuanian constitutional law. The concept of the Seimas resolution is enriched by its significance in March 1990, when the act of independence was adopted and published, as well as its direct provision in the constitution of 1992. This legal act addresses the relationship between the state authorities (distrust of government) and operational matters of the parliament itself (pre-term elections). The Seimas resolution is not an ordinary by-law. Having analysed more than twenty years of Lithuanian parliamentary experiences, the resolution should rather be considered as the primary means of expression of the political will of the Seimas. Depending on the importance of the issue, the will could be derived from the constitution itself and its principles, as well as from the representation of people's sovereignty. One of the most important areas of implementation of the Seimas resolution is the parliamentary oversight. By adopting respective resolutions, the Seimas may require reports from the accountable state authorities; it also may assess their performance or assign them various tasks. Some very important seimas resolutions (for example on elections results or impeachment petition to the constitutional court) could be voted with simple majority of participating members of seimas.