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Sex, Love, and Gender is the first volume to present a comprehensive philosophical theory that brings together all of Kant's practical philosophy - found across his works on ethics, justice, anthropology, history, and religion - and provide a critique of emotionally healthy and morally permissible sexual, loving, gendered being. By rethinking Kant's work on human nature and making space for sex, love, and gender within his moral accounts offreedom, the book shows how, despite his austere and even anti-sex, cisist, sexist, and heterosexist reputation, Kant's writings on happiness and virtue (Part I) and right (Part II) in fact yield fertile philosophical ground on which we can explore specific contemporary issues such as abortion, sexual orientation, sexual orgendered identity, marriage, trade in sexual services, and sex- or gender-based oppression. Indeed, Kant's philosophy provides us with resources to appreciate and value the diversity of human ways of loving and the existential importance of our embodied, social selves. Structured on a thematic basis, with introductions to assist those new to Kant's philosophy, this book will be a valuable resource for anyone who cares about these issues and wants to make sense of them

Helga Varden rethinks Kant's work on human nature to make space for sex, love, and gender within his moral account of freedom. She shows how Kant's philosophy provides us with resources to appreciate and value the diversity of human ways of loving and the existential importance of our embodied, social selves.

At the heart of Kant's legal-political philosophy lies a liberal, republican ideal of justice understood in terms of private independence (non-domination) and subjection to public laws securing freedom for all citizens as equals. Given this basic commitment of Kant's, it is puzzling to many that he does not consider democracy a minimal condition on a legitimate state. In addition, many find Kant ideas of reform or improvement of the historical states we have inherited vague and confusing. The aim of this paper is to untangle both puzzles by exploring Kant's idea of self-governance. I argue that Kant's idea of self-governance gives us a very good starting point for thinking about how to leave room for a variety of political systems—different ideals—that have grown out of and responding to different contingent historical and cultural circumstances. It also helps us id entify those areas where we want to take extra care to build in safeguards to secure stability and to take sufficiently seriously humankind's truly nasty sides. Autogovernança e Reforma no Republicanismo Liberal de Kant - Teoria Ideal e Não-Ideal na Doutrina do Direito em Kant No centro da filosofia jurídico-política de Kant está um ideal liberal, republicano de justiça compreendido em termos de independência privada (não-dominação) e sujeição às leis públicas que garantem a liberdade para todos os cidadãos como iguais. Dado este compromisso básico de Kant, é intrigante para muitos que ele não considere a democracia uma condição mínima para um Estado legítimo. Além disso, muitos consideram as idéias de Kant quanto à reforma ou melhoria dos estados históricos que herdamos, vagas e confusas. O objetivo deste artigo é desembaraçar os dois quebra-cabeças explorando a ideia de auto-governança de Kant. Eu argumento que a ideia de auto-governança de Kant nos dá um bom ponto de partida para pensar em como deixar espaço para uma variedade de sistemas políticos — diferentes ideais — que cresceram e responderam a diferentes contingências históricas e circunstâncias culturais. Também nos ajuda a identificar as áreas em que queremos ter um cuidado extra para construir salvaguardas para garantir a estabilidade segura e para levar suficientemente a sério os lados verdadeiramente desagradáveis da humanidade.

AbstractI start this article by addressing Kant's question why rightful interactions require both domestic public authorities (or states) and a global public authority? Of central importance are two issues: first, the identification of problems insoluble without public authorities, and second, why a domestic public monopoly on coercion can be rightfully established and maintained by coercive means while a global public monopoly on coercion cannot be established once and for all. In the second part of the article, I address the nature of the institutional structure of individual states and of the global authority. Crucial here, I argue, is Kant's distinction between private and public right. Private right concerns rightful relations between individual legal subjects, where public right concerns legal subjects' claims on their public institutions. I propose that the distinction between private and public right should be central to liberal critiques of current legal and political developments in the global sphere.