Suchergebnisse

<p>Revisa las causas que han determinado, en el largo plazo, la permanencia del sistema de partidos políticos en Uruguay. Advierte, contra una explicación tautológica de esta característica, que solo se repite en muy pocos países de América Latina. La centralidad del sistema de partidos debe ser atendida no como rasgo intrínseco, sino como capacidad de respuesta y de cambio ante los eventos históricos del país.</p>

<p>A partir de la crítica a enfoques que privilegian las explicaciones economistas o sociologuitas del tipo de las de O'Donnell, propone un ejercicio de construcción de una tipología, basada en conceptos políticos básicos como la definición del tipo de autoridad política existente y los actores estatales dominantes en el sistema.</p>

The government of Indonesia has set ambitious goals for development, envisioning high, inclusive and sustainable growth over the coming years. Indonesia has the resource endowments and the potential to attain these goals. To turn this potential into reality, the private sector needs to increase investment and productivity to become a growth-engine for quality jobs to meet the needs of a rapidly increasing labor force. This note argues that maintaining and deepening Indonesia s integration into the global marketplace will facilitate this process. Policies that encourage greater integration into the world economy are no substitute, however, for a broader development strategy that takes into account, on one hand, that public support may be needed to improve the general business climate and quality of human capital, particularly logistics services, and on the other, that there remains room for corrective action to compensate groups that may be negatively impacted in the process of integration into the world economy.

This paper examines the patterns of growth of Poland, and its transition into high-income status over the past two decades from a macro and micro perspective. It benchmarks Polish performance with that observed in established high-income countries, and with that of others that have been trapped in middle--income levels and examines the role that integration into the EU had on growth. The analysis reveals, first, that Poland's growth process has been accompanied by a process of diversification of assets, including institutions, physical and human capital. Second, that the progressive integration into the EU bloc boosted growth and productivity because of three keyfactors: (i) increased openness to trade, investment and talent, (ii) increased domestic competition, and regulatory harmonization with EU, (iii) increased certainty in reforms, through a commitment to EU-institutions. Third, that for full convergence to high-income levels, Polish firms need to increase their innovative capacities. The paper extracts lessons applicable to other economies trapped in middle-income levels, as well as to Poland itself to consolidate growth looking forward.

Evidence suggests that Pakistan has the potential for much faster and more diversified economic growth. Energizing trade can help Pakistan to realize its growth potential. Pakistan's inward-oriented trade policies have had the effect of stalling Pakistan's integration into regional and global value chains (GVCs). Pakistan's failure to reform its trade policy to better foster export competitiveness can be attributed in part to institutional fragmentation within the government. This fragmentation has resulted in different agencies sometimes working at cross purposes. Efforts to reduce tariffs have been offset by the introduction of alternative protection instruments such as regulatory duties (RDs) and firm-specific special regulatory orders (SROs). In addition to tariffs, RDs and SROs, other obstacles to global integration include a heavy regulatory burden and perceived risks to investing and operating in the country, which have hurt efforts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Growth and competitiveness are also inhibited by inefficient trade facilitation policies, weak logistics services, and underdeveloped infrastructure. These constraints have made it difficult for Pakistan to fully exploit its proximity to China, a trade powerhouse, with which it has a free trade agreement. All in all, the anti-export bias of Pakistan's trade policy has made it more difficult for outward-looking firms to grow by accessing global markets. A series of actions in the areas of trade policy, trade facilitation and connectivity, and institutional coordination could potentially stimulate Pakistan's growth through increased trade and investment competitiveness. Integration with other countries in the region and neighboring regions, particularly East Asia, will allow Pakistan to diversify both its product basket and markets. Finally, full normalization of trade relations with India would allow Pakistan to benefit from India's fast growth and promote complementarities, including valuechain activities and investment potential.

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have spread rapidly around the world since the 1990s. In the Americas, the proliferation of trade agreements with countries from within and beyond the region have resulted in a "spaghetti bowl" of overlapping rules and regulations, some of which address behind-the-border issues such as investment, competition, labor, and environmental standards. Earlier research has linked trade agreements to increased foreign investment inflows. This article argues instead that the effects of PTAs on FDI depend on the domestic institutional capacities of member countries. Domestic institutions condition the benefits and effectiveness of PTAs by influencing governments' external credibility as well as their ability to implement the agreements they sign. The empirical findings show that weak state capacity exacerbates the spaghetti-bowl effects of multiple, overlapping agreements. Moreover, it is not the quantity but the quality, and more specifically, the depth of trade agreements that matters for attracting FDI.

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have spread rapidly around the world since the 1990s. In the Americas, the proliferation of trade agreements with countries from within and beyond the region have resulted in a "spaghetti bowl" of overlapping rules and regulations, some of which address behind-the-border issues such as investment, competition, labor, and environmental standards. Earlier research has linked trade agreements to increased foreign investment inflows. This article argues instead that the effects of PTAs on FDI depend on the domestic institutional capacities of member countries. Domestic institutions condition the benefits and effectiveness of PTAs by influencing governments' external credibility as well as their ability to implement the agreements they sign. The empirical findings show that weak state capacity exacerbates the spaghetti-bowl effects of multiple, overlapping agreements. Moreover, it is not the quantity but the quality, and more specifically, the depth of trade agreements that matters for attracting FDI. ResumenLos acuerdos de libre comercio se han propagado rápidamente por el mundo a partir de los años noventa. En las Américas, la proliferación de acuerdos comerciales con países dentro y fuera de la región ha resultado en un 'spaghetti bowl' de reglas y regulaciones paralelas y que se superponen. En este trabajo, argumentamos que el efecto de los acuerdos preferenciales de comercio (APC) sobre la IED depende de la calidad de las instituciones nacionales en los países miembros. Las instituciones políticas de cada país miembro afectan la credibilidad externa, así también como su capacidad para implementar los acuerdos que firman, de esa forma condicionando los beneficios y la efectividad de los APC. De acuerdo con nuestro análisis empírico, la baja capacidad estatal exacerba efectos negativos del 'spaghetti bowl' comercial. Además, la calidad (o profundidad) de los APC importa más que la cantidad. Los acuerdos comerciales profundos, que abarcan temas y regulaciones domésticos, tienden a atraer mayores flujos de IED que los acuerdos superficiales.

How do international economic agreements influence the investment patterns of firms from emerging economies? This paper studies the ways in which bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements interact with geographic and cultural distance to influence firms' investment patterns. How does geographic and cultural proximity affect the impact of international economic agreements on foreign direct investment flows? This question is answered using data from an original survey of 700 firms from four emerging (or newly-emerged) economies: Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa. The findings suggest that bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements increase the likelihood of foreign direct investment. Yet, the effects of these agreements on foreign direct investment depend on the distance between the origin and potential destination countries. Moreover, trade and investment agreements appear to interact differently with distance. By providing guarantees to investors and signaling credible commitment from host governments, bilateral investment treaties mitigate the higher uncertainty and transaction costs associated with investing in faraway, unfamiliar markets. By contrast, the investment attraction effectiveness of preferential trade agreements fades with distance.

In 2010 or 2011, Nepal set up a cash incentive scheme for exporters aimed at reducing its trade deficit and vulnerability to external shocks, by promoting export growth and diversification for its firms. The Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice has been partnering with the Government of Nepal to assess the impact of the cash incentive program on export growth and diversification. This note presents the main results of the analysis. Making the support to firms' internationalization a policy priority is commendable Countries around the world, and many countries in the South Asia region have incentives in place to help firms become exporters and succeed in diversifying their export markets.But not all interventions designed to support firms' internationalization work, so, evaluating impact is crucial.Some of the planned changes in the scheme introduced in 2013 revealed public-private dialogue. However, many of these changes have not been fully implemented. The fast-track system introduced in 2013, and by which, firms exporting priority products would not need to certify domestic value addition reflect the systematic feedback of the private sector on the complexity of proving value added content.At the firm level there is no evidence showing a clear link between the effective incentive rates received and export performance, or the changes in the export incentive scheme and performance. The main policy conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the current incentive scheme needs to be revised. The rest of the note is structured as follows. Section two discusses aspects of the design of the allocation mechanism of the incentive. Section three shows the impact of the incentive program from the aggregate level, at the product level and at the firm level.