Suchergebnisse

O Congresso Nacional aprecia atualmente um conjunto de propostas de reforma do setor publico, entre as quais uma reforma tributaria. Ainda que parcial, por deixar intocados pontos importantes que requerem mudancas, trata-se de um importante passo no sentido de aprimorar o sistema tributario. Este artigo discute a evolucao do sistema tributario brasileiro desde a primeira Constituicao republicana. Mostra-se que o processo de evolucao e, por natureza, lento. Discutem-se, ainda, o rumo do federalismo fiscal brasileiro e os objetivos desejaveis de futuras reformas tributarias no pais, bem como as dificuldades a serem enfrentadas para atingi-los. (Pesqui Planej Econ/DÜI)

A constituicao promulgada em 5 de outubro de 1988 deu inicio a uma reforma tributaria nos tres niveis de governo. Este artigo aborda as financas estaduais e municipais, deixando de lado aspectos como as questoes de justica fiscal e efeitos economicos dos impostos, e a dificil situacao em que se encontra o orcamento da uniao

This paper considers some facets of the recent Brazilian experience in fiscal decentralization. For this purpose, it describes the pattern of fiscal decentralization in Brazil and, subsequently, discusses some events of the nineties pertaining to fiscal relations in the federation. Historically, Brazilian experience with fiscal federalism has been marked by ups and downs in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Satisfactory conciliation between the need to ensure a reasonable degree of financial autonomy for subnational governments, on one hand, and the requirement of coordinating fiscal instruments in order to serve national interests, on the other, has not yet been attained. The analysis of events of the nineties does not reveal a consolidated model of federalism but a transition process characterized by attempts to correct the aftermath of both excessive centralization and immoderate decentralization experienced in sequence in the past. The paper concludes that preservation of fiscal decentralization may require the imposition of restrictions on the autonomy of subnational governments, this time for economic rather than for political reasons.

A partir de uma descricao dos Programas de Garantia de Renda Minima (PGRM), adotados em paises europeos e nos Estados Unidos, os autores discutem os formatos implementados no Brasil e propoem uma nova concepcao de PGRM. Alem de ter cobertura nacional, deve mobilizar as esferas federal, estadual e municipal, com participacao da federacao no seu financiamento diretamente proporcional ao numero de pobres na unidade local e inversamente proporcional a capacidade fiscal desta. Embora seja instrumento eficiente de redistribuicao de renda, o PGRM mostra-se incapaz de erradicar por si so a pobreza. Sua maior virtude e poder vir a ser um elemento de reestruturacao do conjunto das politicas sociais no pais. (Novos Estud CEBRAP/DÜI)

Fiscal competition is a desirable feature insofar as it promotes a better match between local policies and the preferences of residents, and creates an environment for experimentation of different policies, with the best outcomes surviving through a mechanism of natural selection. Furthermore, fiscal competition may prevent overexpansion of government activities. However, in a world where mobility of economic agents is high and growing, local jurisdictions ability to select and attract firms and individuals through the use of their tax structure and public spending has substantially increased. In such a setting, local governments (as well as states belonging to a federation or sovereign units forming an economic union) may engage in a competition to attract business investment or tax bases, giving rise to all sorts of economic distortions. Moreover, fiscal competition may considerably weaken the redistributive power of government actions. The basic challenge is, therefore, to avoid or reduce the undesirable effects of fiscal competition while preserving all or most of its benefits. Intergovernmental transfers and harmonization of taxation and of other fiscal policies are the most promising instruments to attain this goal.

This paper surveys the literature on fiscal competition. It considers tax and expenditure competition in a more general set up where different jurisdictions within a federation may compete in the provision of public goods in order to attract some residents and expel others addresses the vast literature on welfare gains or losses of these types of competition. Then, discusses the empirical evidence, focusing on estimates of the sensitiveness of production factors to tax differentials and on the importance of the strategic interdependence among jurisdictions. The authors combine econometric studies with some case studies. Last they discuss the design of mechanisms to cope with fiscal competition, especially under a more global environment where factors become more mobile. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)