Suchergebnisse

SINCE 1972, THE SHARE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE IN MOST INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES. IN AN INTERNATIONAL CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS, IT HAS A SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE SHARE OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN GDP. THE ACTORS WHO HAVE AN INTEREST I CENTRALIZATION ARE ANALYZED. THE DYNAMICS OF CENTRALIZATION ARE ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONSE ASYMMETRY AND TWO THRESHOLDS. 'POPITZ' LAW' OF THE ATTRACTION OF THE LARGER BUDGET IS TESTED WITH RESPECT TO THE EC COMMISSION: HIGH-RANKING POLITICIANS COME MAINLY FROM THE SMALLER MEMBER STATES. THE VOTERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION ARE ANALYZED IN A POOLED REGRESSION.

THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT GOVERNMENTS AIM AT 'THE PUBLIC INTEREST'. IT IS A NORMATIVE THEORY WHICH - WITHOUT MUCH QUESTIONING - IS ALSO APPLIED AS A POSITIVE THEORY: IT IS SUPPOSED TO JUSTIFY AND EXPLAIN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AT THE SAME TIME. IF SOME SPECIFICALLY POSITIVE ANALYSIS IS ADDED, IT USUALLY ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN WHY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IS LESS EXTENSIVE THAN APPEARS TO BE DESIRABLE. THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH DOES NOT DENY THAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MAY SOMETIMES BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. BUT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE A SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION OF SUCH INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FAILURES. THE CENTRAL THESIS OF THIS PAPER IS THAT THERE EXISTS A SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION FOR THESE FAILURES AND THAT IT MUST BE GROUNDED ON PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY. THE ANALYSIS DEALS WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND WITH THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENTS. BOTH ARE SUBSUMED UNDER THE HEADING OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. THE FIRST PART OF THE PAPER SUMMARIZES THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH AND DRAWS ATTENTION TO ITS LIMITATIONS AND ABUSES. IN THE SECOND PART, THE NEW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IS PRESENTED AND ITS THREE MAIN IMPLICATIONS ARE DERIVED AND CONFRONTED WITH THE EVIDENCE.