Suchergebnisse

"Since the 1960s onwards, the nature and the future of the European Union have been defined in legal terms. Yet, we are still in need of an explanation as to how this entanglement between Law and EU polity-building emerged and how it was maintained over time. While most of the literature offers a disembodied account of European legal integration, Brokering Europe reveals the multifaceted roles Euro-lawyers have played in EU polity, notably beyond the litigation arena. In particular, the book points at select transnational groups of multipositioned entrepreneurs that have elevated the role of law in all sorts of EU venues. In doing so, it draws from anew set of intellectual resources (field-theory) and empirical strategies only very recently mobilized for the study of the EU. Grounded on an extensive historical investigation, Brokering Europe provides a revised narrative of the 'constitutionalization of Europe'"

Scholars generally agree that 'independent' institutions such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and European Central Bank have created a space and role for themselves that has no equivalent in national political settings. However, we still lack a better understanding of the importance of this independent branch in the EU polity. This article contends that the central relevance of independence is connected to the historically rooted connection between 'independence' and 'international government' – a relationship the history of which can be traced back to the League of Nations' foundational period as the inaugural scene for the nexus between power and knowledge in international politics. Ultimately, this article questions the extent to which this specific grammar of international government has been constitutive of the EC polity in terms of valued modes of legitimacy and types of authority.

Calling into question the meaning of "independence" in contemporary central banking, the present article investigates the social origins and post-crisis persistence of the European Central Bank's (ECB) core macroeconomic model, despite broad acknowledgement of its failure to anticipate the financial crisis. We trace the making of the model; the process by which it became dominant in European central banking and beyond; criticism in the wake of its failure to predict the financial-cum-Eurozone crisis; and its persistence, nonetheless, in the crisis' aftermath. We argue that the formation, meanings, and persistence of the ECB's model cannot be understood as effects of the bank's independence or the model's intrinsic qualities. Rather, the model's trajectory is best understood in light of the ECB's transnationally embedded social location in international finance, professional economics, and European governing institutions. The necessity of calculating Europe, irrespective of the accuracy or predictive strength of the model being used, has less to do with the ECB's independence from domestic politics and more to do with its transnational embeddedness – or, stated differently, that the ECB is, in a sense, too embedded to fail.

Calling into question the meaning of "independence" in contemporary central banking, the present article investigates the social origins and post-crisis persistence of the European Central Bank's (ECB) core macroeconomic model, despite broad acknowledgement of its failure to anticipate the financial crisis. We trace the making of the model; the process by which it became dominant in European central banking and beyond; criticism in the wake of its failure to predict the financial-cum-Eurozone crisis; and its persistence, nonetheless, in the crisis' aftermath. We argue that the formation, meanings, and persistence of the ECB's model cannot be understood as effects of the bank's independence or the model's intrinsic qualities. Rather, the model's trajectory is best understood in light of the ECB's transnationally embedded social location in international finance, professional economics, and European governing institutions. The necessity of calculating Europe, irrespective of the accuracy or predictive strength of the model being used, has less to do with the ECB's independence from domestic politics and more to do with its transnational embeddedness - or, stated differently, that the ECB is, in a sense, too embedded to fail.