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Polarization in Hungary is one of the most severe cases in Europe. It is predominantly elite-driven, and determined mostly by the antagonistic confrontation between the parties. Left and Right blocs oppose each other in a struggle where the loser is completely denied any influence on policymaking. The two blocs endorse opposing views on socio-cultural policies, but this division emerged as a consequence of the rhetoric and coalitional choices of parties, more than from the societal divisions that they ostensibly represent. Moreover, while the perceived ideological distance between party blocs is wide, the actual programmatic differences in the parties' economic and social policy stances are modest. This article draws on a broad range of sources to describe the process of polarization in Hungary after the fall of communism. I discuss how a polarizing style of political competition can lead to a politically divided society and, over the long run, to democratic erosion.

Recent comparative electoral research shows that both ideological and competence voting are influenced by the degree of party system polarization. However, while the former association is uncontroversial, investigations on the latter have led to contradicting results. This study takes one step back, arguing that polarization rather affects how voters perceive party ideological positioning and competence. Building on literature linking elite polarization to mass partisanship, the study argues that party identification is a strong moderator of party evaluations in polarized elections. Hypotheses are tested with multilevel logit models on a pooled data set of European Election Studies from 1994 to 2009. Results show that partisans are more likely to view their preferred party as the most competent and ideologically close when the environment is polarized, while there is no such effect for non-partisans. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Political misinformation is becoming an increasingly central topic in both public and academic debate. The main normative concern is that the diffusion of false political news might lead to distorted perceptions of the social and political reality. Indeed, existing research largely focuses on the determinants of public misinformation and the spread of false news. However, the mere awareness of the diffusion of fake news might have important implications, by reducing the public trust in the information environment. This study aims at explaining the contextual variation in citizens' perceived exposure to false information and their concerns for the impact of false information on society and democracy. We focus on two properties of the context: party polarization, as a proxy for the degree of political conflict, and media accuracy. We provide empirical evidence for our claims using a mix of data from Eurobarometer, the European Election Studies, the European Media System Survey, and Freedom House. We find that polarization and media accuracy are not related to the citizens' self-assessed exposure to false information, but they are significantly associated with their concerns. We also find that citizens' perceived exposure to false news is better explained by the degree of media freedom in the country.

AbstractIn the last decade, political protest events have been rising in Western democracies. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the diffusion of conspiracy theories in political communication, a phenomenon that has captured the interest of scholars for its growing political relevance. However, while most research focuses on the reasons why citizens believe in conspiracies, studies looking at the political-behavioral implications of such beliefs, in particular their connection to political radicalism, have been more limited. In this paper, we investigate the association between people's belief in conspiracies and their propensity to endorse political violence or to legitimate radical political action. Building on pathway theories of radicalization, we argue that conspiracy theories provide narratives that might help people channel their feelings of resentment toward political targets, fueling radical attitudes. We provide some correlational evidence using survey data of US respondents collected on MTurk. We observe attitudes toward political violence using two multi-item batteries, one developed by us. Our results show that people who score higher on a scale of generic conspiracy belief are also more likely to endorse violent political actions.

In reaction to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook has restricted the access to its Application Programming Interface (API). This new policy has damaged the possibility for independent researchers to study relevant topics in political and social behavior. Yet, much of the public information that the researchers may be interested in is still available on Facebook, and can be still systematically collected through web scraping techniques. The goal of this article is twofold. First, we discuss some ethical and legal issues that researchers should consider as they plan their collection and possible publication of Facebook data. In particular, we discuss what kind of information can be ethically gathered about the users (public information), how published data should look like to comply with privacy regulations (like the GDPR), and what consequences violating Facebook's terms of service may entail for the researcher. Second, we present a scraping routine for public Facebook posts, and discuss some technical adjustments that can be performed for the data to be ethically and legally acceptable. The code employs screen scraping to collect the list of reactions to a Facebook public post, and performs a one-way cryptographic hash function on the users' identifiers to pseudonymize their personal information, while still keeping them traceable within the data. This article contributes to the debate around freedom of internet research and the ethical concerns that might arise by scraping data from the social web.