Why do stabilizations fail?
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 135-149
ISSN: 1748-7889
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In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 135-149
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: Open Economies Review, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 321-340
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This paper analyzes the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. By providing financial support that may allow the reduction of inflation without incurring politically unacceptable economic costs, the IMF can hasten stabilization. But, since support can also reduce the costs of inflation, it may instead delay it. Empirical results obtained for 10 countries that suffered from chronic inflation fail to support the hypothesis that IMF financial assistance accelerates stabilization. Rather, they indicate that other factors have a greater impact on the timing of stabilizations: greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization, while a higher level of inflation hastens it. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ...
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This paper is an empirical analysis of the likelihood of failure of inflation stabilization programs. Random effects logit models are estimated on a dataset of 39 programs implemented in 10 countries since the late 1950s, in order to determine which economic and political variables affect the probability of failure of stabilizations. Besides the well-known effects of real exchange rate appreciation, decreasing foreign reserves, budget deficits and slower GDP growth, I find that political instability, party fractionalization, undemocratic institutions, longer time in office and leftist incumbents increase the probability of failure of inflation stabilization plans. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ...
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This paper is an empirical analysis of the likelihood of failure of inflation stabilization programs. Logit models are estimated on a dataset of 39 programs implemented in 10 countries since the late 1950s, in order to determine which economic and political variables affect the probability of failure of stabilizations. Besides the well-known effects of real exchange rate appreciation, decreasing foreign reserves, budget deficits and slower GDP growth, I find that political instability, party fractionalization, less pluralism or democracy (greater autocracy), longer time in office and leftist incumbents also increase the probability of failure of inflation stabilization plans. ; Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) - Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação ...
BASE
This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations. ; Fundação para a Ciêencia e Tecnologia (FCT) - Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação ...
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In: Economics & politics, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 275-295
ISSN: 1468-0343
In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations result from coordination problems caused by collective choice‐making mechanisms. Although several previous studies have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the delays of stabilizations have previously been undertaken. This paper reports the results of such tests. The degree of fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation are identified as important determinants of the timing of inflation stabilizations.
In: Economics & politics, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 275-296
ISSN: 0954-1985
This essay deals with real convergence in the European Union (EU). Real convergence is here defined as convergence of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard. I examine whether there is empirical evidence of real convergence among EU countries or regions and if the current effort towards nominal convergence has slowed real convergence. The main findings are that there has been some real convergence at the country level, mainly before the mid- 1970s, but not much evidence of real convergence is found at the regional level. I also find that the convergence criteria set in the Treaty of Maastricht may have slowed real convergence in the European ...
BASE
In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations result from coordination problems caused by collective choice-making mechanisms. Although several previous studies have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the delays of stabilizations have previously been undertaken. This paper reports the results of such tests. The degree of fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation are identified as important determinants of the timing of inflation stabilizations. ...
BASE
This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of ...
BASE
The paper discusses the causes of failure of inflation stabilization plans. Following a description of stylized facts of inflation stabilization, a model of Balance of Payments crises is presented, highlighting some of the main factors leading to the collapse of stabilizations. Empirical results obtained when estimating a binary probit model over a panel of 34 stabilizations identify real exchange rate appreciation, lack of foreign reserves, and government budget deficits as the main causes of failure of inflation stabilization plans. This is consistent with the model presented in this paper, with the stylized facts of stabilizations, and with some of the models found in the literature. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - ...
BASE
In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations generally result from some sort of coordination problem caused by the mechanisms of making collective choices. Although several authors have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the timing of stabilizations have been undertaken. This is what I try to accomplish here with the use of a duration model. Empirical results identify the degree of fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation as important determinants of the timing of inflation ...
BASE
In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations generally result from some sort of coordination problem caused by the mechanisms of making collectivechoices. Although several authors have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the timing of stabilizations have been undertaken. This is what I try to accomplish here with the use of a duration model. Empirical results identify the degree of fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation as important determinants of the timing of inflation ...
BASE
In: European journal of political economy, Band 66, S. 101934
ISSN: 1873-5703