Suchergebnisse

This paper examines whether the European integration process, by transferring policy instruments to supra-national authorities, has affected voters' evaluations of governments' economic performance at elections. The analysis is implemented on a panel of 15 EU countries, from 1970 to 2011. Results suggest that before the Maastricht Treaty, citizens held incumbents responsible for GDP growth and for the evolution of inflation, particularly when measured relative to the EU average. After the Maastricht Treaty, there was a significant reduction in the impact of economic variables, especially inflation, on electoral outcomes. During the current economic crisis the capacity to control the budget deficit appears to be the main determinant of incumbents' vote shares. ; Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), COMPETE, ...

This paper examines if the European integration process, by transferring policy instruments to supra-national authorities, has affected voters' evaluations of governments' economic performance at electoral periods. The analysis is implemented on a panel of 15 EU countries, from 1970 to 2011. Results suggest that before the Maastricht Treaty, citizens held incumbents responsible for GDP growth, and for the evolution of inflation, particularly when measured relative to the EU average. After the Maastricht Treaty, only fiscal policy variables show up as statistically significant. The capacity to control the budget deficit appears as the main determinant of electoral results, especially during the current economic crisis. ; COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ...

The paper examines the determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities using a large and unexplored dataset covering all (278) mainland municipalities over fifteen years. Empirical results reveal that besides normative objectives, the national government also takes into account political motivations in the distribution of funds to municipalities. Grants increase during local election years, more funds are transferred to municipalities where the government party had higher percentages of votes, and where there are more swing voters. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) - PTCD/ECO/65711/2006 ...

Although the literature on the political economy of public finance is already quite extensive, most articles analyse the behaviour of central governments. Furthermore, studies about the Portuguese economy are scarce. The present article contributes for a better understanding of these phenomena by testing the influence of political factors on municipal expenditure decisions in Portugal. The dataset used in the empirical work has information for all mainland Portuguese municipalities from 1979 to 2000. The tests performed reveal that local politicians increase capital expenditures before elections, particularly on roads and streets construction. Results also indicate that when the mayor belongs to the party that dominates the municipal assembly capital expenditures are higher. Finally, no support was found for partisan effects on incumbents' investment expenditures choices. ; Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) - Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação ...

Working with a sample of 13 European nations from 1960 to 1997, this paper compares voters' and policymakers' attitudes towards unemployment and inflation. Empirical work on vote functions shows that inflation is the most important determinant of electoral results and unemployment is the least important. Reasons for the emergence of a neo-liberal consensus among European policymakers are discussed and empirically tested. The spread of these conservative ideas and the willingness to achieve a monetary union are suggested as possible explanations for why governments go unpunished for the increase and persistence of unemployment in ...

Working with a sample of 13 European nations from 1960 to 1997, this paper compares voters' and policymakers' attitudes towards unemployment and inflation. It is thought that policymakers' beliefs about the behavior of the economy play an important role in determining electoral results since they influence voters' perceptions of what macroeconomic policy can achieve and which objectives it should pursue. Empirical work on vote functions shows that inflation is the most important determinant of electoral results and unemployment is the least important. Reasons for the emergence of a neo-liberal consensus among European policymakers are discussed and empirically tested. The spread of these conservative ideas and the willingness to achieve a monetary union are suggested as possible explanations for why governments go unpunished for the increase and persistence of unemployment in ...

Working with a sample of 13 European nations from 1960 to 1997, this paper compares voters' and policymakers' attitudes towards unemployment and inflation. It is thought that policymakers' beliefs about the behavior of the economy play an important role in determining electoral results since they influence voters' perceptions of what macroeconomic policy can achieve and which objectives it should pursue. Empirical work on vote functions shows that inflation is the most important determinant of electoral results and unemployment is the least important. Reasons for the emergence of a neo-liberal consensus among European policymakers are discussed and empirically tested. The spread of these conservative ideas and the willingness to achieve a monetary union are suggested as possible explanations for why governments go unpunished for the increase and persistence of unemployment in ...

This paper tests the joint hypotheses that policymakers engage in fiscal policy opportunism and that voters respond by rewarding that opportunism with higher vote margins. Furthermore, it investigates the impact of fiscal illusion on the previous two dimensions. Empirical results, obtained with a sample of 68 countries from 1960 to 2006, reveal that opportunistic measures of expenditures and revenues generate larger winning margins for the incumbent and that the opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy instruments is larger when the current government is less likely to be reelected. Furthermore, fiscal illusion contributes to the entrenchment of incumbent policymakers in office and promotes opportunistic behaviour. ; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia ...

Intergovernmental transfers are susceptible to the tactical influence of the transfer-giving government notwithstanding the institution of a formula-based system under the control of an independent institutional body. This study explores the arrangement of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria, where the formula-based system under the control of a constitutionally recognised body is in place, using the data from the year 2007 to the year 2016. The general conclusion from this study does not support equity considerations but rather tactical manipulation in intergovernmental transfers. Results suggest that states with poor fiscal capacity, especially the rural and less developed states, receive lower transfers per capita, contrary to equity considerations. There is evidence that transfers to states under the control of opposition parties and term-limited governors are lower. Additionally, transfers are strategically increased to all states during election periods possibly for the federal government's political base enlargement and strengthening. ; This paper was financed by National Funds of the FCT — Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology within the project ...

This paper studies the impact of term limits on voter turnout, using the recent introduction of term limits at the local government level in Portugal as a natural experiment. Although instrumental, expressive, and information-based theories of voter participation imply effects of term limits on turnout, this is clearly an under-researched topic. Applying a difference-in-differences approach to data at both the municipal and parish levels, we find strong evidence that the introduction of term limits increased voter participation. Our results contrast with previous findings for California and demonstrate that more re search on this topic is clearly necessary. ; Compete 2020, Portugal 2020, Feder, FCT ...

This paper analyzes the effects of the introduction of term limits at the local government level, using the Portuguese case as a natural experiment. Term limits became binding in the 2013 municipal elections, forcing 52% of the incumbent mayors to step down. The effects of this institutional change are studied using a differences-in-differences approach, on a sample comprising all Portuguese municipalities, from 1998 to 2013, and detailed data on local finances and municipal and mayor characteristics. The results indicate some benefits of term limits, such as the mitigation of the opportunistic manipulation of local finances, which has been more prevalent among more experienced eligible mayors. ; Compete 2020 ; Portugal 2020 ; FEDER: FCT ; This work was carried out within the funding with COMPETE reference nº POCI-01-0145-FEDER-006683 (UID/ECO/03182/2013), with the FCT/MEC's (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P.) financial support through national funding and by the ERDF through the Operational Programme on "Competitiveness and Internationalization – COMPETE 2020 under the PT2020 Partnership ...